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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to provide the Commission with the information necessary for the assessment 
of the economic, social, and environmental impacts of a possible extension of the scope of the EU product 
safety legislation (ATEX Directive 2014/34/EU, Pressure Equipment Directive 2014/68/EU and Machinery 
Directive 2006/42/EC) with respect to equipment intended for the use in the offshore oil and gas industry. 
Whereas equipment on fixed units is in the scope of these three Directives, mobile offshore units and 
equipment installed on them are currently in general excluded. In addition the Pressure Equipment 
Directive excludes also well-control equipment. The study investigates whether there are safety issues 
which could be addressed by extending the scope of the Directives and what would be the impacts of such 
an extension. 
Title Study on the impacts of possible amendments to the ATEX, the Machinery, and the Pressure 
Equipment Directive with respect to equipment intended for use in the offshore oil and gas industry 
• EU product safety Directives (ATEX Directive 2014/34/EU; the Pressure Equipment Directive
2014/68/EU; and the Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC).
• Overview of the structure of the MODU market, forecasts up to 2023 and the major market
drivers and restraints.
• Several stakeholders have participated in the present study: manufacturers of equipment,
drilling contractors, Oil and Gas companies, drilling operators, Public Authorities, Certification
Bodies.
• An online survey and personal interviews/meetings with the stakeholders have been organised.
• Economic and social impact study of the possible extension of the EU product safety Directives
to cover oil and gas equipment specifically designed for MODUs and of the extension of the
Pressure Equipment Directive to cover well-control equipment.
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Executive summary 
Following the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico in 
2010, the Offshore Safety Directive 2013/30/EU (OSD)1 was adopted in the European 
Union. This Directive applies to both fixed and mobile offshore units and is the main 
mechanism for ensuring that the safety and the environmental protection are fully 
regulated in the Union waters.  
Mobile offshore units2 are considered as seagoing vessels and their safety is subject to 
rules in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) (see the Code for the 
Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (2009 MODU Code3)). 
However, according to point 6 of the preamble of the 2009 MODU Code, “the Code does 
not include requirements for the drilling of subsea wells or the procedures for their 
control”, being such drilling operations subject to control by the coastal State (although 
a harmonised approach at EU level does not exist at the moment). 
Contrarily to fixed units (both offshore and onshore), mobile offshore units, and the 
equipment installed on them, are currently excluded from the EU Product Safety 
Directives, namely the Machinery Directive (MD)4, the Pressure Equipment Directive 
(PED) 5  and the ATEX Directive 6 . This exclusion has however exceptions to be 
considered. For example:  
• Floating units intended for production, and the machinery/equipment on-board 
such units are not excluded from the scope of these EU Product Safety Directives 
since these are intended to be located on the oil field for the long term and hence 
considered as fixed units;  
• Machinery which may be installed on both fixed and mobile offshore units is also 
subject to the MD (guidelines to the application of the MD); 
• The exclusion under the PED similarly only applies to “equipment specifically 
intended for installation on-board mobile offshore units or for the propulsion 
thereof”.  However, equipment intended for installation on both mobile and fixed 
offshore units falls within the scope of the PED. 
As mobile offshore units can be used, among other, for drilling or production, it follows 
that equipment intended to be installed specifically on drilling units are excluded from 
the scope of the three Product Safety Directives. Consequently, this study will focus on 
mobile offshore drilling units (MODU) and their possible inclusion in the Product Safety 
                                           
1 Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on safety of offshore oil 
and gas operations and amending Directive 2004/35/EC; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013L0030&from=EN  
2 The guidelines to the application of the Machinery Directive (MD) and the Pressure Equipment Directive 
(PED) define a mobile offshore unit as “a unit that is not intended to be located on the oil field permanently 
or for the long term, but is designed to be moved from location to location, whether or not is has a means of 
propulsion or of lowering legs to the sea floor”. 
3 IMO MODU Code; IMO Resolution A.1023(26)-Adopted on 2 December 2009 
http://www.techstreet.com/products/1787107 
4 Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006L0042&from=EN  
5 Pressure Equipment Directive (97/23/EC); http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:01997L0023-20130101&from=EN ; Pressure Equipment Directive 2014/68/EU; 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0068&qid=1436865661883&from=EN  
6 ATEX Directive 94/9/EC ; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:01994L0009-
20130101&from=EN , ATEX Directive 2014/34/EU; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0034&from=EN  
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Directives. Anyway, whichever extension of the scope of the legislation cannot be 
retroactive and it would only apply to new equipment. 
Additionally, well-control equipment used in the petroleum, gas or geothermal 
exploration and extraction industry and in underground storage which is intended to 
contain and/or control well pressure is also specifically excluded from the scope of the 
PED. The report also studies the possible inclusion of well-control equipment in the 
PED. 
The study aims at providing the European Commission with the information necessary 
for the assessment of the impacts of an extension of the Product Safety Directives to 
MODUs and of the PED to well-control equipment.  
Therefore, a comprehensive desk research on markets, legislation, and equipment on-
board MODUs and fixed facilities (offshore and onshore) has been carried out.  
Additionally, an on-line survey “European Commission Survey on Offshore Oil & Gas 
Equipment 2015 – Cost of compliance with EU product safety legislation” was 
conducted by the JRC to collect more detailed information and data from various 
stakeholders groups, namely owners, operators, manufacturers, public authorities and 
certification bodies. In parallel to the on-line survey, one drilling company and one 
manufacturer were interviewed. Heterogeneous views exist among the various 
stakeholder groups and these are, in our view, attributable to conflicts of interest and, 
in some cases, to an improper comprehension of the EU Product Safety Directives.  
A statistical analysis of past accidental events between 1970 and mid-2013 occurred on 
MODUs showed that it is not possible to state whether there is a safety issue related to 
the current exclusion of MODUs from the Product Safety Directives but, because of the 
limitations in the dataset used, it is also not possible to exclude it. 
Different policy options regarding the possible extension of the Product Safety 
Directives and their socio-economic and environmental impacts have been presented 
and analysed in this report. 
In this respect, the report concludes that the extension of ATEX to cover MODUs would 
have only a small impact regarding electrical equipment, since the requirements for its 
protection against explosive atmospheres are very similar to these currently applied by 
the IMO MODU Code/IEC-Ex scheme. In our opinion there might be an increase of 
safety if mechanical equipment were covered by ATEX, because currently the IMO 
MODU Code only sets out some recommendations regarding its installation in 
hazardous zones. An extension of ATEX to cover MODUs would allow a common 
legislative framework for mobile and fixed units to exist with limited incremental costs 
for double certification.  
As the objectives of the MD are not covered by the IMO MODU Code, there is a gap in 
the safety of equipment, which could in principle be covered by extending the MD to oil 
and gas offshore equipment specifically designed to be installed on-board MODUs. In 
our opinion, the extension of scope of MD would most likely have positive impact on 
safety and environment, limited impact on costs for ship owners, no impact foreseen 
for SMEs and increased business for certification bodies. However, the option of 
extending MD to MODUs would require further investigation. This deeper analysis could 
go into further detail, clarifying, among other, whether certain equipment (e.g. 
compensators) can be treated as machinery.  
All oil and gas equipment under pressure, which is not classified as well-control and is 
not specifically designed or modified for use on MODUs, is currently under the scope of 
PED. A reasonable option could be the extension of scope of PED to cover such limited 
number of equipment under pressure specifically designed or modified for MODUs. In 
our opinion, this extension could be achieved with reasonable costs for certification 
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because of the limited set of equipment currently not covered by the PED. However, we 
suspect that the overall impact of this extension would be rather limited.  
An extension of the PED to cover well-control equipment, which is currently excluded 
from its scope, would be complicated to implement since the specific essential safety 
requirements for well-control equipment should be defined and included in the 
Directive. In other words, the possible extension would not just be limited to removing 
a paragraph from the list of excluded equipment. Moreover, the same extension, which 
would only cover hazards due to pressure, would not solve other important aspects 
linked to operability and reliability of the well-control equipment.  
In addition to discussing the extension of the Product Safety Directives individually, the 
report also describes qualitatively the impacts of extending them in combination and for 
specific sets of equipment. 
Throughout this study, we had to operate under certain constraints. The existence of a 
wide range of products in the offshore industry, the complex cost structure of the 
equipment, the limited response rates to the survey (in particular for manufacturers, 
notified bodies and standardization bodies) and the lack of quantitative data (cost of 
equipment, production figures, etc…), have made possible only a qualitative 
assessment of the impacts of the various policy options. 
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1. Introduction 
Following the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico on 
20th April 2010, the European Commission carried out a review of the adequacy of the 
provisions in force in the European Union to prevent similar accidents occurring in the 
European offshore oil and gas industry. 
On 12th October 2010 the Commission issued a Communication to the European 
Parliament and the Council entitled “Facing the challenge of the safety of offshore oil 
and gas activities” [COM(2010) 560 final] 7 . Section 2.1 of the Commission Staff 
Working Document [SEC(2010) 1193 final] 8  accompanying the aforementioned 
Communication notes that “EU [product safety] legislation excludes from its scope 
mobile offshore units and equipment installed thereon”. It also states that “some of the 
EU and EEA Coastal States consider that it would be useful to apply EU legislation to 
equipment installed and used on mobile offshore units”. Moreover, the Pressure 
Equipment Directive9 (PED) also excludes well-control equipment from its scope. 
Later on, in 2011, the European Commission launched a legislative proposal which 
resulted in the Offshore Safety Directive 2013/30/EU 10  (OSD) with the purpose of 
facilitating an increased protection of the marine environment and coastal economies 
against pollution, establishing minimum conditions for safe offshore exploration and 
exploitation of oil and gas to limit possible disruptions to the European Union 
indigenous energy production, and finally to improving the response mechanisms in 
case of accidents. Both fixed and mobile offshore units fall within the scope of the OSD. 
Mobile offshore units11 are considered as seagoing vessels and their safety is subject to 
rules in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Code for the Construction and 
Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (IMO MODU Code12). However, the IMO 
MODU Code does not cover drilling operations which are now covered by legislation of 
Member States (a harmonised approach at EU level does not exist at the moment).  
Contrarily to fixed units (both offshore and onshore), mobile offshore units and the 
equipment installed on it, are currently excluded from the EU Product Safety Directives, 
                                           
7 [COM(2010) 560 final]; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0560:FIN:EN:PDF 
8 [SEC(2010)1193 final]; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2010:1193:FIN:EN:PDF 
9 Pressure Equipment Directive (97/23/EC); http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:01997L0023-20130101&from=EN ; Pressure Equipment Directive 
(2014/68/EU); http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0068&qid=1436865661883&from=EN  
10 Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on safety of offshore oil 
and gas operations and amending Directive 2004/35/EC; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013L0030&from=EN  
11 The guidelines to the application of the Machinery Directive (MD) define a mobile offshore unit as “a unit 
that is not intended to be located on the oil field permanently or for the long term, but is designed to be 
moved from location to location, whether or not is has a means of propulsion or of lowering legs to the sea 
floor”. 
12 IMO MODU Code; IMO Resolution A.1023(26)-Adopted on 2 December 2009 
www.techstreet.com/products/1787107 
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namely the Machinery Directive (MD)13, the Pressure Equipment Directive (PED)14 and 
the ATEX Directive15.  
However, according to the guidelines to the application of the Machinery Directive, this 
exclusion has exceptions. Machinery which may be installed on both fixed and mobile 
offshore units is subject to the Machinery Directive. The exclusion under the Pressure 
Equipment Directive similarly only applies to equipment specifically intended for 
installation on-board or for the propulsion of the mobile offshore unit.  
Moreover, the guidelines to the MD and PED state that “floating units intended for 
production […], and the machinery installed on-board such units, are not excluded".  
As mobile offshore units can be used, among other, for drilling or production, it follows 
that equipment especially designed for mobile units and intended to be installed 
specifically on mobile drilling units is excluded from the three Product Safety Directives. 
Consequently, this study will focus on mobile offshore drilling units (MODU). 
Even though the Product Safety Directives are focussing on the safety and protection of 
health of persons, the Directives also contribute to the overall safety and the 
prevention of major accidents, as required by the Offshore Safety Directive. 
The purpose of this study is to provide the Commission with the information necessary 
for the assessment of the economic, social and environmental impacts of an extension 
of the scopes of ATEX, PED and MD to cover oil and gas equipment especially designed 
to be installed on MODUs as well as in well-control equipment which is currently 
excluded from the scope of PED. 
This report provides 1) an overview of the global and European offshore drilling market, 
2) a summary of the existing, rather articulated, legislation, 3) a description of the 
main categories of equipment on-board mobile and non-mobile units, 4) a comparative 
analysis of IMO MODU Code vs the Product Safety Directives, 5) an overview of the 
equipment specifically intended to be installed on-board MODUs  and of the equipment 
which may be typically installed on both fixed and mobile offshore  units. In addition to 
this, the report discusses the results from an on-line survey entitled “European 
Commission Survey on Offshore Oil & Gas Equipment 2015 – Cost of compliance with 
EU product safety legislation”, conducted by the JRC to collect more detailed 
information and data from the various stakeholders groups. In parallel to the on-line 
survey, twenty-eight other companies were approached but did not express their 
intention to participate in an interview. Finally, only one drilling company and one 
equipment manufacturer agreed for interviews. 
The report also includes a statistical analysis of offshore accidents and incidents which 
have occurred on MODUs since 1970. The analysis was conducted with the purpose of 
identifying – if possible – specific types of equipment, structural components, and 
systems which were more frequently involved in accidental situations. 
The evidence provided by the survey and the statistical analysis of offshore accidents 
allowed us to investigate whether a safety issue exists or not. If some safety case 
exists, a formal impact assessment would have to be conducted by the European 
Commission. The impact assessment is also supposed to find the way in which the EU 
Product Safety Directives (ATEX, MD, and PED) could help to solve the problem. In view 
                                           
13 Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006L0042&from=EN  
14 Pressure Equipment Directive (97/23/EC); http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:01997L0023-20130101&from=EN ; Pressure Equipment Directive 2014/68/EU; 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0068&qid=1436865661883&from=EN  
15 ATEX Directive 94/9/EC ; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:01994L0009-
20130101&from=EN , ATEX Directive 2014/34/EU; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0034&from=EN  
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of a possible Impact Assessment, a number of options for the extension of the 
legislation and its consequences have been presented and analysed in this report. 
This report is organized as follows: 
Section 2 introduces the offshore drilling rig market and shows an overview of the 
global MODU market, and specifically of the European MODU market. 
Section 3 describes typical and specific oil and gas equipment that is installed on-board 
MODUs and classifies it according to whether it can fall within each product safety 
Directive and whether is covered by the IMO MODU Code. 
Section 4 shows an overview of the existing international maritime legislation, 
specifically the IMO MODU code, and compares it with the Product Safety Directives. 
Section 5 is devoted to the well-control equipment. It explains the dual barrier system 
for well-control, the Well Barrier Elements (WBEs), the Blow-out Preventers (BOPs) and 
their control unit, and discusses the possible inclusion of the BOPs in the PED. 
Section 6 considers the on-line survey. It explains the methodology of data collection 
from the stakeholders, it includes the profile of the stakeholders who have participated 
in the survey and provides an overview of the results with a focus on the safety 
aspects. Details on the answers from different stakeholders are provided in Annexes B-
F. 
Section 7 includes the interviews carried out by the JRC with two leading companies in 
the MODU market. 
Section 8 illustrates a number of options for the extension of the legislation and a 
qualitative assessment of their potential consequences. 
Conclusions are given in Section 9. 
Finally, a set of annexes is provided: 
A. Product safety legislation – exclusions in ATEX, PED and MD and guidance 
B. Online survey: answers from Companies (equipment manufacturers) 
C. Online survey: answers from Companies (MODU owners/operators) 
D. Online survey: answers from Certification Bodies 
E. Online survey: answers from Public Authorities 
F. Online survey: answers from Other types of entities 
G. Leading companies in the MODU market 
H. List of the contacted stakeholders for a personal interview 
I. Statistical analysis of offshore accidents and incidents on MODUs since 1970 
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2. The MODU market 
The overall information on the market is relevant and it demonstrates the economic 
importance of the offshore sector. On the other hand, it has not been possible to find 
representative economic data about the equipment on-board MODUs and on the trade 
flows neither in reports nor via the survey. 
2.1. The MODU submarkets 
Over the last decade, the majority of wells drilled worldwide (around 3500 wells per 
year) were drilled using MODUs [1]. 
The offshore drilling MODU industry is composed of five markets (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Direction of cash flow through offshore MODU markets [1] 
1. In the contract drilling market, MODUs owned and operated by contractors are 
leased to Exploration and Production (E&P) firms on a day-rate basis to drill or 
service wells. Day-rates (i.e. contract costs of leasing per day) depend on a 
number of factors, such as type and age of MODU, length of contract, and area of 
deployment. Day-rates for MODUs can vary from an average of 60,000US$ per day 
for the older jack-ups to prices above 650,000US$ per day for the newest 
generation drill-ships. Longer contracts usually entail lower day-rates since they 
give rig managers planning security and increase a rig´s utilization rate. Utilization 
decreases with age as the MODUs will suffer more downtime due to necessary 
repairs and upgrades, or simply because their outdated technology is not in 
demand. The significant cost incurred through low utilization rates caused by 
transit and the continuous development of drilling technology make leasing MODUs 
the more prudent choice; 
2. The MODU new-build market uses shipyard labour and capital to convert steel and 
third-party equipment into rigs. Turnkey contracts are used for the construction 
and delivery of rigs. The construction market is dominated by manufacturers from 
South Korea, China and Singapore. The importance of the Asian manufacturers to 
the production of MODUs is in part due to the capability of their docks to produce 
ships on the scale of modern jack-ups, drill-ships and semi-submersibles and due 
to their mastery of the learning curve for the production of these complex vessels. 
The main drivers of the current building cycle are the old age of the global jack-up 
and semi-submersible fleet and the strong demand for deepwater units (advances 
in technology are allowing the drilling of wells in waters below 10,000 ft (3,048 m) 
and in more demanding high pressure and high temperature environments). The 
ascension of deepwater and ultra-deepwater floaters does not, however, mean that 
midwater and shallow water vessels are destined to go out of business. The 
demand for deepwater and ultra-deepwater vessels varies regionally, due to the 
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different water depths in which oil and gas are found around the world, with some 
regional markets focusing almost exclusively on deepwater and ultra-deepwater 
projects and others maintaining a strong focus on projects in shallower waters; 
3. The upgrade market is a ship repair market which both upgrades and maintains 
rigs. Upgrades to old rigs’ technology, steel and equipment are essential to ensure 
safe operations and sustain competitiveness and market value; 
4. In the second hand market-rigs are sold among and between contractors and other 
market participants. Rigs may be sold for use in the service market, converted to 
another use, or sold into the scrap market; 
5. In the scrap market, shipbreaking firms buy rigs on the second-hand market, either 
directly from contractors or via brokers. Equipment is removed and reused or sold 
as market conditions and demand permit. Following sale, dismantling occurs and 
the steel is sold for scrap to steel mills. The financial value of individual sales in the 
scrap market is low, and companies do not frequently report income from scrap 
sales leading to the smallest and least transparent of the five markets. 
MODUs transition through several distinct stages over their lifecycle (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Transitions among rig activity states [1] 
Active rigs are working under contract and are the only state in which a rig receives 
income. Active rigs may be drilling, waiting on location, or in transit or in a 
mobilization/demobilization status. Active rigs become inactive when their drilling 
contract expires. If a rig is to be idled for a short period of time, the rig is typically 
maintained in a prepared or ready-stacked state. Ready-stacked rigs are idle but 
available for immediate use with minor preparation. 
If MODU owners do not expect a rig to be utilized in the near term, the rig is cold-
stacked to reduce operating cost and support fleet day-rates. Cold-stacked units are 
stored in a wet dock and require capital and time to return to working condition. The 
upgrade and maintenance market is responsible for reactivating cold-stacked units, and 
frequently sold in the second-hand market. As a MODU ages, it will spend an increasing 
portion of its time cold-stacked. After being cold-stacked for several years, reactivation 
costs become prohibitive and a rig is labelled dead-stacked. Units may remain dead-
stacked for many years before being dismantled. 
2.2. Overview and forecast of the global MODU market 
Taking into account the drastic drop in the oil price and the fact that the current 
situation in the offshore segment is very difficult, with substantially reduced activity 
(stalled or terminated exploration and development projects, within the EU and 
worldwide, as they are no longer economic), rigs coming off hire or being stacked, 
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numerous layoffs and a strong focus on cost-efficient operations, the market analysis 
for the period 2013-2023 has to be considered with caution [2]16. 
Up until 2023, the MODU market is expected to be driven by the vast unexploited and 
undiscovered deepwater reserves; the technological advances in deepwater exploration 
and the enhanced oil recovery; and the strong oil demand due to the developing 
economies of Asia and Africa. The latest technological development, which allows 
drilling for oil and gas in waters below 3,000 m, has made production from mature and 
abandoned fields economical again, promoting a new era of offshore exploration and 
production activity. Until 2023 the majority of growth will come from the deep and 
ultra-deepwater segment. 
There have been numerous major discoveries in previously unexplored territories 
around the world. The bulk of them have been made in the golden triangle, traditional 
deepwater and ultra-deepwater areas, made up of the area between the Gulf of Mexico, 
offshore Brazil and the Gulf of Guinea. In these areas the deepwater industry has 
become an established market with excellent growth prospects. The Asia Pacific region 
also has significant deepwater reserves although regional disputes over territory are 
currently preventing the market from achieving its full potential. The Middle East and 
Europe have less potential in these areas than other regions. 
Regional differences in water depth determine the level of demand for the various types 
of MODUs, i.e. areas with vast quantities of oil in deep and ultra-deep waters show high 
demand for drill-ships and semi-submersibles, while the presence of jack ups is strong 
in areas with hydrocarbon reserves in shallow waters [2, 5]. In particular: 
o Jack-ups are the oldest and most widely used MODUs, and operate in shallow 
waters (≤550 ft~170 metres) and the vast majority of units operate in water 
depths between 200ft (~60 metres) and 400ft (~120 metres); 
o Semi-submersibles represent the second largest category of MODUs; today’s sixth-
generation units can drill at a depth of more than 10,000ft (~3,000 metres); 
o Drill-ships are the preferred type of MODU for deepwater (4,000 ft – 7,000 ft, i.e. 
~1,200 – 2100 metres) and ultra-deepwater(>7,000 ft; ~>2100 metres) drilling, 
due to their ability to operate in harsher and more isolated environments, as well 
as their capability for storage of production fluids. 
In Table 1 the worldwide contracted MODUs in 2015, the worldwide total rig fleet in 
2015, and the overall utilization rates is presented. Total MODUs fleet includes active, 
stacked and under construction MODUs. 
Table 1. Worldwide MODU fleet (December2015) [6] 
Type of MODU 
Contracted 
MODUs in 2015 
(Globally) 
Total MODUs 
fleet in 2015 
(Globally) 
Utilization rate 
(%) 
Jack-ups 327 643 50.9 
Semi-submersibles 116 208 55.8 
Drill-ships 88 168 52.4 
Other (tender rigs, drill-barges, inland 
barges, submersibles) 
52 164 31.7 
Total MODU fleet 583 1183 49.3 
                                           
16  The material contained in this section draws relevant information from the 2013 report “The Mobile 
Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) market 2013-2023” by Visiongain [2]. On the contrary, another two reports by 
Visiongain: “The Oil & Gas Drilling Technologies Market 2011-2021” [3] and “Deepwater & ultra-deepwater 
exploration and production (E&P) market forecast 2014-2024: Prospects for TOP Companies with seismic, 
drilling, subsea and FPS Technologies” [4] did not result such useful as the one specialized in MODUs. 
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Additionally 171 of the 263 offshore platform rigs (fixed platforms) are currently 
contracted, representing a utilization rate of 65%. 
On the other hand the main market restraints are related to: 
o the high operating costs for exploration, many semisubmersible and drill-ships 
costing upwards of 500,000US$ per day;  
o the tightening supply of drilling and production vessels due to the high demand 
of these vessels together with the few shipyards with the capability to produce 
them;  
o the legal disputes over sovereign territories in the Arctic Ocean and the South 
China Sea,  
o the difficult access to financing; and  
o the lack of qualified professionals. 
Significant developments have occurred in the design of platforms and other units over 
the past 30 years, with increased use of floating and mobile units for production 
operations. These may also incorporate drilling equipment. This trend is likely to 
continue, especially when operation in deep water are involved. Such units are not just 
vessels, but serve as industrial process plants and workplaces with the associated 
major risks when working on location. Mobile offshore units (MOU) cover a lot of 
aspects depending on its specific role, such as drilling, accommodation (flotel), 
production, storage and offloading plus well intervention. Such units can be for floating 
production, storage and offloading (FPSOs), floating production, drilling, storage and 
offloading (FPDSOs) and floating production platforms (FPPs) based on semi-
submersible vessels. Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) is a sub category of the 
mobile offshore unit (MOU), and is not involved in production and storage. However, a 
MODU can also be used for production purposes. Its role will then change to cover 
production as well and it can be classified as MODPU - Mobile Offshore Drilling and 
Production Unit (used in a production mode for a time and then changed its designation 
to encompass this widened role).  
2.2.1 Description of the EU/EEA MODU market 
The North Sea, Barents Sea and the European territorial waters in the Mediterranean 
make up the European market. The majority of European hydrocarbon reserves are 
located in shallow waters and only a small part of the traditional UK and Norwegian 
exploration area, which accounts for the vast majority of spending in the European 
market, has deepwater reserves. Deepwater and ultra-deepwater reserves are also 
located further north offshore the Orkney and Shetland Islands, off the Norwegian 
north coast and around the Faroe Islands. Country's with reserves in the Eastern 
Mediterranean are also increasingly optimistic about deepwater exploration, brought 
upon by exploration success offshore Israel, and are offering new blocks in the coming 
years .  
Therefore, it is estimated that the drill-ships market will become increasingly important 
due to the increase in deepwater drilling projects as companies seek to exploit the 
existing reserves in a region that offers very favourable working conditions with political 
stability, operational transparency and personnel and tech support. The challenge in the 
North Sea is related to the extremely harsh conditions, requiring more sophisticated 
and very specialized equipment. These harsh conditions will be a further growth 
incentive for the European market as it will become the primary source of demand for 
harsh environment units throughout all submarkets. Nevertheless, the midwater 
market will continue to be strong in Europe, and semi-submersibles and jack ups will 
maintain a high market share. 
The European MODU market was worth US$8,377 mln in 2013. Thanks to the 
increasing demand for expensive harsh environment MODUs, the European MODU 
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market will be worth $12,384 mln in 2018 and grow at a Compound Annual Growth 
Rate (CAGR) of 3.4% over the interval 2018-2023. The North Sea market will grow at a 
CAGR of 5.7% between 2013 and 2023 and will be worth $14,636 mln in 2023. With 
the current low prices of crude oil, this estimation can be taken with caution. 
The barriers to entry for the global MODU market are related to the fact that it is a very 
capital intensive market and to the great emphasis on companies' experience and 
reliability especially since the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The European market is 
among the most difficult markets for new companies to enter because the very 
stringent regulations with regard to the environment and safety have increased further 
as a consequence of the BP oil spill in 2010. 
The European MODU market drivers are the following: 
o Declining regional hydrocarbon supply: European hydrocarbon reserves have been 
declining for years and many countries in the region have become dependent on 
non-European states for their energy needs. Companies and governments are now 
looking to develop previously inaccessible reserves in the region; 
o Renewed interest in mature /marginal North Sea fields: The majority of fields in the 
North Sea have been under production for several decades. With technological 
improvement in enhanced oil recovery, companies are now becoming interested in 
developing fields that previously were considered to be economically unviable; 
o Barents Sea, Faroe Islands and Shetland Islands: In the last years significant 
discoveries have been made in the previously unexplored deepwater areas in the 
North Sea. An agreement reached in 2011 between Norway and Russia ended a 40 
year dispute and opened up more than 68,000 square miles to oil and gas 
exploration in the Barents Sea. The Faroe and Shetland Islands have also seen 
increasing drilling activity in deepwater over the past years while the Dromberg 
field offshore Ireland has been estimated to contain up to 1 billion barrels of oil. 
The main restraints of the European MODU market include: 
o Economic climate: The economic and financial conditions in the region make it 
difficult for many actors in the oil and gas industry to gain access to the capital 
needed in an industry where fleet additions are largely financed through debt; 
o Clean energy agenda: The governments of the EU/EAA area are working on 
ambitious policies to fortify the EU's energy security and to combat climate change. 
2.2.2 Description of the world MODU market 
The development, in terms of Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR), of the regional 
MODU markets throughout the period 2013-2023 has been estimated as follows [2]: 
South America (7.9%), North America (7.9%), Africa (9.5%), Europe (5.7%), Asia 
Pacific (8.9%), Middle East (4.0%) and Rest of the world (9.1%). 
On the other hand there will be very little overall change in the regional market share 
during the decade 2013-2023. The Middle Eastern and European markets will lose a 
small percentage of the market share due to the limited spending on drilling operations 
in deeper waters. The African market will gain market share due to the significant 
increase of the drilling activity on Africa's coasts. The markets in the golden triangle will 
remain the three dominant regional markets while the Asia Pacific market will take over 
Europe's position as the fourth largest regional market by 2023. 
The South American market 
The South American market, which includes all MODUs deployed for offshore drilling off 
the coast of the continents eastern and western shores as well as drilling in the 
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Caribbean Sea and Mexico, is primarily driven by Brazil's vast deepwater and ultra-
deepwater reserves in the Santos, Campos and Espirito Santo basins and Petrobras's 
pre-salt agenda. Petrobras impressive investment includes the construction of 38 
production vessels, 50 drilling rigs and 49 shuttle tankers and support vessels between 
2011 and 2020. The main reason for the barriers to entry in the Brazilian market is the 
national oil company of Brazil, Petrobras, and the country's regulations which currently 
demands that 65% of the equipment used in operations offshore Brazil be produced in 
the country. Smaller companies and companies without a strong footing in the Brazilian 
market will struggle to fulfil these requirements increasing the barriers to entry for the 
most important MODU market. 
Domestic oil production in Mexico has been declining in recent years and the national 
oil company Pemex is now looking to compensate for the loss in the daily production by 
increasing its exploration efforts in the Mexican part of the Gulf.  
The North American and the Gulf of Mexico markets 
The North American region includes vessels offshore Alaska, Eastern Canada, the US, 
and Cuba. Alaska will see growing investment in its offshore oil and gas industry as 
exploration drilling in the subarctic and arctic water in the region increases. 
In 2012 Cuba also started an offshore exploration program but so far has not 
encountered any major finds as three different companies, Repsol, PETRONAS and 
PDVSA, all drilled in different areas offshore Cuba.  
The Gulf of Mexico is expected to play a major role in the oil and gas industry over the 
coming years. The oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 has significantly increased 
barriers to entry in the North American market [2]. Safety and environmental 
regulations for offshore operations, and even more for deepwater and ultra-deepwater 
drilling, have been tightened drastically in the US part of the Gulf and Mexico is looking 
to implement similar regulations. 
The African market 
The African MODU market, that includes all drilling activity offshore Africa, will be 
driven by very strong offshore exploration and development activity. In West Africa, 
geology similar to pre-salt reserves in Brazil and recent pre-salt findings in Angola, 
have started a new wave of exploration with governments from Gambia to South Africa 
initiating drilling programs.  
On the east coast of Africa large gas findings in deepwater reserves offshore 
Mozambique and Tanzania have created a potentially very large new market for the 
MODU industry. Recently, in August 2015, Eni has made a world class supergiant gas 
discovery at its Zohr Prospect, in the deep waters of Egypt. The discovery well Zohr 1X 
NFW is located in the economic waters of Egypt’s Offshore Mediterranean, in 4,757 feet 
of water depth (~1,450 metres), in the Shorouk Block. According to the well and 
seismic information available, the discovery could hold a potential of 30 trillion cubic 
feet of lean gas in place (5.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent in place) covering an area 
of about 100 square kilometres. Zohr is the largest gas discovery ever made in Egypt 
and in the Mediterranean Sea and could become one of the world’s largest natural-gas 
findings.  
In North Africa the political instability caused by the Arab Spring stopped exploration 
efforts in several countries but despite this fact the area will also see a strong increase 
in demand for MODUs. In the period 2013-2023 deepwater drilling operations will take 
on an even greater market share as most projects in West and East Africa are in deeper 
waters.  
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Drill-ships and semi-submersibles will maintain a combined share of over 75% of the 
market, while jack-ups will have a market share of around 20%. The African MODU 
market is still very high risk in terms of exploration success rate, less so in the more 
explored areas of Angola and Nigeria, and all operators in the region try to keep capital 
expenditure as low as possible .  
The Asian Pacific market 
The main driver behind development in the Asia Pacific market, that includes the waters 
of China, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei, Papua New Guinea, Australia and 
New Zealand, is the large unexplored deepwater and ultra-deepwater territory in the 
area and the potential reserves that are to be found. While the region will see strong 
demand in shallow and midwater operations, the higher expenditure in deep and ultra-
deepwaters will account for the majority of growth in the market. In the coming years 
the market will see growth throughout the various submarkets as many areas are in 
the very early stages of development.  
China will be a driving force in developing deepwater and ultra-deepwater reserves in 
the region. Apart from the China's national oil companies several international oil 
companies are investing heavily in exploration and production operations as they look 
to bring oil and gas to the increasingly energy hungry Chinese market. In Malaysia, 
Indonesia and the Philippines, the sector will see strong investment as large areas of 
deeper water have not been explored and shallow and midwater operations are 
conducted largely by older MODUs which will be replaced over the coming years. A big 
obstacle to increased growth in the region is the legal dispute about the sovereign 
borders in the South China Sea which will prevent a large part of deepwater territory in 
the South China Sea from becoming available for exploration and production.  
In Australia production of LNG from reserves off its north-western coast has grown 
rapidly over the past years. The development of floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG) 
facilities will give an additional boost to the market as it will make deepwater gas 
exploration and production more profitable.  
A factor that makes entry to Asia Pacific market easy is the distance from other major 
deepwater markets as in the offshore sector transit times do matter. Because of that 
many companies only maintain a small part of their global fleet in the Asia Pacific 
region at any time, thereby reducing competition from major companies. 
The Eastern Mediterranean market 
Offshore activity in the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, The Gulf of Oman as well as offshore 
Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean makes up the Middle East market. The Persian Gulf, 
where a fleet of over 100 jack-ups operate in shallow waters, is the traditional offshore 
market of the Middle Eastern region and the one where most money is spent. In 
general these jack-ups are several decades old but despite low day-rates and increased 
downtime remain active due to the low technological drilling requirements in the area. 
Other countries that show similar dynamics are Oman, with reserves in the Gulf of 
Oman, and Yemen, whose offshore reserves are located in the Gulf of Aden and the Red 
Sea.  
The other market for MODUs in the region is located in the Eastern Mediterranean along 
the coast of Israel, Lebanon and Syria. Demand for semi-submersibles and drill-ships in 
the Middle East will be far lower than in other regional markets since only Israel has 
discovered proven reserves in deepwater areas.  
The low technological drilling requirements in the area allow companies to enter the 
market through acquisition of an older jack-up rig, or via the order of a modern jack-up 
and become instantly competitive. The fact that jack-ups are the region's main MODU 
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types, and are much cheaper than drill-ships and semi-submersibles, further simplifies 
the entry to the market. 
The rest of the world market 
The rest of the world market is defined as spending on drilling activities in the arctic, 
along the eastern Russian coast, in the Caspian Sea and in India, Myanmar and 
Bangladesh. The growth will mainly come from an increase in offshore drilling in South 
Asia and uptake of expensive drilling projects in Arctic waters. Increased demand for 
MODUs of all types will come as a result of offshore projects in the Arabian Sea and the 
Bay of Bengal where Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka are looking for oil and gas in 
previously unexplored areas. Drilling in the Arctic will be driven by the vast 
hydrocarbon potential in the region. Despite various obstacles to explore the Artic, the 
harsh environmental conditions, the lack of existing infrastructure, the long lead times 
and the strict regulations, many companies are investing heavily in the region. 
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3. Inventory of the equipment on-board MODUs
3.1. Typical Oil and Gas equipment 
According to the EU Product Safety Directives, equipment which may be typically 
installed on both fixed and mobile offshore units is already covered by the PED and the 
MD but not by the ATEX Directive17. 
Besides, well-control equipment used in the petroleum, gas or geothermal exploration 
and extraction industry and in underground storage which is intended to contain and/or 
control well pressure is also specifically excluded from the scope of the PED. Thus, well-
control equipment installed on-board mobile and fixed offshore units as well as that 
installed on onshore platforms is out of the scope of the PED.  
Since the variety of equipment is huge, it has been decided to focus on systems or 
groups of equipment rather than on individual devices. Six main categories have been 
identified by grouping certain equipment and considering its importance for the safety 
of the operations (Table 2 to Table 7): 
1. Drilling equipment
2. Well intervention equipment
3. Material handling equipment
4. Well-control equipment
5. Other pressure equipment, and
6. Electrical equipment.
For each system – or group of equipment – it is detailed whether it could be placed in 
an explosive atmosphere and thus could fall under the ATEX scope, whether it could be 
considered as “machinery” and therefore could potentially fall within the MD and 
whether it could be under pressure conditions and therefore could potentially fall within 
the PED. Finally, it is detailed whether the system is currently covered by the IMO 
MODU Code.  
The applicability of the ATEX/MD/PED Directives and the importance from the safety 
point of view is presented by colours, according to the following meaning: 
o Systems of high importance from the safety point of view and which
require further analysis
o Systems of lower importance from the safety point of view, in
comparison with the above explained ones, and which would be
worth analysing if the necessary resources were available
o Minor systems from the safety point of view that do not require
further analysis
17  MODUs and equipment installed on-board MODUs are currently out of scope of the Product Safety 
Directives (MD, PED, ATEX). However, this exclusion has exceptions. According to the guidelines to the 
application of the MD, machinery which may be installed on both fixed and mobile offshore units is subject to 
the MD, even if is installed on MODUs. Similarly, the exclusion under the PED only applies to equipment 
specifically intended to be installed on-board or for the propulsion of the mobile offshore units. 
Thus, in case of the MD and the PED, the impact of extending their scopes is therefore limited to the MODU 
itself as well as to the equipment specifically intended to be installed on-board or the propulsion thereof. On 
the other hand, the extension of the ATEX Directive would impact on the MODU and on the equipment on-
board, even if it is not specifically intended to be installed on-board MODUs. 
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Section 2.1.3 of the MODU Code specifies that “each MODU should be designed, 
constructed and maintained in compliance with the structural, mechanical and electrical 
requirements of a classification society” and goes on to further specify that such a 
classification society “has recognized and relevant competence and experience with 
offshore petroleum activities”.  
Classification societies are private institutions in the shipping industry which establish 
and maintain technical standards for the construction, operation and classification of 
ships and offshore structures. They also carry out regular surveys of ships in service to 
ensure compliance with these standards18. 
Today by the term "classification" it is understood whether a ship meets the relevant 
classification society’s rules or it does not. As a consequence it is either 'in' or 'out' of 
'class'19. 
There are twelve societies, all belonging to the International Association of 
Classification Societies (IACS). The primary societies are American Bureau of Shipping 
(ABS), Det Norske Veritas (DNV, Norwegian) and Lloyd’s Register of Shipping (Lloyd’s 
Registry, English). It is very rare to see a MODU that is not classified by one of the 
three primary societies, with ABS having most of the units20. 
When registering a vessel for international travel, one must choose a nation under the 
flag of which that vessel will sail. The term “flag of convenience” refers to registering a 
ship in a sovereign state different from that of the ship's owners. Ships registered 
under flags of convenience can often reduce operating costs or avoid the regulations of 
the owner's country. To do so, a vessel owner will find a nation with an open registry, 
or a nation that allows registration of vessels owned by foreign entities. A ship operates 
under the laws of its flag state, so vessel owners often register in other nations to take 
advantages of reduced regulation, lower administrative fees, and greater numbers of 
friendly ports21. 
In addition to performing surveys for ship owners, Classification Societies also offer 
their services to Governments to perform statutory surveys on ships registered under 
their flags on their behalf19. 
The connection between the international maritime regulations, developed by the IMO, 
and the classification rule requirements for a ship’s hull structure and essential 
engineering systems is codified in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS)22. 
A ship owner that is dissatisfied with class can change to a different one relatively 
easily. This has led to more competition between classes and a relaxation of standards. 
Thus, due to the loss of confidence of the shipping industry in the classification societies 
[7], the role of these and their rules have not been considered in the preparation of this 
report even though if it is integral to the application of the MODU Code. 
According to MODU owners, when the classification society rules are considered, many 
(though not all) of the “No” entries in in the column headed “Is it covered by IMO 
MODU Code?” in the below listed tables would be “Yes”.  
                                           
18 www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/hosanee_0910_ 
mauritius_PPT.pdf 
19 www.iacs.org.uk/document/public/explained/CLASS_KEY_ROLE.pdf 
20 www.iacs.org.uk/Explained/members.aspx 
21 https://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=31395 
22 http://maritime-connector.com 
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Table 2. Drilling equipment 
 Can be in 
explosive 
atmosphere 
and requires 
protection? 
Is it kind of 
machinery? 
Can be 
under 
pressure? 
Is it covered by IMO 
MODU Code? 
 
Hoisting, lifting, 
handling and rotary 
systems  
including Drawworks, 
Crown block, Travelling 
block, Drilling hook, Top 
drive / Drilling machine, 
Rotary table, Pipe handling 
machines, BOP crane, X-
mas tree crane, etc.* 
Yes Yes No No 
Cranes and lifting 
equipment used in oil and 
gas operation are not 
covered with the 
exception of the 
protection against 
explosive atmospheres 
(IEC) 
 
Derrick structure 
Derrick 
No Yes*** 
only for 
movable 
derrick 
structure**** 
No No; conditionally Yes 
The MODU Code (Chapter 
12, sections 12.2 and 
12.5) does address all 
lifting and hoisting 
equipment and drilling 
derricks. Specific 
reference to the rated 
capacity of each reeving 
in the derrick’s equipment 
provides clear evidence 
that concern is the 
operational safety of the 
lifting operation. 
 
Tensioning and motion 
compensating systems 
including Tensioners: 
Marine riser and surface 
BOP tensioners, 
Compensators: Drill string 
compensators, etc. 
Yes No  
but 
components of 
active 
compensator 
can be treated 
as machinery 
No No  
but it is protected against 
explosions (IEC) 
 
Mud circulating system See Table 5; Well-control equipment  
Cementing system  
including Cement pumps, 
etc. 
Yes No*** 
components of 
the systems 
can be treated 
as machinery 
Yes No  
but it is protected against 
explosions (IEC) 
 
String/Pipes  
Drill string, Casing, etc.** 
No No Yes No  
 
Marine riser 
No No Yes No  
 
*Wider and more detailed list could include: Drawworks (assembled machinery), drawworks (stand-alone 
winch), assembled cylinder operated hoisting systems, hydraulic cylinders (“rams”), travelling yoke, yoke 
sheaves, equalizers, dead line anchor, fastline wheel, deadline wheel, swivel, drilling line, drillers cabin, drill 
line / steel wire rope, cranes in derrick, etc. 
**Not included pipe handling systems with their components: Horizontal pipe handling machines, horizontal to 
vertical pipe handling machines, fingerboard, manipulator arms, tubular feeding machine, mousehole, etc. 
which are more suitable for Table 5. Material handling equipment 
***If parts are in scope of MD then the system would be as an assembly; the Report do not consider the 
assembly issue 
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****For non-movable derrick structure: There are too many equipment items to conclude with a single YES or 
NO. Derrick structure and its substructure is not machinery in itself. 
Table 3. Well intervention equipment 
 Can be in 
explosive 
atmosphere? 
Is it kind of 
machinery? 
Can be 
under 
pressure? 
Is it covered by IMO 
MODU Code? 
 
Wireline equipment No No Yes No  
Snubbing equipment No Yes Yes No  
Coiled tubing equipment No* Yes Yes No  
*Such equipment may also be in explosive zones. 
Table 4. Material handling equipment 
 Can be in 
explosive 
atmosphere? 
Is it kind of 
machinery? 
Can be 
under 
pressure? 
Is it covered by IMO MODU 
Code? 
 
Lifting appliances 
including Cranes, etc. 
Yes Yes No No* 
but it is protected against 
explosions (IEC) 
 
Lifting gear  
including Hooks, 
Swivels, etc. 
Yes Yes No No* 
but it is protected against 
explosions (IEC) 
 
*The MODU Code, Chapter 12, sections 12.2 and 12.5, does address all lifting and hoisting equipment and 
drilling derricks. Specific reference to the rated capacity of each reeving in the derrick’s equipment provides 
clear evidence that concern is the operational safety of the lifting operation. 
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Table 5. Well-control equipment 
 Can be in 
explosive 
atmosphere? 
Is it kind of 
machinery? 
Can be under 
pressure? 
Is it covered by 
IMO MODU Code? 
 
Mud circulating system 
including Mud pumps, Mixing 
units, Mud centrifuge, Mud 
cleaner, Mud-gas separator, 
Drilling pipes, Bit, Dampener, 
Degasser, Desilter, Valves, 
Conduits, etc. 
Yes No** 
Components of 
the system can 
be treated as 
machinery 
Yes*** 
 
No  
but it is protected 
against explosions 
(IEC) 
 
Blow-out preventer (BOP) 
with its control unit 
including BOP stacks, BOP 
control unit i.e. Koomey unit, 
etc.* 
Yes No** Yes No 
but it is protected 
against explosions 
(IEC). Some issues 
related to BOP, and 
explicitly during the 
emergency 
shutdown, are 
covered by IMO 
 
Well head  
including Christmas tree, 
Choke manifold… 
Yes No Yes No  
but it is protected 
against explosions 
(IEC) 
 
Packers No No Yes No  
Cementing system See Table 2; Drilling equipment  
String/Pipes See Table 2; Drilling equipment  
*Wider list could include also: BOP running/retrieving guiding system 
**Some parts of the whole BOP system can be treated as machinery (for example in the safety-critical 
equipment analysis) 
***Pumps are outside of the scope of PED, but the whole mud circulation system is necessary for well-control 
(pressure well-control). On the other hand, pumps can fall within the scope of the PED if the potential 
pressure hazard is sufficiently high compared with other hazards such as e.g. hazards created by moving 
machine parts (in the case of mud pumps, pressure hazards can be sufficiently high) 
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Table 6. Other pressure equipment 
 Can be in 
explosive 
atmosphere? 
Is it kind of 
machinery? 
Can be under 
pressure? 
Is it covered by IMO MODU 
Code? 
 
Separators and 
tanks  
including 
Separators, Fuel 
tanks, etc. 
Yes No  Yes No 
but it is protected against 
explosions (IEC)Tanks for fuel 
for the propulsion of MODU are 
covered by IMO 
 
Emergency shut-
down valves 
Yes No Yes No 
but it is protected against 
explosions (IEC) 
 
Air hoist Yes Yes Yes No  
but it is protected against 
explosions (IEC). 
Air hoists are lifting and 
hoisting equipment addressed 
by section 12.2 of the MODU 
Code but not if it is used for 
drilling or any other oil and 
gas operation. 
 
Gas lift 
equipment 
Yes No 
Components 
can be treated 
as machinery 
Yes No  
but it is protected against 
explosions (IEC) 
 
Pumps and 
compressors 
Yes Yes Yes No  
but it is protected against 
explosions (IEC). It is covered 
by IMO in the context of bilge 
drainage 
 
Downhole motor 
(Mud motor) 
No Yes Yes No  
Hydraulic jar No No Yes No  
Engines  
including Diesel 
engine 
Yes No 
A motor itself 
is not a 
product falling 
within the MD 
Yes No 
but it is protected against 
explosions (IEC). It is covered 
by IMO in the context of 
propulsion of MODU 
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Table 7. Electrical equipment 
 Can be in 
explosive 
atmosphere? 
Is it kind of 
machinery? 
Can be 
under 
pressure? 
Is it covered by IMO MODU Code?  
Underwater systems 
and appliances  
including Remote 
Operated Vehicles/ ROV 
No No  
for some of 
them Yes 
No No  
Electrical power 
systems  
including Emergency 
power supply system – 
generator, Emergency 
power distribution 
system, Emergency 
battery, etc. 
Yes* No No No; conditionally Yes 
but it is protected against 
explosions (IEC) 
It is covered by IMO in the context 
of safety and for the propulsion 
system of MODU; Chapter 5 of the 
MODU Code applies to all power 
installations on MODUs except to 
those used for oil and gas 
operations. 
 
Uninterruptible 
power system 
Yes* No No No; conditionally Yes  
but it is protected against 
explosions (IEC) 
Emergency power supply is 
addressed by the MODU code. An 
uninterruptible power supply is 
implicit to provision of power to 
certain systems, including BOPs. 
 
Field equipment  
including Public address 
flashing lights, Junction 
boxes, etc. 
Yes No No No  
but it is protected against 
explosions (IEC) 
It is covered by IMO in the context 
of safety of MODU 
 
Control systems  
including Control and 
instrumentation, 
Process control system, 
Safety and automation 
system, etc. 
Yes No No No 
but it is protected against 
explosions (IEC) 
It is covered by IMO in the context 
of navigation of MODU 
 
Trace heating circuits Yes No No No 
but it is protected against 
explosions (IEC) 
 
*It is not wise solution to have such devices in explosive atmosphere but it can happen 
Most pumps are excluded from the PED based on art. 2(j) however, the manufacturer 
has to demonstrate that this exclusion applies (pumps may fall within the scope of PED 
if its potential pressure hazard is high compared with other hazards).  
Currently the BOP is excluded from the scope of the PED based on art. 2(i) regardless 
of where it is located ((mobile / fixed offshore units or onshore units).  
Each piece of equipment on-board MODUs should be assessed about whether it falls 
within the scope of the Product Safety Directives taking into account their scope and 
exclusions.  
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For example, a generator as a single component does not fall within the scope of the 
MD, but the assembled generator with e.g. a combustion engine, is an assembly of 
machinery and, hence, falls under the MD. 
3.2. Specific Oil and Gas equipment installed on MODUs 
Equipment specifically intended to be installed on-board MODUs is currently not 
covered by any of the EU Product Safety Directives (ATEX Directive, MD and PED).  
For example, three types of specific equipment for MODUs which aim at overcoming 
movable effects caused by weather or other conditions, are described below: 
Marine riser system: It consists of riser pipe, riser tensioners and ancillaries. The 
riser pipe is connected to the top of subsea blow-out preventer (BOP), and is pulled up 
by the riser tensioner system on-board to keep vertical configuration. The riser pipe 
serves as a conduit for returning mud to the surface from the hole and as a guide for 
running drill stem and casing from the floater to the hole under the seafloor. A marine 
riser system is shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Marine riser system23 
o Motion compensating and tensioning system: Is a device to maintain constant 
weight on the bit during drilling operation in spite of oscillation of the floater due to 
wave motion. One of the devices is a bumper sub. The bumper sub is used as a 
component of a drill string, and is placed near the top of the drill collars. A mandrel 
composing an upper portion of the bumper sub slides in and out of a body of the 
bumper sub like a telescope in response to the heave of the rig, and this telescopic 
action of the bumper sub keeps the bit stable on the bottom-hole. The bumper sub 
is able to transmit the torque from the drill stem to the drill collar to rotate the bit. 
o Heave compensator: It is placed in the derrick. There are two types of heave 
compensator. One is a crown mounted heave compensator and the other is an in-
line compensator that is hung below the traveling block in the derrick. Both 
systems use either hydraulic or pneumatic cylinders that act as spring supporting 
the drill steam load, and allow the top of the drill stem to remain stationary, as the 
rig heaves up and down. 
                                           
23 Usage rights: Figure labeled for reuse 
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4. International Maritime Legislation, EU Product Safety 
Directives and applied Standards 
MODUs are subject to international maritime safety regulations, in particular the 2009 
IMO MODU Code (Resolution A.1023.(26)) which is correlated with the requirements of 
the Marine Equipment Directive 96/98/EC24 (MED).  
The purpose of the MED is “to enhance safety at sea and the prevention of marine 
pollution” and “to ensure the free movement of the above-mentioned equipment within 
the European Union, the European Economic Area (EEA), Iceland and Norway”. The 
MED applies to equipment installed on-board ships that are registered in the European 
Union, including Norway and Iceland. The equipment (as listed in Annex A to the MED) 
must meet specific international conventions, relevant IMO resolutions and circulars, 
and relevant international testing standards.  
The IMO MODU Code has been developed to provide an international standard for 
mobile offshore drilling units of new construction which will facilitate the 
international movement and operation of these units and ensure a level of 
safety for such units, and for personnel on-board, equivalent to that required by 
the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, as amended, 
and the Protocol of 1988 relating to the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966, 
for conventional ships engaged on international voyages. 
The present edition of the MODU Code (2009 edition, as amended), in consideration of 
the inclusion of classification society rules, addresses virtually all the structure, 
machinery and electrical systems of a MODU that can be included in the shipyard 
construction contract with exclusion of equipment intended to be used in oil and gas 
operations including, but not only limiting to drilling operation. The MODU Code has 
been amended twice since the 2009 edition was approved and is currently under 
revision, in consideration of the results of the Macondo incident investigations. The 
revision includes, inter alia, standards for electrical equipment in hazardous areas. 
Related to the IMO MODU CODE, it should be highlighted that: 
1. Throughout the development of the Code, it was recognized that it must be based 
upon sound design and engineering principles and experience gained from 
operating such units; it was further recognized that design technology of 
mobile offshore drilling units is not only a complex technology but is 
continually evolving and that the Code should not remain static but be re-
evaluated and revised as necessary. To this end the Organization will 
periodically review the Code, taking into account both experience and future 
development. 
2. Any existing unit which complies with the provisions of this Code should be 
considered eligible for issuance of a certificate in accordance with this Code. 
3. This Code is not intended to prohibit the use of an existing unit simply 
because its design, construction and equipment do not conform to this 
Code. Many existing mobile offshore drilling units have operated successfully and 
safely for extended periods of time and their operating history should be 
considered in evaluating their suitability to conduct international operations. 
4. The coastal State may permit any unit designed to a lower standard than 
that of the Code to engage in operations having taken account of the local 
conditions (e.g., meteorological and oceanographic). Any such unit should, 
however, comply with safety requirements which in the opinion of the coastal State 
are adequate for the intended operation and ensure the overall safety of the unit 
and the personnel on-board. 
                                           
24 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31996L0098&from=en 
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5. This Code does not include requirements for the drilling of subsea wells or 
the procedures for their control. Such drilling operations are subject to 
control by the coastal State. 
4.1. ATEX Directive vs IMO MODU Code  
This section provides a comparison between the requirements of the IMO MODU Code 
and the ATEX Directive concerning the protection of equipment against explosions and 
the marking of equipment. 
The ATEX Directive is a legal requirement within the EU, hence, the equipment intended 
to be used outside the EU legally does not have to be certified by ATEX. However, ATEX 
is often recognized for activities carried out outside the EU.  
About 80% of the equipment is certified according to both ATEX (to be placed in the 
most hazardous zones 0 and 1) and IEC25, this latter being accepted worldwide but not 
in Europe, as shown in Figure 4.  
In addition, other different worldwide certification schemes exist, such as INMETRO26 
(Brazil), HazLoc27 (the US), TIIS28 (Japan), UL29 (the US, Mexico, Middle East, etc.), 
CSA30  (Canada), and old GOST and new CUTR31 (Russia).  
 
Figure 4. Most common requirements in the world for the equipment intended to be installed in potentially 
explosive atmospheres32 
                                           
25 www.IEC.com; IEC is the IEC System for Certification to Standards Relating to Equipment for Use in 
Explosive Atmospheres. It uses quality assessment specifications that are based on International Standards 
prepared by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). 
26 National Institute of Metrology, Standardization and Industrial Quality (INMETRO), Brazil; 
www.inmetro.gov.br/english/accreditation/sobre_org_cert.asp 
27 Hazardous Location 
28 Technology Institution of Industrial Safety; www.tiis.or.jp 
29 UL Mark for the United States through accreditation by Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA); www.osha.gov, C-UL Mark for Canada through accreditation by the Standards Council of Canada 
(SCC) 
30 Canadian Standard Association (CSA); www.csagroup.org 
31 Russian Certification; www.gost-r.info/news-2013-03-07.php 
32 Copyright granted by NEMA Enclosures; www.nemaenclosures.com/ 
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Given that MODUs are designed to operate all around the world, the marking according 
to both ATEX and IEC could be beneficial.  
The IMO MODU Code refers to the series of standards IEC 60079 and IEC 61892, and in 
particular to the standards: 
• Series 60079: 60079-4, 60079-4A, 60079-10, 60079-12, 60079-13, 60079-14, 
60079-16, 60079-17, 60079-19, 60079-20, 60079-25, 60079-27, 60079-28, 
60079-29-1, 60079-29-2, 60079-30-1 and 60079-30-2. 
• Series 61892: 61892-1, 61892-2, 61892-3, 61892-4, 61892-5, 61892-6, 61892-7, 
61892-8. 
A number of small, but essential, differences have been observed between IMO MODU 
Code and ATEX Directive. In particular: 
1. The ATEX Directive considers categories of equipment (category 1, category 2 and 
category 3) and IMO MODU Code considers hazardous zones (zone 0, zone 1 and 
zone 2). There is a direct correlation between equipment categories and zones, 
namely category 1 corresponds to zone 0, category 2 corresponds to zone 1, and 
category 3 corresponds to zone 2. 
2. The ATEX Directive considers hazardous areas caused by gases and dusts while 
IMO MODU Code only considers hazardous areas caused by gases (since dusts are 
not generally encountered during offshore drilling operations). 
3. Contrarily to the IMO MODU Code, the ATEX Directive does not differentiate 
between electrical and machinery installations and it only considers “Equipment” 
and “Protective systems”. Thus, the comparison between IMO MODU Code and 
ATEX Directive related to the technical requirements (see the following points), has 
been made according to the Essential Health and Safety Requirements of the ATEX 
Directive and also according to some harmonised standards under ATEX (EN 1127-
1, EN 60079-0 and EN 13463-1). 
4. In the case of the electrical installations placed in zone 1, the IMO MODU Code 
allows some protection classes (oil immersion, pressurized enclosures and powder 
filling) that are not allowed according to the ATEX Directive. In the same way, the 
IMO MODU Code allows a type of protection (called ‘s’) especially approved by the 
Administration for electrical installations in hazardous zone 2. For every single case 
it should be studied if this special protection matches with a protection class 
allowed by the ATEX Directive. 
5. According to ATEX, mechanical equipment intended to be installed in potentially 
explosive atmospheres shall comply with the requirements of the harmonised 
standard EN 13463 (Non-electrical equipment to be installed in potentially 
explosive atmospheres). According to the standard EN 13463-1 (Non-electrical 
equipment to be installed in potentially explosive atmospheres - Part 1: Basic 
method and requirements), the following protection classes are used:  
• “f”: flow restricting enclosure 
• “d”: flameproof enclosure 
• “c”: constructional safety 
• “b”: control of ignition source 
• “p”: pressurised equipment 
• “k”: liquid immersion 
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On the contrary, the IMO MODU Code does not specify any protection class for 
mechanical equipment placed in hazardous zones, and only sets out the following 
recommendations: 
• Mechanical equipment should be limited to that necessary for operational 
purposes; 
• Mechanical equipment and machinery in hazardous areas should be so 
constructed and installed as to reduce the risk of ignition from sparking due to 
the formation of static electricity or friction between moving parts and from 
high temperatures of exposed parts due to exhausts or other emissions; 
• The installation of internal combustion machinery may be permitted in zone 1 
and zone 2 hazardous areas, provided that the Administration is satisfied that 
sufficient precautions have been taken against the risk of dangerous ignition; 
• The installation of fired equipment may be permitted in zone 2 hazardous 
areas, provided that the Administration is satisfied that sufficient precaution 
has been taken against the risk of dangerous ignition. 
4.2. IMO MODU Code vs Machinery Directive (MD) 
The IMO MODU Code “does not include requirements for the drilling of sub-sea wells or 
their procedures for their control.” Besides, the MD explicitly excludes seagoing vessels 
and mobile offshore units together with the equipment on-board such vessels or units. 
Contrarily to the MD, the IMO MODU Code does not have a clear definition of the term 
‘machinery’ and does not mention the term “assembly”. However, IMO MODU Code 
refers to marine and industrial machinery in point 4.1.1 “…The provisions apply to both 
marine and industrial machinery”.  
4.3. IMO MODU CODE vs Pressure Equipment Directive (PED) 
The scope and purpose of the IMO MODU Code and the PED are different. 
The PED applies to the design, manufacture and conformity assessment of pressure 
equipment and assemblies with a maximum allowable pressure greater than 0,5 bar. 
In the context of this study, the following equipment is excluded from the scope of the 
Directive: 
1. Well-control equipment used in the petroleum, gas or geothermal exploration and 
extraction industry and in underground storage, which is intended to contain 
and/or control well pressure. This comprises the wellhead (Christmas tree), the 
Blow-out Preventers (BOP), the piping manifolds and all their equipment upstream. 
2. Pipelines comprising piping or a system of piping designed for the conveyance of 
any fluid or substance to or from an installation (onshore or offshore) starting from 
and including the last isolation device located within the confines of the installation, 
including all the annexed equipment designed specifically for pipelines. This 
exclusion does not apply to standard pressure equipment such as may be found in 
pressure reduction stations or compression stations.  
3. Ships, rockets, aircraft and mobile off-shore units, as well as equipment specifically 
intended for installation on-board or the propulsion thereof; 
In general, the IMO MODU Code deals with maritime safety and practically treats all 
machinery and pressure devices from the point of view of the navigation and stability of 
the platform (ship), and through these principles, it also deals with the safety of the 
personnel on-board and with environmental issues.  
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The IMO MODU Code does not explicitly include requirements for the drilling of subsea 
wells or the procedures for their control, being such drilling operations subject to 
control by the coastal State.  
However, the Code considers BOPs as vital systems / essential services for safety in an 
emergency, and claims that the power available should be sufficient to supply all those 
essential services. It specifically claims “the emergency source of power should be 
capable for a period of 18 hours of closing the blow-out preventer and of disconnecting 
the unit from the well-head arrangement, if electrically controlled; unless they have an 
independent supply from an accumulator battery suitably located for use in an 
emergency and sufficient for the period of 18 h”. It also states that the blow-out 
preventer control system, among other essential facilities, should be operable after an 
emergency shutdown. 
4.4. Applied Standards 
Today, the most widely used standards in the offshore sector are the Norwegian 
standards provided by the Standard Norge (NORSOK) 33 , the American Petroleum 
Institute (API) 34  standards and the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO)35 standards.  
Norway is a European country with a very extensive experience in the offshore oil and 
gas activities, and hence its standards are extensively used in Europe and the rest of 
the world as an example of first class offshore regulation and practice.  
On the other hand, the API standards cover the offshore oil and gas activities very 
thoroughly, and despite the fact that these are not obligatory in the European Union, 
they are widely used both in Europe and in the rest of the world as an example of best 
practice.  
Nevertheless, the use of the API and NORSOK standards outside the US and Norway 
respectively, is not unjustified since the worldwide accepted ISO standards often 
include solutions coming from these two standardisation organisations.  
The three mentioned standardisation organizations commonly cite each other in their 
official documents and even work together to develop new standards and to find the 
best solutions in standardisation. This approach is not in conflict with the philosophy of 
the OSD, which, in its recital 30, claims “To ensure safety in design and continuous safe 
operations, the industry is required to follow the best practices defined in authoritative 
standards and guidance. Such standards and guidance should be updated based on 
new knowledge and invention to ensure continuous improvement. Operators, owners 
and competent authorities should collaborate to establish priorities for the creation of 
new or improved standards and guidance in the light of the Deepwater Horizon accident 
experience and other major accidents…”. 
Additionally, in Europe standards for offshore oil and gas activities are also provided by 
the European Committee for Standardization (CEN)36, the British Standard Institution 
(BSI)37, and the Deutsche Institut für Normung (DIN)38, etc.  
                                           
33  The Norwegian Standards are freely available in PDF format with no charges from 
www.standard.no/en/sectors/Petroleum 
34 www.api.org 
35 www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_ics/catalogue_ics_browse.htm?ICS1=75 
36 www.cen.eu; fr. Comité Européen de Normalisation (CEN) 
37 www.bsigroup.com, http://shop.bsigroup.com/ 
38 www.din.de 
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According to the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP), the 
relationship among different standardization bodies is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Relationship among different standardization bodies 
In Figure 5, API is the American Petroleum Institute, ASTM is the American Society for 
Testing and Materials, ANSI is the American National Standards Institute, ABNT is the 
Associação Brasileira de Normas Técnicas39, PTIT is the Petroleum Institute of Thailand, 
TISI is the Thai Industrial Standards Institute, OGP is the International Association of 
Oil & Gas Producers, EEMUA is the Engineering Equipment and Materials Users’ 
Association, SN and NORSOK refer to the Standard Norge, BSI is the British Standard 
Institution, ISO is the International Organization for Standardization, CEN is the 
European Committee for Standardization, IEC is the International Electrotechnical 
Commission, and CENELEC is the European Committee for Electrotechnical 
Standardization.  
The Vienna Agreement 40  is the agreement on technical cooperation between the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the European Committee for 
Standardization (CEN) signed on June 27th; 1991. 
4.4.1 NORSOK standards 
The NORSOK standards are developed by the Norwegian petroleum industry to ensure 
adequate safety, value adding and cost effectiveness for petroleum industry 
developments and operations. Furthermore, NORSOK standards are, as far as possible, 
intended to replace oil company specifications and serve as references in the 
authorities' regulations41. 
Experts from a wide range of Norwegian companies participate heavily in the 
development of international and European standards, in order to define safe and 
economical design and processes. However, Norwegian safety framework and climate 
conditions may require own standards, or additions and supplements to International 
                                           
39 www.abnt.org.br 
40 www.iso.org/va 
41www.standard.no/en/sectors/energi-og-klima/petroleum/norsok-standards/#.VvEQY0Zwuc0 
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standards and European standards. The NORSOK standards have been developed to 
fulfil these needs42. 
The preparation and publication of NORSOK standards is supported by the Norwegian 
Oil and Gas Association (OLF)43 and by the Federation of Norwegian Industries44. The 
NORSOK standards are available for free in the official website of the Standard Norge45. 
In addition, the OLF has released a number of free guidelines46 related to drilling, 
integrated operations, health, working environment and safety, etc.  
The main NORSOK standards are schematically shown in Figure 647. 
 
  
                                           
42 http://www.standard.no/en/sectors/energi-og-klima/petroleum/ 
43 www.norskoljeoggass.no/en 
44 www.norskindustri.no/English 
45 www.standard.no/ 
46 www.norskoljeoggass.no/en/Publica/Guidelines 
47 www.standard.no/Global/bilder/Petroleum/NORSOK%20Plansje%202.pdf  
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Figure 6. Scheme of the main NORSOK standards.  
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Even though Norwegian legislation is considered to be strict in the industry, the 
Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) has followed closely the findings following 
the Deepwater Horizon blow-out and has made a thorough research to reveal any 
required change and improvement. This includes a review of the Norwegian regulations 
as well as of the NORSOK standards48. As a consequence, four NORSOK standards have 
been updated:  
• NORSOK D-001 “Drilling facilities”49, Revision 3, published in December 2012;  
• NORSOK D-002 “Well intervention equipment”50, Revision 2, published in June, 
2013; 
• NORSOK D-007 “Well testing system”51, Edition 2, published in September 2013; 
• NORSOK D-010, “Well integrity in drilling and well operations” 52 , Revision 4, 
published in June 2013. 
Table 8 shows a list of the main existing NORSOK standards connected with the 
offshore oil and gas industry.  
Table 8. NORSOK standards 
Field Title Code 
Architect 
Living quarters area C-001 
Architectural components and equipment C-002 
Helicopter deck on offshore installations C-004 
Drilling 
Drilling facilities D-001 
Well integrity in well and drilling operations D-010 
Well intervention equipment D-002 
Well testing system D-007 
Electrical Electrical systems E-001 
Geotechnology Marine soil investigations G-001 
HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) and sanitary 
systems 
H-003 
Instrumentation 
Field instrumentation I-001 
Safety and automation system I-002 
Metering 
Fiscal measurement system for hydrocarbon gas I-104 
Fiscal measurement system for hydrocarbon liquid I-105 
System Control 
Diagram (SCD) System control diagram 
I-005 
Piping and Layout 
Piping and valves L-001 
Piping system layout, design and structural analysis L-002 
Piping details L-CR-003 
Piping fabrication, installation, flushing and testing L-004 
Compact flanged connections L-005 
Material 
Materials selection  M-001 
Structural steel fabrication  M-101 
                                           
48 Rygg, O.B. and Dagstad, T. in Safe and sustainable drilling operations, Advantage NZ-2013. 
49 www.standard.no/PageFiles/25325/NORSOK%20D-001u3_2012%20(3).pdf 
50 www.standard.no/PageFiles/29616/D-002u2.pdf 
51 www.standard.no/PageFiles/31156/NORSOK%20D-007u2.pdf 
52 www.standard.no/PageFiles/29619/D-010u4_2013_en_02.pdf 
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Field Title Code 
Material data sheets for structural steel  M-120 
Aluminium structural material  M-121 
Cast structural steel  M-122 
Forged structural steel  M-123 
Surface preparation and protective coating  M-501 
Cathodic protection  M-503 
CO2 corrosion rate calculation model  M-506 
Welding and inspection of piping  M-601 
Fabrication and installation of GRP piping systems  M-622 
Material data sheets and element data sheets for piping  M-630 
Qualification of manufacturers of special materials  M-650 
Qualification of non-metallic sealing materials and manufactures M-710 
Structrural 
Integrity of offshore structures N-001 
Collection of metocean data  N-002 
Actions and action effects  N-003 
Design of steel structures  N-004 
Condition monitoring of loadbearing structures N-005 
Assessment of structural integrity for existing offshore load-bearing N-006 
Process 
Process systems P-100 
Process design P-001 
Lifting equipment 
Lifting equipment R-002 
Safe use of lifting equipment R-003 
Safe use of lifting and transport equipment in onshore petroleum 
plants 
R-005 
Mechanical 
Mechanical equipment R-001 
Piping and equipment insulation R-004 
Safety 
Technical safety S-001 
Working environment S-002 
Environmental care S-003 
Machinery- working environment analyses and documentation S-005 
HSE evaluation of contractors S-006 
Safety Equipment Data Sheets S-011 
Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) in construction-related 
activities 
S-012 
Telecommunication 
Telecom systems T-001 
Telecommunication and IT systems for drilling units T-003 
Telecom subsystems T-100 
Subsea 
Subsea Production Systems U-001 
Life extension for subsea systems U-009 
Underwater 
operation 
Manned underwater operations U-100 
Diving respiratory equipment U-101 
Remotely operated vehicle (ROV) services U-102 
Petroleum related manned underwater operations inshore U-103 
Pipelines Life extension for transportation systems Y-002 
Technical 
information 
Documentation for operation DFO Z-001 
Component identification system Z-CR-002 
Coding system Z-DP-002 
Technical Information Flow Requirements Z-003 
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Field Title Code 
CAD symbol libraries Z-004 
2D-CAD drawing standard Z-005 
Supplier`s documentation of equipment Z-018 
MC and 
preservation 
Preservation Z-006 
Mechanical Completion and Commissioning Z-007 
Reliability 
engineering and 
technology 
Risk based maintenance and consequence classification Z-008 
Risk analyses Risk and emergency preparedness assessment Z-013 
Standard Cost 
Coding 
Standard Cost Coding system Z-014 
Temporary 
equipment 
Temporary equipment Z-015 
Temporary equipment-forms Z-015 
The NORSOK standards make reference to several international standards. Related to  
electrical installations in hazardous areas, some IEC/EN standards are cited  e.g. in 
NORSOK standard E-001, NORSOK standard D-007, NORSOK standard I-001 and 
NORSOK standard S-001, see Table 9. Some of them are harmonised under the ATEX 
Directive while others are not. 
Table 9. IEC/EN standards related to electrical installations in hazardous areas mentioned in NORSOK 
standards.  
IEC/EN standards 
mentioned in 
NORSOK 
standards 
Title 
Harmonised standard 
under ATEX 
equipment Directive? 
EN-13463-1* 
Non-electrical equipment for potentially explosive 
atmospheres. Basic method and requirements 
Yes 
IEC 60079-0 
Electrical apparatus for explosive gas 
atmospheres_Part 0: General requirements 
Yes 
IEC 60079-14 
Electrical apparatus for explosive gas 
atmospheres_Part 14: Electrical installations in 
hazardous areas (other than mines) 
No 
IEC 60079-15 
Electrical apparatus for explosive gas 
atmospheres_Part 15: Construction, test and marking 
of type of protection “n” electrical apparatus 
Yes 
IEC 61892-7:2007 Mobile and fixed offshore units_Electrical 
installations_Part 7: Hazardous areas 
No 
* EN 13463 series has been recently replaced by ISO 80079-36 and 80079-37 standards  
4.4.2. ISO standards 
The aim of Technical Committee ISO/TC 67 “Materials, equipment and offshore 
structures for petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries” is the 
standardization of the materials, equipment and offshore structures used in the drilling, 
production, transport by pipelines and processing of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons 
within the petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries53. 
  
                                           
53 http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_technical_committee?commid=49506 
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Norway takes part in all sub-committees in ISO/TC 67, and contributes with experts in 
most of the working groups. Moreover, the Norwegian petroleum industry participates 
also in many of other international standardization committees54. 
The Technical Committee ISO/TC 67 has 7 subcommittees:  
• SC2 “Pipeline transportation systems”; 
• SC3 “Drilling and completion fluids, and well cements”; 
• SC4 “Drilling and production equipment”; 
• SC5 “Casing, tubing and drill pipe”; 
• SC6 “Processing equipment and systems”; 
• SC7 “Offshore structures”; 
• SC8 “Arctic operations”. 
At the same time the subcommittees have working groups, such as:  
• WG2 “Conformity assessment”; 
• WG4 “Reliability engineering and technology”; 
• WG5 “Aluminium alloy pipes”; 
• WG7 “Corrosion resistant materials”; 
• WG8 “Materials, corrosion control, welding and jointing, and non-destructive 
examination (NDE)”, WG10 “Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) installations and 
equipment”; 
• WG11 “Coating and lining of structures and equipment”; 
• WG12 “CO2 aspects”.  
The Technical Committee ISO/TC 67 proposed, on March 2011 after the Macondo and 
Montara accidents, an action plan expressed in the document ISO/TC 67 N 1119 to 
address the lessons learned from these accidents55.   
A scheme of the ISO standards used in the oil and gas industry is shown in Figure 7. 
4.4.3. API standards 
The American Petroleum Institute (API) 56  is the national body that represents all 
aspects of America’s oil and gas industry.  
The API Standards Program, which dates back to the 1920's, is accredited by the 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI)57  and provides an ongoing forum for 
continuous improvement by, and collaboration among, companies, regulators, and 
other industry stakeholders.  
The American Petroleum Institute (API) develops each of its standards after an open 
consultation with representatives from government regulators, engineering companies, 
contractors, equipment manufacturers and the oil and natural gas industry.  
                                           
54 Robert Baligira. The effect of Macondo blow-out on risk analysis and risk management. Faculty of Science 
and Technology, University of Stavanger, 2013. 
http://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/182281/Baligira_Robert.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 
55 www.iso.org/iso/tc67actionplan.pdf  
56 www.api.org; the standards can be bought from www.techstreet.com 
57 www.ansi.org 
 Study on the impacts of possible amendments to the ATEX, the Machinery, and the 
Pressure Equipment Directive with respect to equipment intended for use in the 
offshore oil and gas industry 
 
 
 
37
Over 100 API standards are referenced in the US Government regulations and raise the 
level of safety performance across the industry. The implementation of the regulations 
and industry standards issued by the American Petroleum Institute (API) resulted in 
significant improvements in the reliability and safety of offshore operations as 
highlighted by the absence of significant accidents over the past two decades before 
Macondo accident. However, Macondo accident occurred in the Mexican Gulf in 2010 
despite of the already very good existed regulative. This caused the need of further 
improvements, being the API Std. 53 “Blow-out Prevention Equipment Systems 
for Drilling Wells”58 the most important one related to the oil and gas equipment 
installed on MODUs. 
                                           
58 www.techstreet.com/products/1846173 
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Figure 7. Schematic structure of petroleum standards published by the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO)59 
                                           
59 Copyright granted by the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (IOGP); www.iogp.org 
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5. Well-control 
Well-control equipment is intended for the prevention or mitigation of the dangerous 
effects caused by an unexpected release of formation fluid, such as natural gas and/or 
crude oil, from the well to its surroundings 60 . Technically, well-control involves 
preventing the formation fluid, usually referred to as kick, from entering into the 
wellbore during drilling. Formation fluid can enter the wellbore if the pressure exerted 
by the column of drilling fluid is not great enough to overcome the pressure exerted by 
the fluids in the formation being drilled. Failure to manage and control these pressure 
effects can cause serious equipment damage and injury, or loss of lives. Improperly 
managed well-control situations can cause blow-outs, which are uncontrolled and 
explosive expulsions of formation fluid from the well, potentially resulting in a fire and 
explosion. If well-control measures fail to prevent formation fluids entering the 
wellbore, the blow-out eventually can be stopped using a “blow out preventer” – BOP. 
As the rams and choke of the BOP remain closed, a pressure test has to be carried out 
and the drilling fluid with increased density has to be pumped inside the well to kill the 
kick and to circulate it out. 
Well-control includes measures, practices, procedures and equipment, such as fluid flow 
monitoring, to ensure safe and environmentally protective drilling, completion, 
abandonment, and workover operations as well as the installation, repair, maintenance, 
and operation of surface and subsea well-control equipment61. 
5.1. Dual Barrier System for well-control 
The standard NORSOK D-010 “Well integrity in drilling and well operations” defines the 
minimum functional and performance oriented requirements and guidelines for well 
design, planning and execution of safe well operations. In general, to control a well in a 
proper way, a concept of two independent barriers has to be considered (in the sense 
of NORSOK D-010) – see Section 5.3.1. The improved concept of “two barriers” has 
been introduced with a new version of the NORSOK D-010 standard where safe well-
design should include a primary barrier, consisting of the column of drilling mud 
surrounding the drill string, and a secondary barrier, made up of a system of elements–
an “envelope”–including the Blow-out Preventer (BOP) shear ram, high-pressure riser, 
annulus access valve, casing, and other aspects of the well construction. Also, the first 
barrier (blue) is in most cases hydraulic, while the second one (red) is mechanical – see 
Section 5.3.1; Figure 14 and Figure 15. 
When a user requests the CE mark on the equipment used to form the barrier, a 
discussion needs to take place with the manufacturer to justify the requirement and its 
commercial and legal implications thereof. Each item of equipment is classified under 
one of the three categories: 
• Equipment meeting the definition of Pressure Equipment as established in the 
Directive, and is not excluded from PED (up to now BOP is excluded from PED but 
not from MD if it can be treated as machinery); exclusion of well-control equipment 
from PED; article 1, 2(i); 
• Equipment that is excluded from the PED (pumps are excluded but the 
manufacturer still needs to show that pressure is not a significant design factor. 
This can be the case of mud pumps since they work under very high pressure; 
exclusion of pumps; article 1, 2(j); 
                                           
60 API RP 96, Deepwater Well Design and Construction, First Edition, March 2013. 
61 Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf, 30 CFR 250 (2013). 
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• Equipment that may have to comply with the Pressure Equipment Directive, 
depending on special requirements of location where it is intended to be installed 
(applied for BOPs especially designed for MODUs; exclusion for MODUs; article 1, 
2(n)). 
The responsibility for compliance, where required, lies with the manufacturer. Where 
pressure equipment is manufactured outside the EEA, the responsibility shall lie with 
the person or company importing the equipment into the EEA. 
Both, PED and IMO MODU Code do not treat the problem of well-control. On the one 
hand, the PED excludes it as follows “well-control equipment used in the petroleum, gas 
or geothermal exploration and extraction industry and in underground storage which is 
intended to contain and/or control well pressure. This comprises the wellhead 
(Christmas tree), the blow out preventers (BOP), the piping manifolds and all their 
equipment upstream”. Moreover, “mobile off-shore units as well as equipment 
specifically intended for installation on-board or the propulsion thereof” are currently 
excluded from the scope of the PED. Thus, the PED applies to the design, manufacture 
and conformity assessment of pressure equipment and assemblies of pressure 
equipment with a maximum allowable pressure greater than 0.5 bar unless excluded 
from the scope of the Directive. 
On the other hand the IMO MODU code “does not include requirements for the drilling 
of subsea wells or the procedures for their control. Such drilling operations are subject 
to control by the coastal State.” on-board. This means that well-control issues are not 
currently covered in a harmonised way at the European Union level. 
Detailed information about the equipment and the procedures to control a well (to form 
barrier) can be found in the NORSOK D-010 standard “Well integrity in drilling and well 
operations”.  A barrier needs to have a structural and a leak-resistant capability of a 
product to contain the applied pressure, i.e. to have pressure integrity.  
Well Barrier Elements (WBEs) – examples 
- Mud circulating system 
The mud circulating system (Figure 8) usually consists of a mud pump, mud centrifuge, 
mud-gas separator, drilling pipes, bit, dampener, degasser, mud cleaner (desander, 
hydrocyclone), desilter, valves, conduits, etc62: 
• Mud pump is a large, high-pressure reciprocating pump used to circulate the mud 
on a drilling rig. A typical mud pump is a two or three-cylinder piston pump whose 
replaceable pistons travel in replaceable liners and are driven by a crankshaft 
actuated by an engine or a motor. 
• Mud centrifuge consists of equipment that uses centrifugal force to separate 
small solid components from liquid drilling fluid. 
• Mud cleaner63 consists of a cone-shaped device, a hydrocyclone, designed to 
remove very fine solid particles from the drilling mud. Desander (hydrocyclone) is a 
centrifugal device for removing sand from drilling fluid to prevent abrasion of the 
pumps. It may be operated mechanically or by a fast-moving stream of fluid inside 
a special cone-shaped vessel, in which case it is sometimes called a hydrocyclone. 
• Mud-gas separator consists of equipment that removes gas from the mud coming 
out of a well when a kick is being circulated out. 
• Drilling pipes are used to convey drilling fluid and to transfer rotation from the 
drilling table to the drilling bit. 
                                           
62 depending on how the components are linked to form an assembly 
63 http://oilfield.gnsolidscontrol.com/mud-recycling 
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• Bit is the cutting or boring element used in drilling oil and gas wells (drilling fluid 
under pressure circulates through nozzles of bit). 
• Dampener is an air or inert gas device that minimizes pressure surges in the 
output line of a mud pump. Sometimes is called surge dampener. 
• Degasser is used to remove unwanted gas from a liquid, especially from drilling 
fluid. 
• Desilter is a centrifugal device, similar to a desander, used to remove very fine 
particles, or silt, from drilling fluid. This keeps the amount of solids in the fluid to 
the lowest possible level. 
• Valves 
• Conduits 
 
Figure 8. Mud circulating system64 
A summary for the mud circulating system is given in  
Table 10. 
Table 10. Pressure equipment; mud circulating system 
Onshore Offshore 
Yes 
Fixed: Yes 
Mobile: Yes; Specifically designed for Mobile: Yes/No* 
Covered by: 
PED: No (onshore or offshore)**, conditionally Yes for some elements*** 
IMO MODU: No****/Yes***** 
*if Yes, exclusion 1 2(n) of PED hence is relevant – MODU exclusion 
**Exclusion 1 2(i) of PED – Well-control 
***Mud pump can possibly have pressure as dominant design factor and hence Exclusion 1 2(j) of PED will 
not apply 
****IMO MODU Code does not include requirements for the drilling of subsea wells or the procedures for 
their control. Thus, mud cleaner, mud-gas separator, drilling pipes, bit, dampener, degasser, desilter and 
similar devices used for in drilling process are not under the scope of IMO MODU Code 
***** pump systems and centrifugal systems are in general under the scope of IMO MODU Code, with the 
exception of those for oil and gas operations 
                                           
64 Copyright granted by Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA), United States Department of 
Labour; www.osha.gov 
 Study on the impacts of possible amendments to the ATEX, the Machinery, and the 
Pressure Equipment Directive with respect to equipment intended for use in the 
offshore oil and gas industry 
 
 
 
42
Some typical components of a mud circulating system are shown in Figure 9 and Figure 
10. 
 
 
Figure 9. Desander and desilter65 
 
 
Figure 10. Drilling Bit (with a typical nozzle geometry)66 
-Packers 
A packer is a standard component of the completion hardware of oil or gas wells 
installed to provide a seal between the outside of the production tubing and the inside 
of the casing, liner, or wellbore wall. It can be either drilling packer or production 
packer. It can be removable or permanent packer that can only be removed by drilling 
it out.  
The packer forms the basis of the cased-hole completion design. The packer is a sealing 
device that isolates and contains produced fluids and pressures within the wellbore to 
protect the casing and other formations above or below the producing zone. This is 
essential to the basic functioning of most wells.  
                                           
65 Copyright granted by Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA), United States Department of 
Labour; www.osha.gov 
66 Usage rights: Figure labeled for reuse 
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Packers can be hydraulic, inflatable (use fluid pressure to inflate a long cylindrical 
tube), etc. 
A summary for packers is given in  
Table 11. 
Table 11. Pressure equipment: packers 
Installed on: 
Onshore Offshore 
Yes 
Fixed: Yes  
Mobile: Yes; Specifically designed for Mobile: No* 
Covered by: 
PED**: No (onshore or offshore) 
IMO MODU***: No 
*exclusion 1 2(n) of PED hence is not relevant – MODU exclusion 
**explicitly excluded from the scope of PED since it is device which main purpose is to contain and/or control 
well pressure (Exclusion 1 2(i) of PED) 
***IMO MODU Code does not include requirements for the drilling of subsea wells or the procedures for their 
control 
Since Macondo, the industry has undertaken significant research and intervention to 
enhance global standards for well-control equipment (e.g. Well-control Institute67).  
5.2. The Blow-out Preventer (BOP) and its control unit 
A blow-out preventer (BOP) is a large, specialized valve or similar mechanical device, 
used to seal, control and monitor oil and gas wells to prevent blow-out, the 
uncontrolled release of crude oil and/or natural gas from well. Blow-out preventers are 
used on land wells, offshore rigs, and subsea wells. Land and subsea BOPs are secured 
to the top of the wellbore, known as the wellhead. BOPs on offshore rigs are mounted 
below the rig deck. Subsea BOPs are connected to the offshore rig above by a drilling 
riser that provides a continuous pathway for the drill string and fluids emanating from 
the wellbore. In effect, a riser extends the wellbore to the rig. BOPs come in two basic 
types, ram and annular. Both are often installed together in drilling rig BOP stacks, 
typically with at least one annular BOP capping a stack of several ram BOPs.  
An annular-type blow-out preventer can close around the drill string, casing or a non-
cylindrical object, while a ram-type BOP is similar in operation to a gate valve where 
pipe rams close around a drill pipe.  
Blind sealing rams, which have no openings for tubing, can close off the well when the 
well does not contain a drill string or other tubing and seal it. Blind shear rams are 
intended to seal a wellbore, even when the bore is occupied by a drill string, by cutting 
through the drill string. 
A typical blow-out preventer system consists of68: 
                                           
67 Formally established in 2013 by the International Association Of Drilling Contractors, the well-control 
Institute (WCI) brings together representatives from drilling industry stakeholders to develop the 
comprehensive solutions necessary to significantly improve human performance in well-control worldwide; 
www.iadc.org/well-control-institute 
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• Blow-out preventer control panel: controls, opens and closes blow-out preventers, 
• Blow-out preventer control unit (Accumulator; Kommey unit): a device that stores 
hydraulic fluid under pressure in special containers and provides a method to open 
and close the blow-out preventers,  
• Blow-out preventer stack (BOP stack): the assembly of well-control equipment 
including preventers, spools, valves, and nipples connected to the top of the 
wellhead. 
An accumulator (koomey unit) is a storage device for pressurized hydraulic nitrogen, 
which is used in operating stacks of Blow-out Preventer (BOP). It is a device installed in 
a hydraulic system to store energy or, in some applications, dampen pressure 
fluctuations. Energy is stored by compressing a pre-charged gas bladder with hydraulic 
fluid from the operating or charging system. Depending on the fluid volume and pre-
charge pressure of the accumulator, a limited amount of hydraulic energy is then 
available independent of any other power source. Well pressure-control systems 
typically incorporate sufficient accumulator capacity to enable the blow-out preventer to 
be operated with all other power shut down. The control system of Blow-out Preventer 
(BOP), called an accumulator (Koomey unit), provides the energy to operate stacks of 
the blow-out preventer. This system consists of typical pressure devices: compressed 
gas bottles, regulator valves, pumps, hydraulic reservoir, control manifold, and control 
valves. 
A summary for an accumulator for BOP systems (koomey unit) is given in Table 12. 
Table 12. Pressure equipment; accumulator for BOP systems (koomey unit) 
Installed on: 
Onshore Offshore 
Yes 
Fixed: Yes  
Mobile: Yes; Specifically designed for Mobile: No* 
Covered by: 
PED: No** (onshore or offshore) 
IMO MODU: No** (Yes)**** 
*Exclusion 1 2(n) of PED hence is not relevant – MODU exclusion; explicitly excluded from the scope of PED 
since it is a device whose main purpose is to contain and/or control well pressure (Exclusion 1 2 (i) of PED) 
**Yes, if their parts (bottles for hydraulic pressure, manifolds, reservoir tanks, valves, etc) are treated 
separately***IMO MODU Code does not include requirements for the drilling of subsea wells or the 
procedures for their control 
**** IMO MODU Code claims that the power available should be sufficient to supply all those service that are 
essential for safety in an emergency. Thus, “the emergency source of power should be capable for a period of 
18 hours of closing the blow-out preventer and of disconnecting the unit from the well-head arrangement, if 
electrically controlled; unless they have an independent supply from an accumulator battery suitably located 
for use in an emergency and sufficient for the period of 18 h”;. It also states that the blow-out preventer 
control system, among other essential facilities, should be operable after an emergency shutdown. 
A BOP consists of one or more valves installed at the wellhead to prevent the escape of 
pressure either in the annular space between the casing and the drill pipe or in open 
hole (for example, hole with no drill pipe) during drilling or completion operations69 
(stacks of BOP as shown in Figure 11). 
                                                                                                                                 
68 A. Bahadori, C. Nwaoha, M.W. Clark, Dictionary of Oil, Gas, and Petrochemical processing, CRC Press, 
2014. 
69 www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/oilandgas/glossary_of_terms/glossary_of_terms_b.html 
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Figure 11. Stacks of Blow-out Preventer (BOP)70 
The most important types of stacks of BOP are the annular or pipe-ram, which prevents 
blow-outs from the ring space between the ouside of the drill pipe and the casing, and 
shear-ram or blind-ram,which can cut drilling pipes. 
An annular stack (annular BOP) is a well-control device which has form of large valve, 
usually installed above the ram preventers, that forms a seal in the annular space 
between pipe and well-bore71 (Figure 12). 
                                           
70 Copyright granted by Rob Almeida (photographer); http://gcaptain.com/blowout-4-5-billion-surge-orders/ 
71 www.canscodubai.com/oil-field-glossary.html 
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Figure 12. Annular BOP; Annular stack72 
A BOP that uses blind shear rams to seal off pressure on a hole that is with or without 
pipe is called shear-ram or blind-ram preventer. Blind-ram type preventers have 
interchangeable ram blocks to accommodate different drill pipe, casing, or tubing 
(Figure 13). 
 
 
Figure 13. Shear-ram Blow-out Preventer (BOP); Shear-ram stack, Blind-ram73 
A summary for the BOP is given in Table 13. 
                                           
72 Copyright granted by Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA), United States Department of 
Labour; www.osha.gov 
73 Usage rights: Figure labeled for reuse 
 Study on the impacts of possible amendments to the ATEX, the Machinery, and the 
Pressure Equipment Directive with respect to equipment intended for use in the 
offshore oil and gas industry 
 
 
 
47
Table 13. Pressure equipment; Blow-out Preventer (BOP) 
Installed on: 
Onshore Offshore 
Yes 
Fix: Yes  
Mobile: Yes; Specifically designed for Mobile: No/Yes* 
Covered by: 
PED: No** (onshore or offshore) 
IMO MODU: No*** 
*if Yes, exclusion 1 2(n) of PED hence is relevant – MODU exclusion 
**explicitly excluded from the scope of PED since it is a device which main purpose is to contain and/or 
control well pressure (Exclusion 1 2(i) of PED) 
***IMO MODU Code does not include requirements for the drilling of subsea wells or the procedures for their 
control. On the other hand it claims that the power available should be sufficient to supply all those service 
that are essential for safety in an emergency. Thus, “the emergency source of power should be capable for a 
period of 18 hours of closing the blow-out preventer and of disconnecting the unit from the well-head 
arrangement, if electrically controlled; unless they have an independent supply from an accumulator battery 
suitably located for use in an emergency and sufficient for the period of 18 h”;. It also states that the blow-
out preventer control system, among other essential facilities, should be operable after an emergency 
shutdown. 
A BOP can be treated as a device under pressure since: 
• It is a large, specialized valve or similar mechanical device, usually installed 
redundantly in stacks, used to seal, control and monitor oil and gas wells. Blow-out 
preventers were developed to cope with extreme erratic pressures (which means 
much more than 0.5 bars) and uncontrolled flow emanating from a well reservoir 
during drilling74. 
• As stated in the patent for the first Blow-out Preventer (Ram Type BOP by Harry S. 
Cameron) from 1922, a BOP is a device whose purpose is to seal the wellhead and 
control pressure during drilling and oil production operations75. It is installed on the 
wellhead, and the rams are closed to seal off the well, allowing full control of the 
pressure during drilling and production. The original design could withstand 
pressures up to 3,000 psi (about 200 bar), an industry record in 1922 (In 
comparison, today's BOP can withstand 15,000 psi which is about 1000 bar, 
working in water depth up to 10,000 ft which is about 3000 metres). 
According to NORSOK D-001 "Drilling Facilities", paragraph 5.10.3, a BOP shall as a 
minimum consist of the following: 
• One annular preventer, 
• One shear ram preventer, 
• Two pipe ram preventers, 
• Minimum one choke line outlet, 
• Minimum one kill line outlet, 
• One wellhead coupling or connector, 
• Minimum two manual gate valves, 
                                           
74 www.sivainc.com/product/bops/ 
75 www.asme.org/about-asme/who-we-are/engineering-history/landmarks/227-first-ram-type-blow-out-
preventer, www.asme.org/getmedia/bdc4580b-fca4-42be-b138-a1f34adbf680/227-First-Ram-Type-Blow-out-
Preventer.aspx 
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• Minimum two remote operated gate valves. 
The following aspects related to BOPs have to be highlighted: 
• A BOP is used onshore and offshore and although there are some differences 
between them,  the applied technical standards are the same; 
• In most cases, there are no differences between BOPs for MODU and offshore fixed 
installations; 
• To prevent major accidents in the EU member states, the operator has to maintain 
a very low ALARP threshold through the application of new knowledge and 
invention and to apply all the best technical standards and procedures for drilling, 
according to the Offshore Safety Directive 2013/30/EU (this implicitly means to 
apply NORSOK, API and ISO standards for BOPs);  
• Currently, there are harmonised standards with the PED for the main parts of the 
BOP control system (accumulator) if its main parts are treated as independent 
pressure devices (compressed gas bottles, regulator valves, hydraulic reservoir, 
control manifold, and control valves); 
5.3. Technical Standards in Well-Control 
In this Section the most important technical standards applying to well-control 
equipment are presented. 
5.3.1. Well-Control Standards by NORSOK 
The most important standards by the Standard Norge (NORSOK) in field of well-control 
are: 
• NORSOK D-001 “Drilling facilities”, Revision 3, published in December 2012;  
• NORSOK D-002 “Well intervention equipment”, Revision 2, published in June, 
2013; 
• NORSOK D-007 “Well testing system”, Edition 2, published in September 2013; 
NORSOK D-010, “Well integrity in drilling and well operations”, Revision 4, published in 
June 2013. A Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF) report76 released on May 2012, 
with contributions from the Norwegian Clean Seas Association for Operating Companies 
(NOFO) and the Norwegian Shipowners' Association (NSA), mainly focused on 
prevention of future accidents, has reviewed the major investigation reports after the 
Macondo accident and identified a number of improvements, mainly related to drilling 
standards, operator and contractor management systems, well-control exercises and 
steering documentation and emergency equipment, to reduce blow-out risks on the 
Norwegian Continental Self (NCS). The majority of the prevention recommendations, 
which should be implemented through changes to the Norwegian drilling standards 
Norsok D-001 (drilling facilities) and Norsok D-010 (well integrity in drilling and well 
operations), are explained below. 
-NORSOK D-001; Drilling facilities. Rev. 3, published on December 11th, 2012 
(corrected on January 10th, 2013); 
                                           
76  Summary report. Deepwater Horizon. Lessons learned and follow-up. OLF-The Norwegian Oil Industry 
Association. 
www.norskoljeoggass.no/Global/Publikasjoner/_H%C3%A5ndb%C3%B8ker%20og%20Rapporter/DWH%20ra
pporter/DWH-summary%20June%202012.pdf?epslanguage=no 
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NORSOK D-001 “Drilling facilities” is a frequently used standard in Norway and abroad. 
This standard was initially introduced in 1998. The standard describes the design, 
installation and commissioning principles and requirements for the drilling facilities and 
their systems and equipment on fixed installations and MODUs. Its last revision 
considers recommendations from key industry forums and the experience gained from 
the Macondo accident and other relevant incidents. According to already existing 
regulative in Norway, Blow-out Preventer (BOP) overhaul and recertification are 
required every five years, and according to NORSOK D-001, it was already required to 
have alternative blow-out Preventer (BOP) control system on all floating rigs even 
before Macondo. The technical recommendations made by the OLF report, with which 
the Norsok D-001 has been updated, are the following: 
• Norsok D-001 should be updated to identify the diverter system as a safety system 
designed to handle gas in the riser above the BOP, and to eliminate the possibility 
of a gas cloud being released over the rig. The use of the diverter in such 
circumstances should ensure that all explosive hydrocarbons are released in a safe 
area to the side and ideally downwind of the rig; 
• In order to eliminate the possibility of overloading the mud gas separator, Norsok 
D-001 should be updated to prevent any connection between the diverter system 
and the mud gas separator. However, a connection from the downstream end of 
the choke manifold to the mud gas separator is permited; 
• Norsok D-001 should include more explicit requirements for primary and back-up 
BOP control systems, their ability to perform in emergencies and testing of them; 
• Norsok D-001 shoud contain a requirement for acitivating BOP functions via ROV 
intervention. This will facilitate external activation of BOP elements or release 
functions should all other systems fail. It is recognised that a BOP ram may not be 
closed fast enough by an ROV to seal off a flowing well; 
• Norsok D-001 should be updated to ensure that subsea wellhead casing/tubing 
hangers are locked down on all strings in contact with hydrocarbon-bearing zones. 
-NORSOK D-002; Well intervention equipment. Rev. 2, published on June 25th, 2013; 
The objective of NORSOK D-002 “Well intervention equipment” is to provide common 
requirements for well intervention equipment across all exploration and production 
companies and service companies operating on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. 
The standard defines what is considered typical and ordinary well intervention 
equipment. New equipment, special operations and operations in certain environments 
may require additional requirements and specifications. These specific additions are 
excluded from the standard and should be addressed in the risk assessment of the 
particular job. This standard was initially introduced in 2000. 
Standards Norway has, in cooperation with the stakeholders in the petroleum 
standardisation, carried out a revision process of this standard to: 
• update specific requirements/guidelines to be in line with current and future 
needs/practices; 
• be harmonised with NORSOK D-010 “Well integrity in drilling and well 
operations”77;  
• implement general improvements. 
                                           
77 NORSOK D-002 has been updated to reflect the well barrier terminology in the new NORSOK D-010, to 
provide expanded requirements for capping devices, to update and to reduce external references and to 
provide further specification of test requirements for pressure control equipment. 
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-NORSOK D-007; Well testing system. Rev. 2, published on September 23rd, 2013; 
NORSOK D-007 “Well testing system” describes functional, performance and 
operational requirements for temporary well testing, production clean-up and bleed-off 
equipment and systems used for hydrocarbon flow from exploration or production wells 
on both mobile units and fixed platforms. It is a widely used standard in Norway and 
abroad, and Standards Norway has, in cooperation with the stakeholders in the 
petroleum standardization, carried out a substantial revision process of this standard 
to: 
• Simplify the standard; 
• Update references; 
• Include requirements for double barriers; 
• Modernize the standard throughout, capturing new equipment and new technical 
requirements (including but not limited to Safety Integrity Level (SIL) and the 
Machine Directive); 
• Harmonise the standard with DNV standards78, being the existing gap between the 
DNV’s standard and NORSOK D-007removed. 
The new version of the standard includes, not only requirements for well testing, as in 
the previous version, but also requirements for production clean-up and bleed-off work. 
It also covers not only semi-submersibles, jack-up rigs and drill ships, but also well 
intervention vessels. A new Section 4 has been included to foster alignment with 
NORSOK D-010.  
-NORSOK D-010; Well integrity in drilling and well operations. Rev. 4, published on 
June 26th, 2013; 
NORSOK D-010 “Well integrity in drilling and well operations” defines the minimum 
functional and performance oriented requirements and guidelines for well design, 
planning and execution of safe well operations.  
The focus of the standard is well integrity where this term is defined to be “application 
of technical, operational and organizational solutions to reduce risk of uncontrolled 
release of formation fluids throughout the life cycle of a well”. No other standard 
organization has made a similar specification for this type of operations, and therefore 
the international interest is great.  
This revision was initiated to enhance the standard to include acceptance criteria for 
casing cement applied in the drilling, production and abandonment activities, managed 
pressure drilling and to include new WBE acceptance tables (formation, alternative 
material to cement, LWI equipment). During the revision process after the Macondo 
accident, NORSOK D-010 received considerable attention both nationally (Norway) and 
internationally. The new revision (Rev. 4) of NORSOK D-010 was published in June 
2013, the previous one was from 2004, is an important milestone related to the 
industry's response to further increase the level of safety in drilling operations. The 
revision of the NORSOK D-010 has been essential for the Norwegian and the European 
oil and gas industry to partly to reflect the recommendations derived from the Macondo 
accident.  
The new revision provides more information, particularly regarding plugging and 
abandonment. It includes managed pressure drilling, which was not included in Rev. 3. 
                                           
78 DNV DNV-RP-E102: Recertification of Blow-Out Preventers and well-control equipment for the US Outer 
Continental Shelf 
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It has more on relief well plans and requirements for capping equipment. It identifies 
nine additional well barrier elements to provide a fuller complement of barrier 
management building blocks. The latest revision resulted from extensive consultation 
with industry and captures current best practice. However, operators should be ready 
because Rev. 4 does include more robust safety enhancements that will require greater 
thoroughness and will likely drive costs up.79.  
There are expectations that the revised NORSOK D-010 is further focused on well 
integrity as well as on major accidents prevention.  
In the new version the requirements for the technical and operational barriers intended 
to prevent blow-outs in oil and gas wells. are defined in a clearer way. It has been also 
updated with respect to the inclusion of acceptance criteria for casing cement, and the 
use of new technology. Knowing that failure of the cement barrier and the lack of 
adequate qualification were direct causes of the Macondo and Montara accidents, the 
update of the NORSOK D-010 is very important. In fact, all well barrier schematics 
have been redrawn, mainly to include in-situ formation as part of the well barrier 
envelope. Thus, an improved concept of “two barriers” has been introduced with the 
new version of the standard. In that way, a safe well-design should include a primary 
barrier, consisting of the column of drilling mud surrounding the drill string, and a 
secondary barrier, made up of a system of elements–an “envelope”–including the Blow-
out Preventer (BOP) shear ram, high-pressure riser, annulus access valve, casing, and 
other aspects of the well construction. For the example in Figure 14,production 
example, and in Figure 15, drilling example, primary Well Barrier Elements (WBE) are 
shown in blue and secondary Well Barrier Elements (WBE) are shown in red. The 
primary and secondary barriers must be completely independent in order to prevent a 
blow-out meaning that if an element from primary or secondary barrier fails, the other 
barrier should be intact. This is why typically the primary and the secondary barriers do 
not share elements. In Figure 14, ASCSSV is Annulus Surface Controlled Sub-Surface 
Valve; and SCSSV is Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety Valve. 
  
                                           
79www.energyglobal.com/upstream/exploration/10032014/The_story_of_the_worlds_well_integrity_standard/ 
 Study on the impacts of possible amendments to the ATEX, the Machinery, and the 
Pressure Equipment Directive with respect to equipment intended for use in the 
offshore oil and gas industry 
 
 
 
52
 
 
Typical gas lift production well: 
Primary barrier: 
-Production packer; 
-Casing which are between ASCSSV packer and 
production packer.; 
-ASCSSV packer which are between ASCSSV 
and SCSSV; 
-SCSSV valve; 
Secondary barrier: 
-Production casing cement; 
-Casing; 
-Intermediate cement are between casing and 
intermediate casing; 
-Intermediate casing; 
-Wellhead; 
-Tubing hanger; 
-Annulus access line and valve; 
-Surface production tree; 
-Second annulus access line and valve. 
SCSSV is Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety 
Valve. 
Figure 14. Production example of two barriers for prevention of blow-out (NORSOK D-010)80 
 
                                           
80 Figure 14.8.1, Figure 13.8.1 and Figure 9.6.8.1 (Figure 22, Figure 23 and Figure 24 in this report) from 
NORSOK Standard D-010 Well integrity in drilling and well operations. Rev. 4, June 2013 are reproduced by 
European Commission - Joint Research Centre (JRC).under licence from Standard Online AS 04/2016. © All 
rights are reserved. Standard Online AS makes no guarantees or warranties as to the correctness of the 
reproduction. In any case of dispute, the original shall be taken as authoritative. See www.standard.no. 
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Drilling well: 
Primary barrier: 
-Fluid column 
Secondary barrier: 
-In-situ formations; 
-Casing cement; 
-Casing; 
-Wellhead; 
-High pressure riser; 
Drilling BOP 
Figure 15. Drilling example of two barriers for prevention of blow-out (NORSOK D-010)72 
As pointed out above, NORSOK D-010 was also updated in terms of improved 
procedures for planning, mixing, pumping and qualification of cement as a primary 
barrier. The method of placement and qualification of cement as a primary barrier is 
now better described. The new revision enhances the standard to include acceptance 
criteria for casing cement applied in the drilling, production and abandonment activities, 
managed pressure drilling, etc. For example, when abandoning a well, for wells with 
poor casing cement or no access to the last open hole section, section milling (removal 
of casing) is an alternative method for placing cement in contact with formation to form 
permanent well barrier. Figure 16 below shows how permanent well barrier cement 
could be put in place by the removal of poorly cemented casing by section milling. 
 
 
Figure 16. An illustration of how permanent well barrier cement can be put in place through the use of section 
milling72 
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Due to the update of the NORSOK D-010 with the existing new technologies, an 
increased understanding of the criticality of cement as the primary barrier and of the 
likelihood of successful cementing is expected. 
In the same way, NORSOK D-010 has been updated with Section (4.6) on “Activity and 
operation shut-down criteria”, which includes specific criteria for shut-down of the 
activities or operations. Experiences from a number of well incidents, both in Norway 
and abroad, have shown that a normal operation was carried on even if numerous 
danger signals were present prior to the event (or accident). Because of that, more 
explicit and specific stop criteria have been defined, e.g. what kind of BOP control pod 
failures are acceptable before stopping the operation. As a consequence, an increase in 
the likelihood of safe applications due to the more detailed description of best practices 
regarding new technologies is expected. 
To summarize, the revision includes a large number of changes intended to improve the 
standard, most of which address recommendations from OLF Deepwater Horizon report. 
The technical recommendations made by the OLF report to update Norsok D-010 are 
the following: 
1. Should include the term “critical cement job”. A requirement for independent 
design verification of “critical cement jobs” should also be introduced. This 
verification can be performed by either an independent in-house department or an 
external third party; 
2. Should furthermore require that cement and casing design for slurries placed 
across hydrocarbon zones be verified in cementing company labs prior to use. For 
critical slurry designs, slurry properties should be independently verified. This 
verification can be performed by either an independent in-house department or an 
external third party; 
3. a) Should be updated to define the requirements related to inflow (negative) 
pressure testing clearly. 
b) Well programmes should provide a detailed procedure and acceptance criteria 
for all inflow test. Inflow test should be conducted in a controlled manner with 
detailed procedures which have been approved by an authorised person, and 
accompanied by a demonstrated risk analysis; 
4. Should be further clarified to state that, when changing out the fluid barrier 
element while the remaining barrier consists of untested cement or mechanical 
plugs, all displacement to a lighter underbalanced fluid should be done with closed 
BOP and through the choke and kill lines; 
5. Should be updated to include descriptive values for full/partial/seepage and 
static/dynamic fluid losses so that deviations in return flow can be reported using a 
common frame of reference. Such data can be used to generate acceptable 
downhole loss rates for specific fields; 
6. In order to solve the need for more practice with well-control emergencies, the 
standard should be updated to include requirements for routine well-control 
exercises; 
7. Should specify and require periodic testing of emergency subsea well-control 
activation systems, with due regard to operational activities; 
8. Should include more explicit requirements for primary and back-up BOP control 
systems, their ability to perform in emergencies and testing of them. 
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6. The on-line survey 
6.1. Methodology of data collection from stakeholders 
The survey “European Commission Survey on Offshore Oil & Gas Equipment 2015 – 
Cost of compliance with EU Product Safety Legislation” was developed by the European 
Commission’s DG Joint Research Centre in collaboration with the EC Directorate 
General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW). The 
aim of the survey was to collect information and data in order to perform an analysis of 
the MODU market, and then an assessment study - in terms of costs and benefits - of 
extending the scope of EU product safety legislation (ATEX, Machinery, and Pressure 
Equipment Directives) to equipment installed on-board and intended for use on MODUs. 
The survey was available on-line through the EU Survey platform from June 15th until 
September 30th, 2015. After that – and until October 15th, 2015 – it was possible to 
download the survey as a word document and to send the reply by e-mail. Four 
different versions of the survey were made available, depending on the category of 
interested stakeholders (Public Authorities, Certification Bodies, Companies and Other 
types of entities). The Survey was accompanied by a support letter of DG GROW. 
The survey consisted of four main sections (which were adapted for the different 
stakeholders), i.e.: 
I. Respondent’s profile, where general information on the stakeholder’s category, 
organization’s location, size, and sector, was requested along information on 
present and future sources of revenues; 
II. Information related to Market and applied legislation, which focused on: 
o the specific activity carried out by the enterprise/organization concerning 
equipment installed on offshore oil and gas installations, notably MODUs; 
o the legislation currently applied by the enterprise/organization; 
o the current compliance of the equipment manufactured/installed/supplied by 
the manufacturers/installers/suppliers and of the rigs owned by the drilling 
contractors with EU Product Safety Directives. 
For that purpose the equipment was divided in 6 categories (drilling equipment, 
well intervention equipment, material handling equipment, well-control equipment, 
other pressure equipment and electrical equipment), being these categories 
subdivided in further subcategories. An inventory of the equipment categories is 
given in Section 5.1. 
Related to the six categories/subcategories of equipment the 
enterprises/organizations are asked to: 
o Detail the ones they deal with. 
o Evaluate the importance of each category of equipment in their total revenue: 
a. low importance: <40%; b. medium importance: 40-70%; and c. high 
importance >70%.  
o Foresee if they expect any changes in the overall structure of revenue related 
to the categories of equipment (e.g. a. same level; b. increase; c. decrease; d. 
unknown).  
o Evaluate if the equipment they manufacture/supply/trade/rent/install is in 
compliance with the EU product safety legislation: a. Compliant and certified; 
b. Compliant but not certified; c. Not compliant; or d. Unknown.  
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o Select the standards currently applied among: a. International Standards – 
ISO; b. International Electrotechnical Commission Standards – IEC; c. EN 
European harmonised standards – CEN/CENELEC; d. Norwegian Standards – 
NORSOK; e. British Standards – BS; f. US Standards – such as ASME, API; g. 
Private Standards – such as DNV, etc., and detail the exact name/number of 
standard. 
o Detail other regulations they currently apply. 
III. Information related to Impact Assessment, which focused on the impact of 
the possible extension of the scope of EU Product Safety Directives to cover 
equipment onboard MODUs, in terms of inter alia solved problems, costs, and 
benefits. The section is structured in the following subsections in which the 
enterprises/organizations are asked to provide their opinion about: 
III.1. Safety of the equipment 
o Possible safety problems due to the fact that MODUs are out of the scope 
of the ATEX Directive, MD and PED. 
o Solved problems (safety, environmental, etc.) if the EU Product Safety 
Directives come into force. 
o Suitability of the EU Product Safety Directives for equipment onboard 
MODUs. 
o Necessity of modification of the technical standards currently applied in 
the sector order to meet the Essential Health and Safety Requirements of 
the EU Product Safety Directives. 
o Barriers to trade due to the extension of the EU Product Safety Directives 
(ATEX, MD, PED) to the equipment onboard MODUs. 
III.2. Advantages/disadvantages due to the extension of the Directives 
o Possible disadvantage vis-a-vis their competitors from within/outside 
EU/EEA (e.g. by creating an uneven playfield) due to the compliance 
costs.  
o Way in which the enterprise/organization would offset the costs related to 
the compliance with the EU Product Safety Directives (ATEX, MD, PED): 
a. by increasing investment flows; b. passing the costs to clients by 
increasing the price of the equipment; c. moving to other markets; or d. 
other (to be specified). 
o Benefits or opportunities foreseen due to the compliance of their 
products/services with any of the EU Product Safety Directives (ATEX, 
MD, PED). 
o Way in which the compliance of their products/services with any of the 
EU Product Safety Directives (ATEX, MD, PED) would affect the 
employment in their companies. It would: a. facilitate the creation of new 
job positions in your company; b. lead directly or indirectly to a loss of 
jobs in your company; c. not change the number of posts, but may have 
a qualitative impact on the necessary workforce (e.g. more skilled 
personnel); or d. have no impact on employment? 
III.3. Cost impact/typical case (only for the most important subcategory of 
equipment) 
This part was specific for companies and certification bodies, which had to 
select only one of the six categories of equipment listed above, the one 
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considered as typical for them, for the assessment of impacts. The 
companies had to estimate the substantive and administrative costs to cover 
the selected specific subcategory of equipment if the scope of the EU 
Product Safety Directives is extended. A brief description of the costs 
required to the companies is shown here: 
• Substantive costs: Are the costs related to new design, new materials, 
changes in the production lines, changes in the testing, investments in 
new production machinery, the certification process and the purchase of 
the selected specific subcategory of equipment according to the new 
specifications. It has to be noted that the certification process involves 
not only substantive costs but also administrative costs (see below). 
Substantive costs of the certification process consists of: EC-type 
examination and certification (by the NB (Notified Body)); product 
verification according to the EC type (by the manufacturer); 
examination of the individual equipment through relevant tests (by the 
NB); certification of conformity of the applied tests (by the NB); CE 
marking including other required marking of all the pieces (by the 
manufacturer); and declaration of conformity for all pieces81 (by the 
manufacturer). The substantive costs can be “one-off” (is paid once and 
not repeated) and “per unit produced”.  
 The information was required in a table format, see Table 14. 
Table 14. Substantive costs to cover the selected specific subcategory of equipment with the EU Product 
Safety Directives. 
 ATEX MD PED 
 
One-off Per unit 
produced 
One-off Per unit 
produced 
One-off Per unit 
produced 
New design       
New materials       
Changes in production lines       
Changes in the testing       
Investments in new 
production machinery 
  
  
  
Purchase of the selected 
specific subcategory of 
equipment according to the 
new specifications 
  
  
  
Certification process       
Other comments on the costs       
• Administrative costs: Are the costs related to the familiarization with 
the new regulation, the additional consulting needed and the equipment 
certification. 
Administrative cost of the certification process consists of: Technical 
documentation for the authorities and Notified Bodies (by the 
manufacturer), development/maintenance of the Product Quality 
System (by the manufacturer), and periodical Product Quality System 
assurance (by the Notified Bodies). 
                                           
81 Which is not self-certification 
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The administrative costs can be “one-off” or recurring. In the case of 
the recurring costs, the frequency (how many times per year the cost 
will be repeated) and the estimated time to perform the action 
associated with the cost were required. 
The information was required in a table format, see Table 15. 
Table 15. Administrative costs to cover the selected specific subcategory of equipment with the EU Product 
Safety Directives 
 ATEX MD PED 
 
One-
off 
Frequency 
(times/year) 
Hours 
(h) 
One-
off 
Frequency 
(times/year) 
Hours 
(h) 
One-
off 
Frequency 
(times/year) 
Hours 
(h) 
Familiarisation 
with new 
regulation 
       
  
Additional 
consulting 
  
     
  
Certification 
process 
  
     
  
Other   
     
  
• Additional substantive and administrative costs: Different 
substantive and administrative costs not included previously. 
Additionally the following information was required for the chosen specific 
subcategory of equipment: 
o Average annual production (or number of pieces of the equipment 
supplied/ traded/ rented/ installed); 
o Expected time delays in order to manufacture/supply/trade/rent/install it 
according to que EU Product Safety Directives; 
o Expected difficulties in order to comply with the EU Product Safety 
Directives. 
The Certification Bodies had to estimate the costs for the companies and, if 
applicable, for the Public Authorities related to the certification process of the 
subcategory of equipment chosen. 
 
III.4. Impact of the extension of the Pressure Equipment Directive 2014/68/EU 
(97/23/EC) to well-control equipment 
Currently the Pressure Equipment Directive 2014/68/EU (97/23/EC) (PED) 
does not apply to the equipment used for well-control in oil and gas 
extraction (onshore and offshore, fixed and mobile installations). The 
European Commission is examining the extension of the scope of this 
legislation to cover also well-control equipment. The present section focuses 
on the impact (solved problems, costs, benefits, etc.) of the possible 
extension of the scope of the PED. 
The following aspects were considered within this section of the survey: 
o Problems (safety, environmental, etc.) which could be resolved by 
extending the legislation; 
o Suitability of the PED for well-control equipment; 
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o Particular difficulties that companies may face and affection to the 
market; 
o Necessity of modification of the technical standards which are in use in 
the sector in order to meet the Essential Safety Requirements of the EU 
Product Safety Directives; 
o Barriers to trade if the PED would be extended to cover equipment used 
for well-control. 
IV. Concluding questions, in which the contacted enterprises/organizations were 
asked for their consent to the publication of their replies, either openly or in an 
anonymous form. Participants were also asked if JRC could contact them for further 
questions or clarifications. 
6.2. Profile of the stakeholders who have answered the survey 
The names of the stakeholders which have participated in the EC survey on offshore 
safety and have agreed to the publication of their answers with their data included are 
listed below. 
6.2.1 Companies who have answered the survey 
Companies were grouped in two main categories, i.e. Manufacturers / installers / 
suppliers of equipment and Rig operators and owners. Some of these companies are 
very important in the European MODU market and have a local strong presence also in 
other regions. 
Manufacturers / installers / suppliers of equipment 
o Varco BJ BV (The Netherlands) (www.nov.com) 
Varco BJ BV operates as a subsidiary of National Oilwell Varco and offers 
mechanical components for land and offshore drilling rigs, land drill and well 
servicing rigs, tubular inspection, drill string equipment, and lifting equipment. 
Varco BJ conducts downhole, handling, supply chain, and well services to 
customers throughout the Netherlands; 
o Drillmec (Italy) (www.drillmec.com) 
See a short description of Drillmec in section 7.1; 
o Nine companies which did not want to reveal their identity. 
Drilling contractors and operators 
o Dolphin Drilling LTD Aberdeen (UK) (www.dolphindrilling.no) 
Dolphin Drilling is a well-established name in offshore drilling and has operated in 
all the major offshore oil and gas regions in the world. In recent years, Dolphin 
drilling LTD has carried out drilling operations in most of the major areas of 
offshore activity, including the North Sea, West Africa, East Africa, Mediterranean, 
India, Brazil and Gulf of Mexico. Dolphin drilling LTD provides services to a broad 
cross section of oil and gas companies including many of the majors, independents 
and national oil companies; 
o Saipem (Italy) (www.saipem.com) 
See a short description of Saipem in Section 7.2; 
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o Fifteen drilling contractors did not want to reveal their identity; 
o Two operators (O&G companies) did not want to reveal their identity. 
6.2.2 Certification Bodies who have answered the survey 
All the Certification Bodies answering the survey did not want to reveal their identity. 
6.2.3 Public Authorities who have answered the survey 
o Health and Safety Executive (UK) (www.hse.gov.uk) 
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is a non-departmental public body of the 
United Kingdom with its headquarters in Liverpool, England. It is the body 
responsible for the encouragement, regulation and enforcement of workplace 
health, safety and welfare, and for research into occupational risks in England and 
Wales and Scotland. Responsibility in Northern Ireland lies with the Health and 
Safety Executive for Northern Ireland. The HSE was created by the Health and 
Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. HSE's Energy Division (ED) is responsible for the 
offshore oil and gas industry; 
o Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (Norway) (www.psa.no) 
Petroleum Safety Authority (PTIL-PSA) is an independent government regulator 
subordinated to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs with responsibility for 
safety, emergency preparedness and the working environment in the Norwegian 
petroleum industry. Created on 1 January 2004, PSA are based in Stavanger and 
has just over 170 staff. Before it was established as an independent agency, PSA’s 
duties were part of the responsibilities of the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
(NPD). PSA serves as the regulator for technical and operational safety, emergency 
preparedness and the working environment in all phases of the petroleum industry. 
This means that PSA’s supervision starts with the initial planning of a development 
project and continues through the design, construction, operation and possible 
removal phases. In offshore sector, PSA is responsible for about 80 fixed platforms, 
56 rigs, about 300 subsea installations, 8 land-based plants, 25 thousand people 
and 15.500km of subsea pipelines, all over the Norwegian shelf. 
o Five Public Authorities did not want to reveal their identity. 
6.2.4 Other types of entities who have answered the survey 
o European Community Shipowners’ Association (ECSA) (www.ecsa.eu); 
ECSA is the organization representing the interests of the national shipowners' 
association of EU Member States and Norway. ECSA established in 2014 the first 
Sectorial Group which covers offshore vessels and MODUs.  
o International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA) (www.imca-int.com); 
IMCA is the international association representing offshore, marine and underwater 
engineering companies, with over a thousand members worldwide. Its members, 
owners and operators of a wide range of offshore construction support vessels, 
including dive support, pipelaying and well intervention vessels, carry out marine 
construction activities for the offshore energy industry all over the world. A number 
of its members also operate MODUs. 
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o International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) (www.iadc.org); 
Since 1940, the International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) has 
exclusively represented the worldwide oil and gas drilling industry. Membership is 
open to any company involved in oil and gas exploration, drilling or production, well 
servicing, oilfield manufacturing or other rig-site services.IADC’s contract-drilling 
members own most of the world’s land and offshore drilling units that drill the vast 
majority of the wells producing the planet’s oil and gas. IADC’s membership also 
includes oil-and-gas producers, and manufacturers and suppliers of oilfield 
equipment and services.  
IADC holds consultative status at the International Maritime Organization and 
observer status at the International Seabed Authority. The Association is a leader 
in developing standards for industry training, notably its well-control Accreditation 
Program (WellCAP)® and rig-floor orientation program, RIG PASS® among others.  
IADC is headquartered in Houston and is one of the city’s largest trade and 
professional associations. IADC also has offices in Washington D.C., the 
Netherlands, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates, as well as chapters in the UK, 
Venezuela, Brazil, Australasia, South Central Asia, Southeast Asia, West Africa, the 
Middle East and across the United States. 
o Norwegian Shipowners' Association (NSA) (www.rederi.no). 
The Norwegian Shipowners' Association (NSA) was founded in 1909 and is one of 
Norway´s most recognized industry organisations, serving more than 160 
companies in the field of Norwegian shipping and offshore contractor activities. The 
members of the NSA employ more than 55.000 seafarers and offshore workers 
from more than 50 different nations. The main objectives of the NSA are to protect 
its members’ interests with regard to industrial and employment issues, and to play 
an active role in respect of shared concerns in the industry; 
o A large Notified Body with 250 employees or more dealing with non-destructive 
testing related to MD and PED; 
o A small Health and Safety Consultancy (up to 49 employees). 
6.3. Results of the survey 
A total of fifty one answers to the survey had been collected up until October 16th, 
2015. Of these: 
o Nine answers were submitted from June 18th, 2015 until June 30th, 2015; 
o Seven answers were received during July 2015, but none during August 2015; 
o Most of the answers (eighteen) arrived just before the first deadline (September 
19th), while an additional six were submitted between September 20th and 
September 30th; 
o The last eleven replies were collected during the first two weeks of October (by 
October 15th, 2015). 
In particular, two answers were obtained through personal interviews, carried out on 
September 17th and October 2nd, 2015 with Drillmec and Saipem, respectively. 
Regarding the types of stakeholders involved, the answers received were as follows: 
o Eight from Certification Bodies (15.7%); 
o Seven from Public Authorities (13.7%); 
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o Thirty from Companies (58.8%), of which elven were submitted by manufacturers / 
installers / suppliers of equipment (21.6%) and nineteen by rig operators and 
owners (37.2%); 
o Six from “Other types of entites” (11.8%): Four of them arrive from different 
associations, one from a Notified Body, and another one from a Health and Safety 
Consultancy firm. 
An overview of the answers provided by manufacturers / installers / suppliers of 
equipment and by rig operators and owners are found in Annexes B and C, 
respectively. Answers by Certification Bodies are summarized in Annex D, while Annex 
E contains the replies from Public Authorities. Finally, answers submitted by “Other 
types of entities” are in Annex F. 
6.3.1 Results of the survey: safety aspects of the equipment 
Special attention has been paid to the safety of the equipment analyzing the existence 
of any safety issue which could be evidenced via the survey and the analysis of past 
accidents, and whether these issues could be addressed by an extension of the scope of 
the three Directives or not.  
The views of the stakeholders, sometimes contradicting, have also been included 
through the analysis of their answers to the following questions related to the safety of 
the equipment. For each question an overview of the answers of the different 
stakeholders is included. 
1. Is the fact that MODUs are out the scope of the ATEX Directive, MD, and 
PED creating a safety problem? 
Only 3/7 (42.9%) of the Public Authorities, which represent around 6% of the total 
stakeholders involved in the survey, think that the exclusion of MODUs from the EU 
Product Safety Directives is creating any safety problem.  
On the contrary, (35/51) stakeholders, more than two-thirds (68.6%) of the 
stakeholders involved, believe that the exclusion of MODUs from the EU Product 
Safety Directives does not create any safety problem. In detail, there is no safety 
problem for 3/11 (manufacturers/installers/suppliers); 19/19 (drilling 
contractors/operators); 8/8 certification bodies; 1/7 of public authorities; and 4/6 
of “other types of entities”.  
13/51 of the stakeholders involved in the survey (25.5%) either did not know or 
did not answer. 
The answers of all the stakeholders involved are shown in the Table 16. 
Table 16. Is the fact that MODUs are out of the scope of the EU Product Safety Directives creating a 
safety problem? 
 
Companies 
(Manufacturers) 
Companies (Drilling 
contractors/Operators) 
Certification 
Bodies 
Public 
Authorities 
Other 
types of 
entities 
Yes 0/11 0/19 0/8 3/7 0/6 
No 3/11 19/19 8/8 1/7 4/6 
Did not reply 7/11 0/19 0/8 2/7 1/6 
Do not know 1/11 0/19 0/8 1/7 1/6 
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The opinion of the manufacturers and the drilling contractors/operators is quite 
different. The fact that MODUs are out of the scope of the EU Product Safety 
Directives does not represent a problem for 100% of the drilling 
contractors/operators, while only 27% of the manufacturers/installers/suppliers 
share this opinion. The “other types of entities” group, which are mainly 
associations representing the drilling contractors, in general terms share their 
opinion and 67% of them think that the current exclusion of MODUs of the EU 
Product Safety Directives does not represent a safety problem. 
A similar trend is also observed for the Certification Bodies and an opposite 
tendency is noted for the Public Authorities. While for 100% of the Certification 
Bodies the current exclusion of MODUs of the EU Product Safety Directives does not 
create any safety problem, only around 14% of the Public Authorities share the 
same opinion. 
The share of the stakeholders for which the exclusion of MODUs from the scope of 
the EU Product Safety Directives does not present any problem is shown in Figure 
17. 
 
Figure 17. Share of the stakeholders for which the exclusion of MODUs from the scope of the EU Product 
Safety Directives does not represent any safety problem 
2. Potential solved problems due to the extension of ATEX Directive, MD and 
PED to cover equipment on-board MODUs 
The following bullet points state the view of the concerned stakeholders. 
Manufacturers/installers/suppliers 
o (1/11): The consideration of all sources of ignition, taken into account by ATEX 
Directive, but not by the US standards; 
o (1/11): Documentation related to HSE issues. The extension will enforce more 
documentation to prove that equipment safety has been considered, but 
without contributing significantly more to the actual equipment safety; 
o (2/11): Think that the extension of the Directives will not solve any problem; 
o (1/11): Does not know; 
o (6/11): did not reply to the question. 
Drilling contractors/operators 
Drilling contractors/operators say that the extension of the legislation would not 
solve any problem because: 
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o Safety, health and environmental problems are already addressed because the 
standards currently applying to MODU are equivalent to ATEX Directive, MD 
and PED. 
o One company points out that they have never had any problem with the 
currently used MODUs. 
o It could be though that the “man-machine interface safety” aspect would be 
improved as MD is more specific to man-machine interface safety than some of 
the current used standards, which have a starting point of unit/system 
integrity. However the currently applied standards also address similar aspects 
on men-machine safety as the MD, although it cannot be stated that they are 
fully covered under MD without an in depth review. 
Certification bodies 
o 2/8 declared that “safety and (possibly) environmental aspects” could be 
addressed; 
o 1/8 declared that protection of explosions should be addressed, but it could be 
done by new standards from IEC TC31 (Equipment for explosive atmospheres) 
and IEC TC18 (Electrical installations of ships and of mobile and fixed offshore 
units); 
o 3/8 believed that extending the scope of EU product safety legislation would 
not solve any problem; 
o 2/8 certification bodies did not reply. 
Public Authorities 
The related answers of the Public Authorities have been: 
o PED provides a considerable level of safety for workers and increases the 
systems integrity; 
o Instead of different regimes of legislation for fixed installations (onshore and 
offshore) and MODU’s, there would be only one regime; 
o Instead of different enforcement regimes, the Regulator could supervise more 
consistently; 
o All Stakeholders phase one regime of legislation and enforcement applicable to 
all equipment, wherever it is installed; 
o No confusion of compliance for temporary/mobile well test equipment; 
o The EU product safety legislation would better facilitate and improve risk 
identification, management and communication processes; 
o Mainly problems related to safety and environment; 
o There are not any severe safety problems which can be resolved by extending 
the legislation; 
o This would bring both MODUs and fixed platforms under the same safety and 
environmental requirements that meet the EU relevant Directives and also 
equate them to similar equipment installed onshore. At present, some 
equipment installed on MODUs only meet standards that are not harmonised in 
the EU and which do not meet all the EHSRs of the relevant Directives thus 
undermining the safety system in the EU; 
o Following many potential major hazard incidents, it would be of great value to 
get the EU Product Safety Directives extended to cover mobile units as well, in 
order, amongst other things, to: 
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a. Provide a simplified legislation and regime to increase practicability for 
both the industry and the regulators; 
b. Reduce uncertainty and save time when verifying applicable equipment 
and clarifying supervision roles; 
c. Give a common approach to the risks offshore and onshore for the same 
type of equipment and activity; 
d. Ensure compatible measures for reducing risks and protecting personnel 
wherever they are working; 
e. Provide harmonisation of the scope of the relevant Product Safety 
Directives so work equipment’s status will be consistent. 
Other types of entities 
o Only one believes that extension of scope would solve safety problems and 
improve features in its services. 
A summary of the results is shown in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18. Potential solved problems by extending the legislation; Opinion of all stakeholders 
3. Suitability of the PED to cover well-control equipment / Potential solved 
problems due to the extension of the PED to cover well-control equipment 
The following bullet points state the view of the concerned stakeholders. 
Manufacturers/installers/suppliers 
o (1/11) company thinks that the documentation related to the safety of the 
product would be improved if the EU Product Safety Directives (EU PSDs) are 
extended. The EU PSDs are stricter and require more HSE documentation than 
the currently applied legislation (DNV-GL and ABS), especially in the case of 
the MD, although without contributing directly to equipment safety/quality.  
o (10/11) companies have not answered the question. 
Drilling contractors/operators 
o (1/19) O&G companies think that the extension of the PED would clarify the 
criteria in the EU/EEA area on acceptance of equipment and suggests a gap 
analysis of the PED with the standards currently followed in the industry in 
order to formulate the legislation appropriately.  
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o On the contrary (13/19) companies do not expect any problem to be solved 
because: 
1. In their opinion well-control equipment is already well covered by the 
existing legislation and industry standards, specifically by API standards, in 
which the ESRs of the PED are already implicit. 
2. In particular for well-control equipment (BOPs, etc.) the already applied 
API standards go in great detail regarding to equipment required 
configuration and performance including pressure ratings and safety 
devices, next to fabrication and in use testing requirements. The 
application of PED would not add any value as PED is not specific enough 
for equipment and does not consider these specific requirements. 
3. Well-control equipment is adequately managed by the recently issued API 
Standard 53 (Blow-out Prevention Equipment Systems for Drilling Wells). 
4. Application of a generic Directive to critical emergency equipment to which 
the industry is committed to updating specific standards would be wholly 
counterproductive. 
5. The acceptance and operation of well-control equipment follows very 
specific and extensive regulation and testing procedures that go beyond 
the scope of the EU Directives, more focused on verifying suitability of 
well-control-equipment design to wellbore conditions.  
Certification Bodies 
o 4 of the 6 Certification Bodies dealing with the PED consider the PED 
appropriate to cover well-control equipment; 
o 2 of the 6 Certification Bodies which deal with the PED are not sure about the 
suitability of the PED for well-control equipment. 
o 3 of the 6 Certification Bodies which deal with the PED think that the extension 
of the scope of the PED to cover well-control equipment could solve the 
following problems: 
1. As currently national standards are used, the extension would lead to a 
harmonization of the legislation across the EEA area; 
2. Safety and environmental problems (without specifying which). 
Public Authorities 
o PED provides a considerable level of safety for workers and increases the 
systems integrity. 
4. Do you consider that the currently applicable legislation is sufficiently 
guaranteeing the safety of the equipment? 
The question was asked to 86.3% (44/51) of the stakeholders, since it was not 
asked to Public Authorities. The answers of all the stakeholders involved are shown 
in the Table 17 and in the Figure 19. 
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Table 17. Suitability of the currently applicable legislation for guaranteeing the safety of the equipment 
according to all stakeholders 
 
Companies 
(Manufacturers) 
Companies (Drilling 
contractors/Operators) 
Certification 
Bodies 
Public 
Authorities 
Other 
types of 
entities 
Yes 4/11 19/19 3/8 
Not asked 
4/6 
No 2/11 0/19 2/8 1/6 
Did not reply 5/11 0/19 2/8 1/6 
Do not know 0/11 0/19 1/8 0/6 
 
Figure 19. a) Suitability of the currently applicable legislation for guaranteeing the safety of the 
equipment according to all stakeholders. b) Share of stakeholders for which the current applicable 
legislation guarantees the safety of the equipment 
More than two-thirds (68.2%) of the asked stakeholders, Public Authorities are not 
taken into account since they were not asked, believes that the current legislation 
guarantees an adequate level of safety on MODUs. Again the opinion of the 
manufacturers/installers/suppliers and the drilling contractors/operators diverges. 
The opinion that the currently applicable legislation sufficiently guarantees the 
safety of the equipment is supported by 100% of the drilling contractors/operators 
but only by 36% of the manufacturers/installers/suppliers.  The opinion of the 
“other types of entities” group is again in line with that of the drilling 
contractors/operators. 
Only around 37% of the Certification Bodies think the currently applied legislation 
guarantees the safety of the equipment. This percentage is incoherent with that 
obtained for the Certification Bodies in question 1 (100% of the Certification Bodies 
think the exclusion of MODUs of the scope of the EU Product Safety Directives does 
not represent a safety problem). The results obtained in question 1 and in question 
3 for the manufacturers/installers/suppliers and the drilling contractors/operators 
are coherent. 
The following bullet points state the view of the concerned stakeholders. 
The related comments of the involved stakeholders are: 
Manufacturers/Installers/Suppliers 
o The US standards are as safe as the EU Product Safety Directives. 
Drilling contractors/operators 
o The currently applied national and international legislation (Class, MODU Code, 
API, Oil and Gas Offshore Safety Directive 2013/30/EU, Performance standards 
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for each of the Safety Case and Environmentally Critical Systems (SECS), etc.) 
warrant an equivalent level of safety and are used globally with a good track 
record in the field; 
o In the majority of Root Cause Analysis the main causes are connected to 
human factor, not to equipment design or certification; 
o There are sufficient controls/inspections based on international standards 
already applied on a global basis to MODUs; 
o MODUs are built according to Class Society requirements and comply with 
many API recommended practices, which cover the majority of issues with 
respect to the drilling equipment not covered under IMO MODU Code; 
o There is no evidence of systemic defects under current global standards; 
o An O&G company points out that MODUs are certified before the spud of a new 
well by means of a recognized third part; 
Manufacturers/Installers/Suppliers 
o 2/8 Certification Bodies think the current legislation could guarantee a better 
level of safety as there is still a room for analysis and improvement to make 
the industry safer;  
o 1/8 Certification Body is not sure as it claims that the level of safety depends 
mostly on the manufacturer of the equipment and on the third party.  
“Other types of entities” 
o The currently applicable international and national standards cannot be 
demonstrated to be inferior to the EU Product Safety legislation. Accidents that 
currently occur cannot be considered as evidence of systemic defects in global 
standards that could be remedied by these Directives.  
o Although the MODU Code does not include requirements for industrial 
equipment installed for drilling, other international and national standards for 
machinery and equipment are in place (flag state, coastal state and 
classification society rules) to comply with relevant standards such as IEC, 
NORSOK, API and Class rules. These standards have been in use in the North 
Sea for over two decades and there is no evidence to suggest that they can be 
attributed to a major incident. Furthermore, the standards for equipment used 
on MODUs have been developed to address the specific risks associated with 
offshore O&G operations, which are not addressed by the more generic EU 
Product Safety Directives. 
o A general reduction of the risk levels offshore is much more likely to be 
achieved through the Offshore Safety Directive than the EU Product Safety 
legislation. Under the Oil and Gas Offshore Safety Directive 2013/30/EU, 
operators of MODUs working in the EU that undertake well operations are 
already required to have systems in place to identify, prevent, detect, control 
or mitigate, and respond to major safety and environmental risks, including 
ensuring that Safety and Environmentally Critical Systems (SECS) are meeting 
appropriate performance standards. Thus, MODU operators, which are already 
required to meet robust standards for machinery and equipment through other 
legislative requirements and to justify the risk mitigation measures they put in 
place would, through the extension of the EU Product Safety Directives, be 
required to comply with generic standards that do not address the specifics of 
MODU operations. This fact could create conflict with the goal based approach 
on which the Offshore Safety Directive is based and potentially undermine 
safety. 
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5. Would the EU Product Safety Directives (ATEX Directive, MD, and PED) be 
a suitable legislation for equipment on-board MODUs? 
In Table 18 and in Figure 20 and Figure 21 the answers of all the stakeholders are 
shown. 
Table 18. Suitability of the EU Product Safety Directives for the equipment on-board MODUs according to 
all stakeholders 
 
Companies 
(Manufacturers) 
Companies (Drilling 
contractors/Operators) 
Certification 
Bodies 
Public 
Authorities 
Other 
types of 
entities 
Yes 5/11 3/19 5/8 5/7 1/6 
No 2/11 13/19 2/8 1/7 3/6 
Did not reply 3/11 1/19 1/8 1/7 2/6 
Do not know 1/11 2/19 0/8 0/7 0/6 
 
 
Figure 20. Suitability of the EU Product Safety Directives for the equipment on-board MODUs according 
to all stakeholders 
 
 
Figure 21. Suitability of the EU Product Safety Directives for the equipment on-board MODUs; Share of 
the answers of all stakeholders 
The question was asked to 100% of the stakeholders and while 37% of the 
stakeholders think the EU Product Safety Directives would be suitable for 
equipment on-board MODUs, a slightly larger share of them (41%) think they 
would not. The rest either did not respond to the question or did not know. 
Considering the different stakeholders, this opinion is supported (in descendent 
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order) by: 71.4% of the Public Authorities,  62.5% of the Certification Bodies, 
45.5% of the manufacturers/installers/suppliers, 17.8% of the drilling 
contractors/operators, and 16.6% of the “Other types of entities”.  
The results obtained for all the stakeholders are coherent with the previous ones. 
In Table 19 the results to question 4 (suitability of the current legislation to 
sufficiently guarantee the safety of the equipment on-board MODUs) and question 
5 (suitability of the EU Product Safety Directives for the equipment on-board 
MODUs) of those stakeholders answering in an affirmative manner to both 
questions are shown. 
Table 19. Stakeholders (%) which have answer in an affirmative manner to question 4 (Q4) and question 5 
(Q5); Comparison 
 
Q4. Suitability of the current legislation 
to guarantee the safety of the 
equipment on-board MODUs 
Q5. Suitability of the EU Product 
Safety Directives for the equipment 
on-board MODUs 
Manufacturers (%) 36.4 45.5 
Drilling 
contractors/operators (%) 
100 17.8 
Certification Bodies (%) 37.5 62.5 
Public Authorities (%) 14.2 (*) 71.4 
Other (%) 66.7 16.6 
(*) Answer to question 1 (as question 4 was not asked to Public Authorities) 
Three main opinions can be distinguished among the five stakeholders:  
o The opinion of the manufacturers/installers/suppliers is not clear as similar 
percentages are obtained for opposite questions.  
o Most of the drilling contractors/operators and “Other types of entities” think the 
current legislation guarantees an acceptable level of safety for the equipment 
on-board MODUs and thus only a small percentage of them (around 17%) 
consider the EU Product Safety Directives suitable for the equipment. 
o The Certification Bodies and the Public Authorities have a similar opinion and 
opposite to that of the drilling contractors/operators and “Other types of 
entities”. Only a low percentage of them think the current legislation 
sufficiently guarantees the safety of the equipment on-board MODUs and thus 
a high percentage of them (62-71%) consider the EU Product Safety Directives 
suitable for the equipment. 
The comments coming from the different stakeholders related to the suitability of 
the EU Product Safety Directives are shown below: 
Drilling contractors/operators 
o The EU Product Safety Directives cannot stand alone and replace the existing 
normative references. Other recognized standards should be considered 
instead. 
o For most drilling related equipment and MODU related equipment there are 
more specific regulations available. European Product Safety Directives would 
be handled as an additional requirement on top of the existing legislation. 
o There is no perceived advantage of extending the legislation from a safety 
perspective. 
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o Related to ATEX Directive many markets in the US and Australia have banned 
ATEX certified equipment for its use offshore. 
Related to this view from the drilling contractors it has to be clarified that 
North America is presently not operating with the IEC/ATEX schemes although 
some effort has been made to produce some homogeneity between North 
American and European Standards, most notably the US and Canada's 
adoption of a Zone system (NEC 505) modeled after European Schemes. 
However, despite the great similarity between North American and European 
Zone systems, they are not identical and are not interchangeable. 
o The issue that MODUs not only comply with Flag State, IMO and Class 
(DNV/ABS/Lloyds) requirements but also with a selection coastal state 
requirements pending on the area of operation (such as UK PUWER) would 
complicate the bases (what regulations will be included) for such assessment. 
o If finally the Directives come into force: 
1. The extension of these should be applied only to the new equipment and 
not to the existing one. 
2. In order to formulate the legislation appropriately, a gap analysis of the 3 
Directives with the standards and Codes that are being followed should be 
made. Extensions of the current Directives should be done to adapt them 
to the MODUs specific case.  
Certification Bodies 
o The EU Product Safety Directives would be a suitable legislation to cover 
equipment installed on MODUs although it would not make the equipment 
safer. 
Public Authorities 
o The EU Product Safety Directives (ATEX, MD and PED) would be a suitable 
legislation for the equipment installed on MODUs since they are already applied 
to similar equipment installed on fixed platforms and it is illogical for the same 
process and equipment to be subject to different safety requirements when 
installed in the same location for the same process in the EU. 
“Other types of entities” 
o The application of the Directives could be justified for fixed installations as 
these have hydrocarbons on deck for almost 365 days per year while MODUs 
are exposed to hydrocarbons for less than 20 days per year. 
o Whereas the EU Product Safety Directives act upon manufacturers and 
suppliers, and therefore may be anticipated by the Commission to convey a net 
benefit to consumers in the EU, this is not the case for MODU owners. Indeed 
the reverse is true: barriers to trade can result, possibly in breach of the EU´s 
own treaties. 
o The requirements of the Directives will not in every case be allowable as 
standards outside the EU. The situation would arise, should the EU Product 
Safety Directives be applied to MODUs, that owners could not maintain 
compliance to operate outside Union waters, and MODUs potentially coming to 
EU waters, including ultra- efficient latest generation installations, would be 
deterred by retrofitting costs. The net effect for EU waters would be a 
dedicated fleet of older generation rigs and a rather uncertain future for drilling 
in the EU; particularly in frontier areas such as deep water Mediterranean and 
the Atlantic rim where older rigs are unlikely to be effective. 
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6. Do you consider that an extension of the scope of the ATEX Directive 
would result in safer equipment? 
The answers given by the different stakeholders to the question are shown in Table 
20 and in Figure 22. 
In this case only 74.5% of the stakeholders (38/51) was considered since the 
question was not asked either to Public Authorities or to “Other types of entities”, 
which were asked about the EU Product Safety Directives as a whole (see question 
9).  
The answers are quite homogeneous in the sense that low percentages of the 
considered stakeholders, companies and certification bodies, consider the ATEX 
Directive would increase the safety of the equipment on MODUs. Considering the 
different stakeholders, these percentages in descendent order are as follows: 33.3 
% of the Certification Bodies (only 3/8 Certification Bodies certify equipment 
according to the ATEX Directive), 18.2% of the manufacturers/installers/suppliers, 
and 10.5% of the drilling contractors/operators. 
Table 20. Potential increase in the safety of the equipment on-board MODUs due to the extension of the 
ATEX Directive; Opinion of all stakeholders 
 
Companies 
(Manufacturers) 
Companies (Drilling 
contractors/Operators) 
Certification 
Bodies 
Public 
Authorities 
Other 
types of 
entities 
Yes 2/11 2/19 1/8 
Not asked 
See 
question 
9 
No 5/11 15/19 1/8 
Did not reply 2/11 0/19 6/8 
Do not know 2/11 2/19 0/8 
 
Figure 22. Would the extension of the scope of the ATEX Directive result in safer equipment? Opinion of 
the Companies and Certification Bodies 
Of the 3/8 Certification Bodies which certify equipment according to the ATEX 
Directive, only one thinks that the extension of the ATEX Directive would result in 
safer equipment. A second one thinks the opposite because safety is adequately 
covered by the existing regulations, and the third one has not replied to the 
question.  
The related obtained comments by type of stakeholder are: 
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Manufacturers/installers/suppliers 
o IEC and US standards are more suitable than ATEX Directive although US 
standards should be updated in order to consider all sources of ignition (e.g. 
static electricity, friction, etc.); 
o ATEX Directive would increase safety in equipment because currently when it is 
not legally required only electrical risks are considered (but not other risks); 
o They consider the fact that ATEX allows self-certification is insufficient 
guarantee for the safety as there is no third party involved 
Related to that point, it has to be pointed out that the ATEX Directive only 
allows self-certification for some specific type of equipment with a lower 
hazard. The involvement of a third party (notified body) in the conformity 
assessment is required for the majority of the equipment. The above statement 
that ATEX allows "self-certification" is therefore misleading as it gives the 
impression that all equipment is self-certified. 
Drilling contractors/operators 
o Self-certification, as allowed by ATEX Directive, will very likely lower the safety 
standard. Independent verification as per IEC is a must.  
o Most of the Ex equipment already in use comes from ATEX origins but without 
the certification, or an equivalent international standard. 
o Zone ratings and equipment safety already exists within Class, Flag and HSE 
Case regimes. 
o Electrical safety is already covered by other standards and recommended 
practices. Mechanical requirements of ATEX will be additional. 
o ATEX Directive is not giving any added value to the current implemented 
MODU standards. 
o Current design basis provide equivalent or higher level of safety. 
o Benefits are unclear and an in depth review is required. 
o In order to formulate the legislation appropriately, a gap analysis with the 
standards and codes that are being followed is suggested. A frame to clearly 
specify the requirements that are now dispersed under several standards 
should be set. 
7. Do you consider that an extension of the scope of the MD would result in 
safer equipment? 
The answers given by the different stakeholders to the question are shown in Table 
21 and in Figure 23. 
In this case only 74.5% (38/51) of the stakeholders are considered since the 
question was not asked either to public authorities or “other types of entities”, 
which were asked the European Product Safety Directives as a whole (see question 
9). 
Neither the manufactures/installers/suppliers nor the certification bodies could 
foresee an improvement due to the extension of the MD. Only 10.5% of the drilling 
contractors/operators could foresee it. 
It has to be pointed out that only 2/8 Certification Bodies certify equipment 
according to the MD. Of these, one thinks that the extension of the MD would not 
result in safer equipment because safety is adequately covered by the existing 
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regulations, and the second one has not replied to the question. 6/8 Certification 
Bodies did not reply to the question as they do not work with the mentioned piece 
of legislation. 
Table 21. Potential increase in the safety of the equipment on-board MODUs due to the extension of the 
MD; Opinion of all stakeholders 
 
Companies 
(manufacturers) 
Companies 
(Owners/Operators) 
Certification 
Bodies 
Public 
Authorities 
Other 
types of 
entities 
Yes 0/11 2/19 0/8 
Not asked 
See 
question 9 
No 5/11 13/19 1/8 
Did not reply 3/11 0/19 7/8 
Do not know 3/11 4/19 0/8 
 
Figure 23. Would the extension of the scope of the MD result in safer equipment? Opinion of the 
Companies and Certification Bodies 
The related obtained comments by type of stakeholder are: 
Manufacturers/installers/suppliers 
o O&G companies already have very high safety standards, like US OSHA 
regulations, as well as third parties inspecting the equipment. The extension of 
the legislation would enforce more documentation related to HSE without 
contributing to the actual level of safety of the equipment. 
Drilling contractors/operators 
o Existing global standards have a track record in the field that allows the 
companies to assess their reliability based on data. The same robust basis is 
not available for equipment subject to the MD. 
o MD is not giving any added value to the current implemented MODU standards. 
o Equipment safety already exists within Class, Flag and HSE Case regimes. 
o There are already sufficient internationally recognized standards and 
recommended practices. 
o Current design basis provides equivalent or higher level of safety. 
o Benefits are unclear and an in depth review is required. 
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8. Do you consider that an extension of the scope of the PED would result in 
safer equipment?  
The answers given by the different stakeholders to the question are shown in Table 
22 and in Figure 24. 
In this case only 74.5% (38/51) of the stakeholders are considered since the 
question was not asked either to public authorities or “other types of entities”, 
which were asked the European Product Safety Directives as a whole (see question 
9). 
Table 22. Potential increase in the safety of the equipment on-board MODUs due to the extension of the 
PED; Opinion of all stakeholders 
 
Companies 
(Manufacturers) 
Companies (Drilling 
contractors/Operators) 
Certification 
Bodies 
Public 
Authorities 
Other 
types of 
entities 
Yes 0/11 2/19 2/8 
Not asked 
See 
question 
8 
No 4/11 15/19 3/8 
Did not reply 4/11 0/19 1/8 
Do not know 3/11 2/19 2/8 
 
 
Figure 24. Would the extension of the scope of the PED result in safer equipment? Opinion of the 
Companies and Certification Bodies 
10.5% of the drilling contractors/operators and 33.3% of the Certification Bodies 
((6/8) Certification Bodies deal with the PED) think that an extension of the scope of 
the PED would improve the safety of the equipment. On the contrary, the 
manufacturers/installers/suppliers ((6/11) deal with the PED) would not expect any 
improvement in the safety of the equipment related to the PED. 
The related obtained comments by type of stakeholder are: 
Manufacturers/installers/suppliers 
o Currently applied standards are more suitable (e.g. ASME standards) 
o API standards, which have been improved since Macondo, are exhaustive for 
BOPs. They also think that the extension of the legislation will enforce more 
documentation related to HSE without contributing to the actual level of safety 
of the equipment.  
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Drilling contractors/operators 
o Existing global standards have a track record in the field that allows the 
companies to assess their reliability based on date. The same robust basis is 
not available for equipment subject to the MD and PED. 
o MD and PED are not giving any added value to the current implemented MODU 
standards. 
o Equipment safety already exists within Class, Flag and HSE Case regimes. 
o There are already sufficient internationally recognized standards and 
recommended practices. 
o Current design basis provides equivalent or higher level of safety. 
o Benefits are unclear and an in depth review is required. 
Drilling contractors/operators 
o No, currently safety is adequately covered by the existing regulations. 
o No, because PED would accept some equipment to be self-certified (under 
module H).  
Related to the concern of the drilling contractors/operators about the “self-
certification”, it has to be pointed out that this view is not correct and has to be 
clarified. The PED allows self-declaration (Module A) only for equipment of 
category I whereas for equipment of category II and higher categories the 
involvement of a notified body is always required. Stating that equipment is 
self-certified (under Module H) is wrong. For a conformity assessment 
procedure based on a quality management system (module H) the Notified 
Body certifies the manufacturer's quality system and carries out surveillance to 
make sure that the manufacturer duly fulfils the obligations arising out of the 
approved quality system. The module H requires the involvement of a notified 
body and is no way comparable to “self-certification”. 
 
9. Do you consider that an extension of the scope of the EU Product Safety 
Directives (ATEX, MD and PED) would result in safer equipment? (only for 
“Other types of entities”) 
66.7% of the “Other types of entities” consider that an extension of the scope of 
the EU Product Safety Directives would not result in safer equipment whereas only 
16.7% of them do. Additionally, another 16.7% do not what to think about this 
question. Results are shown in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25. Would the extension of the scope of the EU Product Safety Directives result in safer 
equipment? Opinion of the “Other types of entities” 
In Table 23 a comparison of the affirmative answers obtained for question 5 
(suitability of the EU Product Safety Directives for the equipment on-board 
MODUs), question 6, question 7, question 8 and question 9 (potential increase in 
the safety of the equipment on-board MODUs due to the extension of the ATEX 
Directive, MD and PED) is shown. 
Table 23. Stakeholders (%) which have answer in an affirmative manner to question 5 (Q5), question 6 
(Q6), question 7 (Q7), question 8 (Q8) and question 9 (Q9); Comparison 
Stakeholder 
Q5. Suitability of the 
EU Product Safety 
Directives for the 
equipment on MODUs 
Potential increase in the safety of the equipment 
on-board MODUs due to the extension of the 
Q6. ATEX Directive Q7. MD Q8. PED 
Manufacturers (%) 45.5 18.2 0 0 
Drilling 
contractors/operators 
(%) 
17.8 10.5 10.5 10.5 
Certification bodies (%) 62.5 33.3 0 33.3 
Public Authorities (%) 71.4 Not asked Not asked Not asked 
Other (%) 16.6 16.7% (Q9) 
According to the answers of the asked stakeholders, public authorities were not 
asked, the potential increase of the safety in the equipment on-board MODUs due 
to the extension of the EU Product Safety Directives is very low.  
Only a low percentage of drilling contractors/operators and “Other types of entities” 
(around 17% in both cases) think the EU Product Safety Directives would be 
suitable for the equipment on-board MODUs and consequently also a low 
percentage of them (10.5-16.7%) think the Directives would increase the safety of 
the equipment. Thus the answers of these stakeholders are coherent. 
While 10.5% of the drilling contractors/operators would expect an improvement in 
the safety of the equipment due to the extension of the MD and PED, none of the 
manufacturers/installers/suppliers would. This result does not follow the general 
trend since the position of the manufacturers/installers/suppliers towards the 
extension of the legislation is in general much smoother than that of the drilling 
contractors/operators. 
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On the contrary, inconsistencies have been found for manufacturers and 
Certification Bodies. A high percentage of manufacturers and Certification Bodies 
(45.5% and 62.5% respectively) agree with the suitability of the EU Product Safety 
Directives for the equipment on-board MODUs, whereas only a low percentage of 
them think these Directives would increase the safety of the equipment. 
Safety aspects of the equipment: Summary of the answers of the stakeholders  
To summarize the answers of the stakeholders related to the safety of the equipment it 
can be said that there are different points of view.  
The answers of the drilling contractors/operators and “Other types of entities”, mainly 
associations representing the drilling contractors, are coherent as in general terms they 
do not consider the EU Product Safety Directives suitable for the equipment on-board 
MODUs and thus do not expect safer equipment due to the extension of the Directives.  
A smoother position towards the extension of the Directives is that of the 
manufacturers/installers/suppliers and certification bodies. Although an important 
percentage of them consider the EU Product Safety Directives suitable for the 
equipment on-board MODUs (45.5% of the manufacturers/installers/suppliers, and 
62.5% of the Certification Bodies) only a small part of them could foresee an 
improvement in the safety of the equipment due to the extension of the Directives.  
Taking into account the answers of these stakeholders (manufacturers, drilling 
contractors and their associations, and certification bodies) we have not observed any 
evidence of safety issues requiring immediate attention from the equipment point of 
view. 
On the contrary, public authorities is the most optimistic group towards the extension 
of the Directives as 71.4% of them find the Directives suitable for the equipment on-
board MODUs and 85% of them think that the extension of the scope of the legislation 
would lead to a significant/very important reduction of the risk. 
In fact, two public authorities, being one of these the Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) 
Norway, have given specific examples of potential solved problems for drilling hoisting 
equipment (well casing elevator and riser running tool). This type of equipment was 
designed according to the non-harmonised standard EN ISO 13535 (API 8C). The 
problem was that its design relied on work procedures to ensure the tool was secured 
for lifting. The procedures failed many times, resulting in the tool being dropped. 
Discussions took place with manufacturers and a modified design that met the principle 
of safety integration and hence the requirements of the Machinery Directive (Annex I 
paragraph 1.1.2) were introduced. Thus, this problem has been already solved. 
Another incident related to the Hydraulic workover Snubbing Unit (HWU) which 
happened in 2010 due to the fact that it was not designed to be “fail safe”, has been 
referenced. No more information has been provided in order to know if the problem has 
been already solved; e.g. which design standards were used?, afterwards, was the 
design changed?, Were the EU Product Safety Directives applied?, etc. 
According to the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA Norway), the strength of the 
EU product safety system is the “safety integration” approach and in particular the 
hierarchy of risk reduction measures, with relying on user precautions and Personal 
Protective Equipment (PPE) only after elimination, substitution and engineering means 
to control the risk have been fully applied to meet the State of the Art.  
Additionally, the potential solved problems due to the extension of the legislation would 
be related to HSE documentation, environmental aspects (without specifying which), 
the improvement of risk identification offshore and onshore for the same type of 
equipment and activity, management and communication processes, simplified 
legislation, clarified supervision roles, and harmonization of the scope of the relevant 
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Product Safety Directives. Some answers say that some safety problems would be 
solved but without specifying which.  
The following specific technical issues related to the equipment, but not specific for any 
of the six big categories of equipment identified in this report, have appeared: 
o Through the extension of the ATEX Directive all sources of ignition (e.g. static 
electricity, friction, etc.) could be considered as currently IEC and US standards 
don´t do it. 
o Through the extension of the ATEX Directive the protection of explosions could be 
addressed (although it could be also done by the standards IEC TC31 (Equipment 
for explosive atmospheres) and IEC TC18 (Electrical installations of ships and of 
mobile and fixed offshore units)). 
o Through the extension of the Machinery Directive the “man-machine interface 
safety” aspect could be improved as the MD is more specific to man-machine 
interface safety than some of the current used standards. 
o Through the extension of the PED an increase in the systems integrity would be 
achieved (as well as in the level of safety for workers). 
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6.3.2 Results of the survey: Extension of the PED to cover well-control 
equipment 
The opinion of the different types of stakeholders related to the extension of the PED to 
cover well-control equipment are the following: 
Manufacturers 
The questions about the extension of the PED to the well control equipment haven´t 
attracted much interest from manufacturers/installers/suppliers since only 27% of them 
are dealing with this specific category of equipment. It has not been possible to get 
their opinion because they mainly either didn´t answer or didn´t know. 
Drilling contractors/operators 
A clear position against the extension of the PED to well control equipment has been 
observed for drilling contractors/operators since 68% of them think the PED wouldn´t 
solve any problem, 63% think the PED is not suitable for well control equipment, 74% 
would expect difficulties, and 68% would expect barriers to trade due to its extension.  
Certification Bodies 
Certification Bodies in general support the extension of the PED to cover well control 
equipment since 67% of those dealing with the Directive find it suitable for well control 
equipment, 67% wouldn´t expect barriers to trade, and 50% think it would solve some 
problems.  
An incoherency has been found in their answers since 67% of them would expect 
difficulties due to the extension of the legislation for the companies (the purchase of 
PED compliant material, change of the design code to a “PED friendly code”, 
certification costs and difficulties due to the change of the technical references, and 
lack of availability of approved personnel outside EU as currently the equipment is 
manufactured to a large extent outside the EU/EEA), and 67% of them wouldn´t expect 
barriers to trade (trade barriers could be glimpsed among the mentioned difficulties for 
companies). 
Public Authorities 
The position of the Public Authorities is not very clear as in 80% of the related 
questions at least a 43% of them either didn´t answer of didn´t know what to expect 
(the percentage of Public Authorities which didn´t know or didn´t answer increases to 
71% for 40% of the questions). 
57% of the Public Authorities find the PED suitable for well control equipment although 
43% of them are aware of the difficulties the companies could have. 
A general comment, even among those supporting the suitability of the PED for well 
control equipment, is that the Directive would be appropriate only for a part of the 
equipment because: 1. the acceptance and operation of well-control equipment follows 
very specific and extensive regulation and testing procedures that go beyond the scope 
of the EU Directives, more focused on verifying suitability of well control-equipment 
design to wellbore conditions, and 2. The PED accepts some equipment to be self-
certified (under module H) while the drilling rules should require more involvement of a 
third party.  
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6.3.3 Results of the survey: general view per type of stakeholder 
The survey and the interview results have been analyzed including a comparison of the 
results for the different stakeholders highlighting the major similarities and differences, 
and the coherence of their statements; the logical explanation to the results obtained; 
the unclear points and those points which still require further examination; whether the 
survey allow to draw general conclusions for a given category of stakeholders, and 
finally the survey´s ability to represent a population that is to say, if the different 
stakeholders are representative samples from which extract a general conclusion. 
Companies 
Eleven companies manufacturing/installing/supplying equipment and nineteen 
companies owning/operating a MODU have answered the survey. 100% of the 
manufacturers/installers/suppliers and around 89% of the drilling contractors/operators 
are present at least in one European country.  
Although in other sections of the document the associations of drilling contractors have 
not been considered together with the drilling contractors, the view of ECSA, an 
association representing the drilling contractors, has been also introduced in this 
section since its position is in line with that of the drilling contractors. 
These are big-sized companies: 82% of the manufacturers/installers/suppliers and 89% 
of the drilling contractors/operators have more than 250 employees.  
Contradicting views have been gathered concerning equipment installed on MODUs vs. 
that installed on offshore fixed platforms and onshore platforms as the equipment is 
almost identical for 82% of the manufacturers/installers/suppliers but only for 5% of 
the drilling contractors/operators. The reason for that is that drilling 
contractors/operators, instead of considering a comparison among the common 
equipment for fixed and mobile rigs, consider the extra specific equipment on MODUs 
due to their mobile nature and for overcoming the effects caused by weather 
conditions, and which obviously is not the case on fixed platforms. As a result, only a 
small part of them consider the equipment identical. On the contrary, for the 
manufacturers/installers/suppliers, which have focused their comparison in the 
differences for the common systems in mobile and fixed platforms, probably by 
comparing the equipment categories they deal with for both types of rigs, found the 
equipment almost identical. 
The equipment mainly considered for the drilling contractors/operators is the following: 
o Specific equipment due to the mobile nature of MODUs: marine systems (ballast, 
bilge, mooring, etc.), positioning equipment and navigation equipment. 
o Specific equipment developed to overcome effects caused by weather conditions: 
marine riser system (riser pipe, riser tensioners and ancillaries), motion 
compensating and tensioning system, and heave compensator. 
According to ECSA the diverging opinions (apart from the marine elements, as 
highlighted) in the replies with respect to differences in equipment are due to the fact 
that, in spite of the hardware in some cases not necessarily exhibiting significant 
differences, the usage pattern and operational envelopes are completely different. 
In our opinion, the answers of the drilling contractors/operators could be also 
interpreted as a justification for applying different legislation to fixed rigs and MODUs. 
This means that if the equipment on both types of rigs is quite different, it is logical 
that the EU Product Safety Directives apply to fixed platforms and not to MODUs. 
In spite of the diverging opinions of manufacturers/installers/suppliers and drilling 
contractors/operators, some common answers have been also given by these two 
stakeholders: 
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o BOPs installed in jack-ups and fixed rigs are different from those installed in 
floaters (semisubmersibles/drill-ships). 
o Power generation and distribution systems, which vary among MODUs and even 
more if compared to fixed facilities. 
100% of companies (both manufacturers/installers/suppliers and drilling 
contractors/operators) obtain revenue from EU/EEA, and at least 50% of them get 
revenue from Asia Pacific, Africa/Middle East and the US. A decrease in revenues is 
expected by 18% of the manufacturers/installers/suppliers and by 53% of the drilling 
contractors in case of extension of the legislation. 
According to the manufacturers/installers/suppliers an important part of the equipment 
manufactured, installed, supplied is currently compliant with the EU Product Safety 
Directives (91% with the ATEX Directive, 73% with the MD and 64% with the PED), 
whereas the current compliance of the assets of drilling contractors with the EU Product 
Safety Directives is much lower: 23% with the ATEX Directive, 23% with the MD and 
59% with the PED. 
100% of the drilling contractors/operators think the current legislation guarantees an 
acceptable level of safety for the equipment on-board MODUs. In general it can be said 
that in their opinion everything is already well covered and should not be touched upon. 
The following statements coming from the drilling contractors are, among many others, 
only two examples demonstrating this: 
o Well-control equipment is already well covered by the existing legislation and 
industry standards, specifically by API standards, in which the ESRs of the PED are 
already implicit.  
o The acceptance and operation of well-control equipment follows very specific and 
extensive regulation and testing procedures that go beyond the scope of the EU 
Directives, more focused on verifying suitability of well-control-equipment design to 
wellbore conditions.  
As a consequence, only around 17% of the drilling contractors/operators consider the 
EU Product Safety Directives suitable for the equipment and only 10.5% think the new 
legislation would increase the safety of the equipment. 
An inconsistency has been specifically found for manufacturers: 45% find the EU 
Product Safety Directives suitable, whereas only a low percentage of them (18% for the 
ATEX Directive and 0% for the MD and the PED) think these Directives would increase 
the safety of the equipment. 
54% of the manufacturers/installers/suppliers think their companies would not be at a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis their competitors from within EU/EEA in case of extension of the 
legislation because the same rules would theoretically apply for all competitors and 
because according to them an important part of the equipment manufactured, installed, 
supplied, as explained above, is already compliant with the EU Product Safety 
Directives. On the contrary, 63% of the drilling contractors/operators would expect a 
disadvantage because the approach to compliance may differ among the MODU owners 
(the age of the rigs would be a significant factor in the cost). 
Related to the possible disadvantages vis-à-vis their competitors from outside EU/EEA, 
the manufacturers/installers/suppliers are optimistic. 54% of them would not expect 
any disadvantage because the equipment they manufacture/install/supply is already 
compliant with the EU Product Safety Directives and they currently manufacture 
according to the three Directives for many parts of the world. 79% of the drilling 
contractors/operators think the opposite because it would be an unfair advantage for 
units which do not have to comply with the EU safety product Directives when 
competing for working outside Europe. 
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54% of the manufacturers/installers/suppliers do not indicate the impact in terms of 
costs that the extension of the legislation would have for their business. Only one 
company has evaluated the substantive and administrative costs. This company, whose 
equipment is not compliant with any of the Directives, and which manufactures up to 
350 units/sets of drilling equipment (hoisting, lifting, handling and rotary systems) per 
year evaluates the costs of compliance in € 12.5 mln per year. The breakdown of the 
costs is shown in Annex B. 
The drilling contractors/operators also find it difficult to estimate the impact in term of 
costs but define it as extremely high. Only three companies have provided rough 
approximations of the costs (the breakdowns of the costs are shown in Annex C). 
• A drilling contractor which is currently planning the replacement of the BOPs and its 
controls to comply with the latest API specifications says that the operation would 
have a cost of USD $25 mln. This company is not aware of any EU Product Safety 
Directives compliant BOPs currently available in the market. The breakdown of the 
cost is shown in Annex C. 
• Another drilling contractor has estimated an overall total cost of compliance with 
the EU Product Safety Directives in € 28 mln per MODU.  
• A third drilling contractor which is active only in Europe and has selected the 
drilling equipment (hoisting, lifting, handling and rotary systems) as the specific 
equipment subcategory, has roughly estimated the costs of compliance for this 
subcategory in the range € 10-75 mln per MODU rig, depending on whether current 
equipment can be reviewed for certification compliance or needs replacement by 
new equipment. 
In order to offset the costs, 64% of the manufacturers/installers/suppliers would 
transfer the costs to the clients by increasing the price of the equipment. In the case of 
the drilling contractors/operators a much more drastic solution could be expected, as 
79% of them see the exit of the European MODU market as the best option.  
27% of the manufacturers/installers/suppliers and 68% of the drilling 
contractors/operators would expect time delays in their business if the legislation is 
extended. These results are again in line with the strong position of the drilling 
contractors/operators towards the EU Product Safety Directives. Only one 
manufacturer, a company manufacturing 2,400 pieces per year of drilling equipment, 
and whose equipment is not compliant with any of the three Directives, has quantified 
the extra time between 8 and 20 months. In the case of drilling contractors, diverse 
results have been obtained: 18 months, 2.5 years for BOP sub-components, minimum 
3 years, and 5-10 years to re-certificate/renew the equipment in all units. 
According to ECSA the manufacturers/suppliers/installers would not likely perceive an 
extension of the Directives as a disadvantage since the cost would be offset to the 
MODU owners, though some of them might be concerned by additional legal liabilities. 
ECSA also thinks that an extension of the Directives would not be perceived as a barrier 
to trade by the manufacturers/installers/suppliers, as their trade outside of the 
European community is rather limited compared to drilling contractors. 
The section on the extension of the PED to well-control equipment has not attracted 
much attention from manufacturers/installers/suppliers and only 16% of them have 
answered those questions. According to ECSA the low interest of the 
manufacturers/suppliers/installers in the well-control equipment questions is due to the 
fact that not very many of them manufacture or assemble well-control equipment.  
On the other hand, around 71% of the drilling contractors/operators would expect 
barriers to trade and other types of difficulties due to the extension of the PED to well-
control equipment.  
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Taking into account i) the size of the companies drilling contractors/operating a rig, ii) 
the fact that five of them are among the top ten offshore drilling contractors in January 
2015 and iii) the fact that their answers are in line with those of very important 
European and International associations representing and serving drilling contractors, it 
can be concluded that the answers received are representative and robust conclusions 
can be made for drilling contractors/operators. 
On the other hand, considering the small number manufacturing/installing/supplying 
companies who answered the survey (11), and the fact that most of them (64%) deal 
with only one or two categories of equipment, out of the six big categories identified in 
the report, it is difficult to provide conclusions of general validity.  
ECSA remarks that MODU Code, flag state requirements, Classification Society 
requirements, and coastal state requirements are all relevant for a MODU, and not only 
the MODU Code. ECSA also points out that no MODUs in the Union waters would gain 
acceptance of its Report on Major Hazards (safety case) without demonstrating full 
adherence with the MODU Code, compliance with regional seas and flag state 
requirements, and maintenance of Classification society rules.  
ECSA also highlights the Section 2.1.3 of the MODU Code where it is specified that 
“each MODU should be designed, constructed and maintained in compliance with the 
structural, mechanical and electrical requirements of a Classification Society” and the 
fact that such a Classification Society “has recognized and relevant competence and 
experience with offshore petroleum activities”.  
ECSA adds that the present edition of the MODU Code (2009 edition, as amended), in 
consideration of the inclusion of classification society rules, addresses virtually all the 
structure, machinery and electrical systems of a MODU that can be included in the 
shipyard construction contract. Furthermore, the MODU Code has been amended twice 
since the 2009 edition was approved and is currently under revision, in consideration of 
the results of the Macondo incident investigations.  
Certification Bodies 
Eight replies from Certification Bodies have been received. 4/8 certify equipment for all 
types of rigs (MODUs, fixed offshore and onshore), 3/8 only for some installations and 
1/8 is certifying according to the PED but deals only with recreational crafts and thus is 
not involved in the O&G sector. 3/8 answers are coming from different departments of 
the same Certification Body, a very large and important one, and 2/8 are large and 
recognized Certification Bodies.  
Although an important percentage of them (62.5%) consider the EU Product Safety 
Directives suitable for the equipment on-board MODUs, only a small part of them could 
foresee an improvement in the safety of the equipment due to the extension of the 
Directives (only 33.3% think that the ATEX Directive and the PED would improve the 
safety of the equipment and 0% think the MD would increase the level of safety). 
Related to the differences between the equipment installed on MODUs and on fixed 
platforms, for 50% of the Certification Bodies the equipment is almost identical with 
small modifications due to the adverse conditions of use (e. g. salt water, strong 
vibrations, ice...), and the fact that must endure the dynamic behaviour from wave 
actions, etc. 25% Certification Bodies replied that the question is not applicable since 
there is a variety of equipment that is identical while some have different requirements 
due to special functions or additional load of moving vessels. The other 25% of the 
Certification Bodies did not reply. Thus, as explained above the differences would be 
mainly related to the mobile nature of MODUs and to its specific equipment to 
overcome effects caused by weather conditions. 
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The Certification Bodies were asked about the expected costs for the companies due to 
the certification process of one sub-category of equipment. The selected sub-category 
was treated as a typical case or example and detailed information on costs were asked. 
They were also asked about the expected cost for the Public Authorities. Only 25% of 
the Certification Bodies answered the question. The first one said that some extra costs 
could be expected for companies but not for Public Authorities. The second one said 
that the well-control equipment would increase its price in 20%. As in the case of the 
companies, incomplete information was obtained. 
Considering that very few Certification bodies replied to the survey, we find the 
obtained answers not representative of this specific stakeholder. In particular, we did 
not receive any answers from Standardization Bodies: their answers would have been 
very valuable as, currently, most of the stakeholders are concerned about the lack of 
harmonised standards in the sector, which is foreseen as not achievable in a short time. 
The answers of the Certification Bodies are very well elaborated and there was no 
indication that these were driven by some interest. However, the extension of the 
Directives could be interpreted as an extra source of income for the Certification 
Bodies, in contraposition with the opinion of the drilling contractors and operators, 
which find it difficult to estimate the impact in term of costs but define it as extremely 
high. 
Public Authorities 
Seven replies from Public Authorities have been received and four of them are coming 
from countries which are the biggest producers of oil and gas in Europe (EU/EEA).  
The views of the Public Authorities and the drilling contractors are divergent in what it 
has to see with the safety of the equipment and the applied legislation. Whereas in the 
opinion of 100% of the drilling contractors/operators all the equipment on-board 
MODUs is well covered by the currently applied legislation and should not be touched 
upon, 71.4% of the Public Authorities, which is the most optimistic group towards the 
extension of the Directives, find the EU Product Safety Directives suitable for the 
equipment on-board MODUs. Also, 86% of the Public Authorities think that the 
extension of the scope of the legislation would lead to a significant/very important 
reduction of the risk. 
As an example of the view of the Public Authorities, the Petroleum Safety Authority 
Norway thinks that the strength of the EU product safety system is the “safety 
integration” approach and in particular the hierarchy of risk reduction measures, with 
relying on user precautions and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) only after 
elimination, substitution and engineering means to control the risk have been fully 
applied to meet the State of the Art.  
The experience of the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway says that many international 
standards such as those produced by API, do not follow the above principal and rely too 
much on the user controls. As a consequence the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway 
does not believe that API “must be adopted” as the basis for best practice worldwide – 
rather the exact opposite, (since API is not accepted worldwide). According to this 
Public Authority API has not in many cases proven to be “good enough”, is deficient in a 
number of areas, covers mainly technical requirements but says little about operational 
requirements and, among other shortcomings, API completely lacks “defined 
requirements” for the reliability of safety-critical functions/equipment. The Petroleum 
Safety Authority Norway says that has sufficient knowledge to affirm that there is a gap 
between the API relevant requirements and the essential safety requirements 
(EHRS) of the Machinery Directive. They believe this is demonstrated by the lack of any 
of such API standards being harmonised in the EU. 
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In view of the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway the situation of having in effect two 
similar, if not the same, environments (e.g. drilling a well)  in Europe with one fully 
meeting the EU’s product safety requirements and a second meeting standards that 
have not been able to be harmonised with these requirements undermines the EU’s 
new approach.  
Norwegian PSA provided examples of near misses, accidents and events that could, but 
for mm or seconds (i.e. luck), could have resulted in a major event, and their analysis 
have shown that equipment (including the lack of good instructions for use and 
maintenance) fell short of EU requirements i.e. the Machinery Directive. 
In spite of being very positive towards the extension of the legislation, the Public 
Authorities are aware of the possible obstacles that companies could have. 86% of 
them think that companies could face difficulties due to the extension of the legislation 
and 50% would expect barriers to trade. 
Having in mind their experience with the EU Directives and with their domestic 
legislation in the offshore oil and gas sector, and having in mind that the overall level of 
safety in offshore as well in onshore industry of those countries are practically among 
the highest worldwide, reliable conclusions can be drawn. In addition, if we consider the 
fact that 100% of the Public Authorities answering the survey deal with the ATEX 
Directive, MD and PED, we can conclude that the obtained answers are representative 
of the mentioned stakeholder. 
In our opinion there is no indication that the received answers of the relevant 
competent authorities were driven by some other interest aside of increasing the level 
of safety within the European waters.  
6.3.4 Unclear points / points which still require further examination 
The following bullet points refer to issues of concern for drilling contractors, operators 
and manufacturers who participated in the survey. 
o As it has not been possible to extract complete information about the expected 
costs of compliance of the equipment with the EU Product Safety Directives, their 
estimation still remains as an unclear point. Even though the survey included 
specific questions related to substantive costs (one-off, per unit produced) and 
administrative costs, such information was not provided by the respondents 
although the question was limited to specific subcategories in order to avoid too 
burden for the respondent. 
The general comment from the drilling contractors/operators is that it is not 
possible to specify the costs unless the applicability is clarified (Never applicable to 
existing units?; Applicable to existing units but after a given date in the future?; or 
Only applicable to MODUs constructed after a given date in the future?). In 
addition, the drilling contractors/operators have stated that the cost also depends 
on the possibility that the equipment is reviewed for certification compliance or 
needs replacement by new equipment. Any retrospective application of the 
Directives on existing equipment would be technically and financially challenging. 
Even the manufacturers of equipment whom the drilling contractors are speaking 
with, have no proposal to comply or are unwilling to give figures at this stage. 
Related to this concern expressed by the drilling contractors/operators, it has to be 
clarified that the new legislation would only be applicable as of a certain 
point in time and cannot be retroactive, thus it would only apply to new 
equipment. 
Additionally dates when a new Directive becomes applicable is communicated in a 
timely manner and subject of the discussion in the legislative process. Moreover, 
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there are always transitional provisions in such situation. Thus, the legislative 
process would result in requirements to be met only by the new equipment. 
o The drilling companies would find it difficult to comply with the EU Product Safety 
Directives because of the huge variety of equipment onboard. A large share of the 
companies suggested the European Commission to conduct a gap analysis to know 
the compatibility between the currently used standards and installed equipment 
and the EU Product Safety Directives.  
Taking as an example a specific subcategory of equipment (eg. BOP), these 
companies are concerned about the compatibility between worldwide used industry 
API standards, as BOPs are currently designed to these, and the PED. The 
companies would need that major Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) advise 
them of anticipated difficulties in maintaining worldwide API compliance whilst 
adding EU specific Directives requirements. 
o In case of the extension of the legislation to MODUs the drilling 
contractors/operators are concerned about the “self-certification” of equipment as 
allowed for some equipment by the ATEX Directive. In their opinion the “self-
certification” of equipment would lower the safety standards. 
The worry expressed by the drilling contractors and operators is unfounded since, 
as explained, the ATEX Directive only allows self-certification for some specific 
types of equipment with low hazard, whereas the involvement of a Notified Body 
(third party) in the conformity assessment is required for the majority of the 
equipment. 
Currently, manufacturers/suppliers (or importers, if the manufacturers are outside 
the EU) must ensure that their products meet Essential Health and Safety 
Requirements of the ATEX Directive and undergo appropriate conformity 
procedures. This usually involves testing and certification by a ‘third-party’ 
Certification Body (known as a Notified Body).  
Additionally manufacturers/suppliers can draw up a written “Declaration of 
Conformity” by following the procedure relating to "Internal Control of Production" 
(referred to in Annex VIII of the ATEX Directive). The self-declaration by the 
manufacturer or his authorized representative is allowed only in the following 
cases:82: 
 Category 3 of equipment (equipment for zone 2): by preparing a technical 
dossier that includes drawings, hazard analysis and users` manual in the local 
language. 
 Category 2 of equipment (equipment for zone 1): Provided that it is not either 
electrical equipment or equipment dealing with internal combustion engines. In 
this case the technical dossier must be lodged with a notified body. 
The concern of the drilling contractors/operators about “self-certification” of 
equipment is also related to the PED as in their opinion the Directive accepts some 
equipment to be “self-certified” under module H (full quality assurance). It has to 
be pointed out that this view of the drilling contractors/operators is not correct and 
has to be clarified.  The conformity assessment module H (full quality assurance) 
requires the involvement of a Notified Body certifying the manufacturer's quality 
system. The Notified Body carries out surveillance to make sure that the 
manufacturer duly fulfils the obligations arising out of the approved quality system. 
Thus, the module H is not comparable to “self-certification”. It should be noted also 
                                           
82 Declaration of conformity is always needed but it is not a self-declaration. In all cases, regardless of 
whether a NB is involved in the conformity assessment or not, the manufacturer has to make the Declaration 
of conformity. 
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that the term self-certification as such does not exist in PED. What is probably 
meant is the conformity assessment procedure (Module A – internal production 
control) whereby the conformity assessment is completed by the manufacturer 
without the involvement of a notified body. This procedure is only allowed for 
equipment of category I (lowest hazard category under PED).  
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7. Interviews with the stakeholders 
Two personal interviews were carried by the JRC team, i.e. on September 17th with 
DRILLMEC (in Piacenza, Italy) and on October 2nd with Saipem (in San Donato 
Milanese, Italy). 
7.1. Interview with DRILLMEC 
The interviewed persons were Angelo Calderoni, Vice President R&D; Marco Lombardi, 
Sales Manager for Offshore and Francesco Colaianni and Luca Abelli, members of the 
Drillmec’s team dealing with legislation, European Directives and certification. On behalf 
of the European Commission, the interviewers were María Aránzazu Aznárez and Dejan 
Brkić. The meeting took place in Podenzano on September 17th 2015. 
Related to the possible extension of the EU Product Safety Directives (ATEX, MD, and 
PED) to cover MODUs, DRILLMEC explained that the equipment they manufacture for 
fixed platform and jack-up units are almost identical. Conversely there is a substantial 
difference between platform/jack-up rigs and floater-based rigs (i.e. semisubmersibles 
and drill-ships), such as but not limited to the heave compensation systems. Likewise 
the BOPs installed on jack-ups and platform-based rigs are different from those 
installed on floaters. DRILLMEC’s packages are manufactured on request and thus 
tailored according to the specific project requirements. In that way they are certified 
following requests by the companies, such as to follow certification scheme of ABS, 
RMRS, CE, NORSOK, ATEX, GOST, API. 
The equipment manufactured by DRILLMEC is compliant and certified with ATEX and 
MD, and also with most of the standards worldwide applied as the equipment is "state-
of-the-art". DRILLMEC claims that their equipment can be certified in Europe as in the 
US without prior modification. Sometimes, there are some specific requirements e.g. 
painting or galvanization which are different in Europe and US and are more stringent 
in Russia. As the drilling equipment is out of the scope of PED, both onshore and 
offshore, this equipment is not compliant with PED. On a case-by-case basis DRILLMEC 
supplies critical equipment sourced from other companies e.g. BOPs. So, if the PED 
would finally come into force DRILLMEC will have to be sure that the equipment 
supplied to them is compliant with the PED. DRILLMEC explained that ATEX 
requirements for fixed platforms do not differ from IEC requirements used worldwide 
and on MODUs in European waters.  
DRILLMEC also introduced the concept of “continuous mud circulation” applied during 
drilling operations, one of the most important technological developments after 
Macondo accident, occurred in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. As explained in the 
Norwegian standard NORSOK D-10, there must be “two safety barriers” in the well 
where the first one is hydraulic and the second one is mechanical. Barriers must be 
tested, independent, durable and reliable: the safety level provided by the hydraulic 
barrier can be significantly improved introducing the continuous circulation system 
manufactured by DRILLMEC. 
This is in line with a previous study carried out by the European Commission dealing 
with an inventory of the Best Available Technologies which can introduce a higher level 
of safety during drilling operations in European waters. DRILLMEC also manufactures 
many automated improvements in order to avoid the presence of workers in the drilling 
floor and during dangerous operations.  
To summarize DRILLMEC does not see any obstacle or barrier to trade if the scope of 
the EU Product Safety Directives (ATEX and MD) would finally be extended to cover also 
oil and gas equipment specifically designed to be installed on MODUs. 
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7.2. Interview with Saipem 
The meeting took place on October 2nd 2015 in Saipem´s headquarters in San Donato 
Milanese (MI). The interviewed persons were Franco Pandolfi, Senior Vice President 
from Drilling Business Unit; Giancarlo Denegri, Vice President; Ricardo Vatta, HSE & 
Systainability Department; Fortunato Amaddeo, Drilling Business Unit; Marco 
Cascianini, Drilling Business Unit; Cristian Scaini, Business and Technology 
Development. On behalf of the European Commission, the interviewers were María 
Aránzazu Aznárez and Dejan Brkić.  
The comments/observations of Saipem are shown below: 
1. Currently much of the equipment installed or used on MODUs is excluded from the 
scope of the EU Product Safety Legislation, and well-control equipment is excluded 
from the scope of the PED. It should be noted, however, that marine equipment 
such as marine pollution prevention equipment, life-saving appliances and fire 
protection equipment installed on European MODUs has to comply with the Marine 
Equipment Directive 96/98/EC. MODUs are also subject to international maritime 
safety regulations, in particular the 2009 IMO MODU Code (Resolution A.1023.(26)) 
which is correlated with the requirements of the Marine Equipment Directive 
96/98/EC. The Directive 96/98/EC (or Marine Equipment Directive - MED) applies 
to equipment installed and used on-board ships that are registered in the EU, 
including Norway and Iceland. Such equipment (as listed in Annex A to the MED) 
must meet specific international conventions, relevant IMO resolutions and 
circulars, and relevant international testing standards. The purpose of the Directive 
96/98/EC is "to enhance safety at sea and the prevention of marine pollution" and 
"to ensure the free movement of the above-mentioned equipment within the EU, 
the European Economic Area (EEA), Iceland and Norway" (Article 1).  
2. EU Safety Directive 2013/30/EU83: All MODUs operating within the EU have, or 
will shortly have a Report on Major Hazards (RoMH) in compliance with the EU 
Offshore Oil and Gas Safety Directive 2013/30/EU; this requires owners to identify 
and assess major safety and environmental risks and from that set in place 
systems to identify, control or mitigate these risks. For each of these systems there 
is a requirement those identify as Safety & Environmentally Critical Systems 
(SECS) and to set Performance Standards for them. These SECS use international 
standards as a bench mark. Owners then have to internally assure themselves that 
the SECS are meeting their Performance Standards and this is further 
independently verified.  
There is a general duty on suppliers, owners and operators of equipment that is not 
a SECS to undertake assessments of that equipment to ensure it meets applicable 
regulations, so it can be deemed to be "fit for purpose". An example of such 
equipment is a workshop tool. These assessments have to be updated on an 
ongoing basis e.g. when equipment is changed in some way, or used for a different 
purpose.  
3. MODU standards: The European Commission Survey compares ATEX, MD and 
PED against the MODU Code, and in the opinion of Saipem it does not appear to 
recognize the other standards that MODUs comply with such as Class Rules, Flag 
Authority Requirements, API, IEC, NORSOK etc. These standards have now been 
used worldwide since some decades and during that time there is no evidence they 
are not "fit for purpose" i.e. no major accident can be attributed to inadequate 
standards of applicable machinery or equipment.  
                                           
83 Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on safety of offshore 
oil and gas operations and amending Directive 2004/35/EC Text with EEA relevance. 
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4. Cost Impact: ATEX, MD and PED are aimed at manufacturers and suppliers, and 
are non-specific to consumers. Saipem appreciates that consumers are seen as a 
beneficiary by the European Commission, because equipment certified under these 
instruments may not be refused entry by any Member State. However in the 
context of having tens of thousands of items of relevant equipment and sub-
components etc. on a MODU, any benefit of cross-EU acceptance is completely 
submerged by prohibitive cost and unfeasible logistics.  
The Survey, whilst intended for response by MODU owners, is not drafted to be 
appropriate for users of such equipment such Saipem is. It has proven extremely 
difficult to obtain meaningful estimates from suppliers of relevant equipment and 
potential certifiers, therefore specific cost impacts of ATEX, MD and PED application 
to MODUs cannot be provided with any accuracy. Even in the event that 
manufacturers, suppliers, certifiers make detailed returns to the Survey it is 
difficult to envisage how the cost impact on MODU owners may be estimated via 
such data.  
That cost implications and revenue impacts are related to the on-costs from the 
suppliers, and retrofitting, downtime etc. Potential inability to retrofit and inferior 
standards of ATEX, MD and PED in some cases which would prevent retrofitting are 
further complications and -inevitably - high cost points.  
Costs arising from compliance to ATEX, MD and PED are unlikely to be recoverable 
by drilling contractors. Where contractual agreements permit this it has proven 
very difficult to enforce. But even where cost pass-through is achieved, the net cost 
to the sector results in reduced capacity for spending elsewhere on safety-related 
improvements.  
Manufacturers cost on the other hand; although not direct costs to MODU owners, 
will always pass-through from the manufacturers and suppliers. Re-certification, 
downtime, retrofitting and non-conformance of ATEX, MD and PED with 
international standards etc. will all fall to the MODU owner to reconcile.  
5. Operations: Whilst the application of ATEX, MD and PED may be justified for 
installations that are fixed, it is not justified for installations that are mobile 
(MODUs), and intermittently and rarely encountering the main major hazards of 
fixed installations: hydrocarbon releases that could lead to explosions and fires. 
Due to the nature of drilling it could be said that less than 20 days per year would 
have an open hydrocarbon column on any MODU in EU waters, and throughout the 
EU only 2 wells being drilled at any one time would be in this condition. 
6. Barriers to trade: Saipem also explained that in their opinion, the extension of 
the scope of the EU Product Safety Directives (ATEX, MD, and PED) to cover 
relevant equipment installed on MODUs will establish some barriers to trade.  
MODU's inside EU applying for work outside EU waters would need to attempt to 
maintain dual standards, as ATEX, MD and PED would not necessarily be 
recognized as international standards. The cost of compliance in the EU and 
remaining in compliance internationally would be a barrier when competing for 
work outside EU with non-EU compliant rigs. This applies equally to rigs outside 
EU; ATEX, MD and PED would be a deterrent to entry to EU for example to latest 
generation MODUs that are not EU-compliant but nonetheless fitted and 
certified/classed to latest international standards.  
Inside the EU, barrier to trade arises from differing approaches to compliance, e.g. 
a MODU owner of an early generation MODU may rely solely on ATEX, MD and PED 
certification and procedures whereas another, late generation MODU may aim for 
dual compliance in- and outside EU, i.e. the market would be skewed to favor 
minimum standards of MD and PED. 
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7. Blow Out Preventers (BOPs): In opinion of Saipem the application of a generic 
standard to critical emergency equipment to which the industry worldwide is 
heavily engaged in updating specific standards API (API Standard 53 - Blow-out 
Prevention Equipment Systems for Drilling Wells; in case of BOP) would be wholly 
counterproductive (and counterintuitive).  
To summarize Saipem is strongly against the extension of the scope of the EU Product 
Safety Directives (ATEX, MD, and PED) to cover relevant equipment installed on 
MODUs. It is also against the extension of PED to cover Blow Out Preventers (BOPs) 
and related well-control equipment. 
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8. Policy options 
In the light of the analysis performed and of the evidence gathered – which include 
analysis of the relevant legislation and standards, survey results, interviews with 
stakeholders, analysis of past accidents, and literature - some qualitative conclusions 
regarding the socio-economic and environmental impacts of different policy options can 
be made. These conclusions may be used as an input to a detailed impact assessment 
according to the established Commission standards that could be carried out by the 
services of the European Commission.  
Data collected through the survey or direct interviews was in some instances not 
representative of the whole population of stakeholders. In addition, the analysis of past 
accidental events was subject to some data limitations, such as incomplete/insufficient 
description, imprecise categorization of events, events collected from very different 
sources, etc. and is therefore only indicative. Thus, it can be said that the existence of 
a wide range of products in the offshore industry, the complex cost structure of the 
equipment, the lack of data on cost of equipment and the lack of information on 
potential additional costs to make equipment compliant with the Product Safety 
Directives have made a full quantitative impact assessment of the options impossible. 
To properly understand the policy options presented in this chapter, it should be 
recalled that MODUs and equipment installed on MODUs are currently out of scope of 
the Product Safety Directives (MD, PED, ATEX) but under the scope of the Marine 
Equipment Directive. However, the exclusions in the Product Safety Directives have 
exceptions. For example: 
• Floating units intended for production, and the machinery/equipment on-board 
such units are not excluded from the scope of these EU Product Safety Directives 
since these are intended to be located on the oil field for the long term and hence 
considered as fixed units;  
• Machinery which may be installed on both fixed and mobile offshore units is also 
subject to the MD (guidelines to the application of the MD); 
• The exclusion under the PED similarly only applies to “equipment specifically 
intended for installation on-board mobile offshore units or for the propulsion 
thereof”.  However, equipment intended for installation on both mobile and fixed 
offshore units falls within the scope of the PED. 
The pros and cons of extending each one of the Product Safety Directives and of the 
mandatory application of the IMO MODU Code are discussed in Section 8.1. 
The impacts of the possible extension of all Product Safety Directives at once are 
analysed in Section 8.2: 
1. Maintaining the exclusion of equipment specifically designed to be installed on 
mobile offshore drilling units from the scope of the ATEX Directive, PED, and MD 
(‘do nothing’ option); Baseline option (current situation); 
2. Extending the scope of the MD and PED to all equipment specifically intended to 
be installed on MODUs, and the scope of the ATEX Directive to all equipment 
installed on MODUs;  
3. Extending the scope of the MD and PED to all oil and gas equipment not 
covered by the IMO MODU Code and specifically intended to be installed on 
MODUs, and the scope of the ATEX Directive to all oil and gas equipment  not 
covered by the IMO MODU Code installed on MODUs; 
The analysis of pros and cons of the extension of the three Product Safety Directives 
carried out in Section 8.1 has shown that there might be some other options to be 
considered. It is therefore necessary to use a systematic approach to deal with the 
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definition of the options. The first step of this systematic approach is to consider 
whether there may be a safety issue in the current situation of exclusion of MODUs 
from the Directives, along with the impacts of the extension of each of them to cover 
the MODU equipment. In consequence, a revised set of options are proposed and 
discussed in Section 8.3: 
1. Impact of extending the EU Product Safety Directives to cover oil and gas 
equipment specifically designed for MODUs: 
a. Extending the scope of the MD to selected equipment (moving, lifting, 
drawworks, rotary tables, etc.) specifically intended to be installed on MODUs; 
b. Extending the scope of the MD to all oil and gas equipment specifically intended 
to be installed on MODUs; 
c. Extending the MD and the PED to all oil and gas equipment specifically intended 
to be installed on MODUs; 
d. Extending the scope of the MD and PED to all oil and gas equipment specifically 
intended to be installed on MODUs, and the scope of the ATEX Directive to all oil 
and gas equipment on MODUs; 
2. Impact of extending the PED to cover well-control equipment. The extension would 
apply to onshore, fixed offshore and mobile offshore platforms: 
a. Maintaining the exclusion of well-control equipment from the scope of PED (‘do 
nothing’ option); 
b. Accepting a technical standard or set of standards to cover well-control 
equipment; 
c. Introducing a new European Directive to cover well-control equipment; 
d. Extending the scope of PED to well-control equipment; 
8.1. Extending the scope of the individual Product Safety 
Directives 
In the following we summarize the conclusions from the detailed analysis of the 
legislative framework and its comparison with the IMO MODU Code, trying to identify 
whether there are safety issues. Before entering into the analysis of the pros and cons 
of extending the 3 Directives, it is useful to make 2 introductory remarks. 
A first remark with regard to the EU Product Safety Directives is that each one deals 
with a different set of hazards (ATEX: explosion, PED: pressure hazard/release from 
overpressure, MD: personnel injury due to all risks including e.g. uncontrolled 
movement of equipment, release from rupture, noise, entrapment, hot surfaces, 
ergonomics, etc.). The IMO MODU Code is a non-compulsory legislation and on the 
other hand aims at protecting the vessel from accidental events (covers the integrity of 
the vessel itself and the essential equipment for seagoing operations), and - indirectly - 
the people on-board and the environment. In that context it focuses on structural 
safety, navigability and seaworthiness of the MODU, rather than the safety of the 
equipment. This difference in the scope is important when considering the possible 
extension of the Directives. Also the IMO MODU Code does not applied to fixed and 
portable equipment for petroleum and other work activities. 
A second remark refers to the compatibility of the EU Product Safety Directives with 
safety-related goal-oriented legislation, which in the field of offshore safety is Directive 
2014/30/EU (the so-called Offshore Safety Directive – OSD). While both pieces of 
legislation aim at increasing safety, their relation is synergetic rather than overlapping 
or contradicting. Indeed, OSD applies to major accident hazards and focuses on the 
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management of safety and the establishment of minimum requirements in operation, 
inspection, maintenance, etc. of offshore oil and gas installations. It requires that the 
equipment and the relevant technical and safety systems are designed, installed and 
operated according to the highest standards. So, it requires that the objectives of the 
EU Product Safety Directives are ensured, i.e. that safety zones for protection against 
explosions have been established and have been calculated according to the accepted 
standards, that safety of lifting devices is ensured according to the internationally 
accepted standards, etc. There is no contradiction on this; all the equipment installed 
on an offshore installation has to comply with the specific safety standards for the 
design and operation of the specific equipment. Moreover, many of the categories of 
equipment that have been identified as critical for safety in the context of the product 
safety legislation are also considered as critical for the Safety and Environmental 
Critical Elements (SECEs) according to the OSD. Therefore, ensuring compliance with 
high standards according to the EU Product Safety Directives often ensure improved 
operability of the SECEs. Furthermore, the experience from the operation of similar 
onshore installations (e.g. chemical industry, refineries, oil/gas storage installations) 
shows that both the Seveso Directive 84  (goal-oriented legislation for the overall 
management of safety) and the Product Safety legislation (ATEX, MD, PED) apply, and 
this is done without any overlaps or contradictions. Also it has to be highlighted that 
PED only excludes equipment specifically intended for installation on-board mobile 
offshore units or for their propulsion and MD and ATEX Directive exclude equipment on-
board mobile offshore units. However, according to the guidelines to the application of 
the MD, machinery which may be installed on both fixed and mobile offshore units are 
subject to the MD even if installed on-board MODUs. PED Guideline 1/27 specifies the 
same for items of pressure equipment. 
On the other hand, well-control equipment on mobile and fixed offshore units as well as 
on onshore installations is out of scope of PED. However, some components of the well-
control system on fixed offshore units and onshore installations are covered by the MD, 
see Table 5. 
Specific issues about the possible extension of each of the EU product safety Directive, 
and combinations of them, are considered hereafter. 
(i) Extension of the scope of the ATEX Directive:  
The IMO MODU Code is based on IEC standards (IEC-Ex certification scheme), which 
are mostly harmonised under the ATEX Directive. The IEC standards for protection of 
equipment intended to be installed in potentially explosive atmospheres are accepted 
worldwide with some national deviations and variations. IEC-Ex is increasingly being 
adopted internationally and becoming more common and referenced by more national 
authorities worldwide.  
The requirements of IEC and ATEX for electrical equipment are very similar and 
compatible. However, for mechanical equipment, ATEX provides more thorough 
protection than IEC. In principle, MODUs which already have IEC-Ex certificate could 
easily obtain also ATEX certificate.  
A European IEC-Ex manufacturer will often issue both IEC-Ex and ATEX documentation 
at the same time. A manufacturer elsewhere in the world can obtain IEC-Ex reports 
locally and request a NB to issue ATEX documentation.  
                                           
84 Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on the control of 
major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and subsequently repealing Council 
Directive 96/82/EC Text with EEA relevance 
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Knowing that US authorities require an IEC-Ex certificate issued by an US-based lab in 
order to allow drilling activities in the US- waters, it would be reasonable to require an 
ATEX certificate for MODUs operating in European waters.  
Conclusions with regards to safety: There is no evidence that the current exclusion of 
MODUs from ATEX decreases their safety in terms of protection against explosions 
regarding electrical equipment. In our opinion, there might be an increase of safety if 
mechanical equipment were covered by ATEX. An extension of ATEX to cover MODUs 
would allow a common legislative framework for mobile and fixed units to exist with 
limited incremental costs for double certification.  
(ii) Extension of the scope of the Machinery Directive:  
MD aims at protecting workers and other exposed persons from injuries due to 
uncontrolled/unexpected operation of the machinery, while IMO MODU Code deals with 
safety of vessels (ships) and indirectly with the safety of personnel on-board. Clearly, 
the objectives of MD are not covered by IMO MODU Code. There is therefore a gap in 
the safety of equipment, which could in principle be covered by extending MD to oil and 
gas offshore equipment which is with specific demands, i.e. which is specifically 
designed in order to be placed on-board MODU units. As mentioned in the beginning of 
this Section, there are no incompatibilities or overlaps with other legislation, while there 
is the synergy that some equipment of systems are also considered as Safety and 
Environmental Critical Elements (SECEs) in the context of the Offshore Safety Directive, 
and would therefore have a safety gain from the improved performance of that 
equipment. It should also be pointed out that harmonised standards need to be 
developed for drilling equipment. 
It has to be stressed that the potential safety gain from the extension of the MD will not 
only be the prevention of major accidents. Very often the undesired events that will be 
prevented will be limited to a few injuries and/or fatalities. This does not exclude the 
prevention of events where the malfunctioning of an element or a system can escalate 
into a major accident. 
The statistical analysis of past accidents using the Worldwide Offshore Accident 
Databank (WOAD) dataset (see Annex I) on the one hand confirmed that certain 
equipment identified as safety-critical has indeed been involved in the causation of 
offshore accidents, but on the other hand it was not able to identify any major 
contribution of particular categories of equipment, therefore it could not support any 
prioritisation of the equipment where MD should apply. This was due to the lack of 
completeness of WOAD and its sources of information, together with its limited and 
selective scope (e.g. incidents appearing in newspapers). An analysis of incidents 
reported to the Competent Authorities could in the future provide further insights on 
the prioritisation of categories of equipment to which MD should be extended. In lack of 
such analysis and based only on the examination of the relative hazard potential of the 
different categories, we could propose that priority and focus should be given to moving 
equipment, lifting devices, drawworks, rotating tables and other similar equipment.  
Conclusions with regards to safety: It appears that there is a gap of safety with regards 
to certain equipment that could be covered by the Machinery Directive. The option of 
extending MD to MODUs, either to all oil and gas equipment which is specifically 
designed to be on-board MODUs or to its limited subset of high-risk categories of 
equipment (moving/lifting equipment), has a scope and requires further more detailed 
investigation. This deeper analysis could go into further detail, clarifying, among other, 
whether certain equipment (e.g. compensators) can be treated as machinery. Design of 
certain equipment is covered by various standards, but none of them cover safety 
specifically or has MD structure (based on ESHR). Overall, the extension of scope of MD 
would have positive impact on safety and environment, limited impact on costs for ship 
owners, no impact foreseen for SMEs and increased business for certification bodies. 
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(iii) Extension of the scope of the Pressure Equipment Directive: 
There are two aspects to be considered:  
o The extension of the scope to include mobile offshore drilling units as well as 
equipment specifically intended for installation on-board or the propulsion 
thereof85; 
o The extension to include well-control equipment86. 
Please note that other exclusions of the PED might also apply to the oil and gas 
equipment (e.g. mud circulation pump). The PED exclusion article 1. 2(j) has to be also 
considered. According to this exclusion some equipment (engines, turbines, 
compressors, pumps, etc.) may be excluded from the PED, although operating above 
0,5 bar, if its pressure hazard is not a significant design factor compared to the other 
requirements to meet the static and dynamic operational effects. This is the case of 
mud circulating pump, which is out of the scope of the PED but could be possibly 
included if its pressure hazard is sufficiently high compared with other hazards (e.g. 
hazards created by moving machine parts). Moreover, the whole mud circulating 
system, including the mud circulating pump, is necessary for well-control operations 
This has to be examined on a case by case basis. 
Many pieces of equipment in the oil and gas industry are based on specific standards 
which take safety into account. There are different opinions from stakeholders 
participating in the survey on whether standards are good enough and are in line with 
Essential Safety Requirements of the EU Product Safety Directives.  
Conclusions with regards to safety: The evidence collected in this study does not allow 
concluding whether there is a gap in safety based on the current situation.  
The PED Directive is in principle relevant for the well-control equipment, such as 
wellhead, BOP, piping manifolds, etc. This equipment is indeed under pressure, 
however it is extremely specialised, serving complex operations and control measures. 
Without doubt it is one of the most critical systems in an offshore installation.  
Experience with well-control equipment has shown that it is a very complex and 
delicate issue. The recent attempt from the United States' BSEE87 to regulate in a 
simplified way the inspections of BOPs has proven to be a failure and indeed reduce 
safety instead of increasing it88.  
It might be useful to have a standard dedicated to well-control equipment to take into 
account all the particularities, the complexities and the special requirements of well-
control equipment, which should take into account the principles of the PED. However, 
the elaboration of how a standard dedicated to well-control equipment would be 
enforced by the law is outside the scope of the study.  
In case of an extension of the scope of the PED, appropriate Essential Safety 
Requirements should be defined (specific and / or in addition to the current ones). It is 
also clear that having specific Essential Safety Requirements would not be the ultimate 
solution as, by definition, these ESR are typically not so detailed. The final technical 
solution would be left to the standardisation body, which would develop new or adjust 
existing standards in order to comply with the Directive.  
                                           
85 Current exclusion PED article 1, 2(n). 
86 Current exclusion PED article 1, 2(i). 
87 Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (www.bsee.gov/) 
88 Probabilistic analyses have demonstrated that increasing the frequency of inspections, as required by the 
proposed by the US BOP Regulation, reduces the overall reliability of the BOP, instead of increasing it.  
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Should further investigation be decided on the option of extending PED, then 3 
separate sub-options may be examined, by deleting one or both of the following articles 
of PED: 
o Article 1.2(i) of the PED excludes “well-control equipment used in petroleum, 
gas or geothermal exploration and extraction industry and in underground storage 
which is intended to contain and/or control well pressure. This comprises the 
wellhead (Christmas tree), blow out preventers (BOP), piping manifolds and all 
their equipment upstream”.  
o Article 1.2(n) of PED excludes “ships, rockets, aircraft and mobile off-shore 
units, as well as equipment specifically intended for installation on-board or the 
propulsion thereof”. 
 
The three sub-options will then be: 
o Sub-option A: Extension of the scope of the PED to cover MODUs but not to well-
control Equipment (this implies the deletion of the words “mobile off-shore units” 
from article 1.2(n); PED). As a consequence, all pressure equipment installed on-
board MODUs, with the exception of well-control equipment, would fall within the 
scope of the PED.  
o Sub-option B: Extension to of the scope of the PED to cover well-control 
equipment but not to MODUs (this implies deleting article 1.2(i); PED) 
Under this option the scope of the PED would be extended to cover well-control 
equipment installed on mobile and fixed offshore units as well as on onshore units 
but not to well-control equipment specifically intended for installation on-board  
MODUs (exclusion in article 1.2(n)). Attention should be paid to ensure that the 
legislation is clear with regard to the application on fixed and mobile platforms. 
o Sub-option C: Simultaneous extension of the scope of the PED to cover well-
control equipment and MODUs (by deleting article 1.2(i) and by deleting the words 
“mobile offshore units” from article 1.2(n); PED) 
With any of these sub-options, it is clear that the Essential Safety Requirements of the 
PED should be examined in detail to know whether these are suitable to cover the new 
equipment and units. On the contrary, additional provisions should be included to cover 
their specificities and hazards. The extension of the scope of the Directive is not simply 
a matter of changing the wording in the definition of the scope but changes may be 
required for the Essential Safety Requirements, the conformity assessment procedures, 
classification of equipment, etc.  
For each sub-option, a separate comprehensive study is needed to quantify the impacts 
of extending PED to the wide set of pressure equipment on-board MODUs. In all cases, 
an increase of business for the certification bodies should be expected.  
(iv) Mandatory application of the IMO MODU Code:  
As mentioned several times throughout the study, IMO MODU Code is the basic 
standard describing the requirements for stability, integrity, navigability and 
seaworthiness of the MODU units. The Code is part of the IMO SOLAS rules and is 
mandatory for vessels with a flag of EU Member States, as required by the Marine 
Equipment Directive. Although compliance with IMO MODU Code is not mandatory for 
non-EU flag MODUs, the information collected during the study (e.g. from ECSA) 
suggests that EU Member States do require compliance with the IMO MODU Code and 
all Classification Societies apply that Code. Nevertheless, it is useful to make a 
recommendation for those Member States accepting non-compliant MODUs to drill in 
their waters to revise their policy, since compliance with the Code is a minimum safety 
requirement. All the discussions about extension or not of the EU Product Safety 
Directives are structured around the assumption that operating MODUs are compliant 
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with the IMO rules (and therefore have explosion safety zones and protection measures 
according to IEC-Ex, etc.). In practice at the moment in European waters, all MODUs 
must at least meet relevant recognized norms and standards or the health and safety 
risks connected with the construction, design and equipment of the MODUs must be 
reduced as much as reasonably practicable. To make sense, this option should include 
the mandatory application of the IMO MODU code to all MODUs working in EU waters. 
8.2. Extending the scope of all EU Product Safety Directives at 
once 
8.2.1 Maintaining the exclusion of equipment installed on mobile 
offshore drilling units from the scope of the ATEX Directive, PED, and 
MD (‘do nothing’ option) 
This is the baseline, expressing the current situation, which implies that different 
legislation applies to equipment installed on fixed platforms and to equipment installed 
on-board MODUs. The current situation implies that any non-CE marked equipment 
designed and manufactured for being used on a MODU cannot be put into service on a 
fixed platform unless it goes through the full conformity assessment process, which in 
some cases is a work-intensive and costly process. In that way the transfer of 
equipment between two very similar facilities would require long administrative 
procedures, considering also legal issues such as placing equipment on the market 
(including second hand market).  
An important share of the equipment manufacturers that answered the survey claim 
that the equipment they manufacture is currently compliant with the EU Product Safety 
Directives. For example, the equipment manufactured by DRILLMEC is compliant and 
certified with ATEX and MD, and also with most of the standards worldwide applied as 
the equipment is "state-of-the-art". DRILLMEC claims that their equipment can be 
certified in Europe as in the US without prior modification. Sometimes, there are some 
specific requirements e.g. painting or galvanization which are different in Europe and 
US and are more stringent in Russia. Thus, the compliance of the equipment with the 
EU Product Safety Directives and other international standards is not in conflict.  
MODU owners and operators claim that the current situation does not create any safety 
problem and guarantees the safety of the equipment since they are already obliged by, 
the Directive 2013/30/EU “on safety of offshore oil and gas operations”, which applies 
to both MODUs and fixed platforms, to take all necessary measures to prevent major 
accidents89 and to limit their consequences for human beings and the environment.  
In consequence, this option is the preferred one for operators and owners, since all 
other options imply certain additional costs. It is worth noting that 3 Public Authorities 
out of all 51 stakeholders involved in the survey, think that the exclusion of MODUs 
from the EU Product Safety Directives may create a safety problem. On the contrary, 
35 stakeholders (68.6% of the total) believe that the exclusion of MODUs from the EU 
Product Safety Directives is not creating any safety problem, and 13 stakeholders 
(25.5% of the total) either did not know or did not answer. 
                                           
89According to the Directive 2013/30/EU, a major accident  is defined as an incident a) involving an explosion, 
fire, loss of well-control or release of oil and gas or dangerous substances involving or with a significant 
potential to cause, fatalities or serious injuries; or b) leading to serious damage to the installation, involving 
or with a significant potential to cause, fatalities or serious injuries; or c) any other incident leading to 
fatalities or serious injury to five or more persons on the offshore installation; or d) any major environmental 
incident resulting from the events listed in a), b), c). 
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8.2.2 Extending the scope of the MD and PED to all equipment 
specifically intended to be installed on MODUs, and the scope of the 
ATEX Directive to all equipment installed on MODUs 
Under this option all the oil and gas and marine equipment will have to comply with 
both the IMO MODU Code and the EU product safety legislation, which deal with 
different safety issues. For example, the MD aims at protecting workers from injuries 
due to uncontrolled/unexpected operation of the machinery whereas IMO MODU Code 
deals with safety of vessels and indirectly with the safety of personnel on-board.  
In our opinion, this option would increase the safety level putting both fixed platforms 
and MODUs at the same level. On the other hand, it is an extreme option which would 
imply that each piece of equipment including those specifically designed to be installed 
on MODUs has to comply with the Product Safety Directives. This can be an expensive 
exercise as equipment specifically designed to be installed on-board MODUs is currently 
out of scope of the EU Product Safety Directives. Even though the change in regulation 
would not be applied retro-actively and would not have an impact on existing units, it 
would have an economic impact for new equipment especially designed for MODUs. The 
economic impact will be transferred to the MODU owners and operators, being in some 
cases unprofitable for them to operate in European waters. In turn, the decision of 
certain MODU owners and operators of not operating in Europe may result in fewer 
available MODU owners and operators and higher extraction costs (an "oligopoly" 
situation).  
It needs to be stressed that recently the US Coastal Authority required MODUs 
operating in US waters to fully comply with the IMO MODU Code and in particular to 
obtain an IEC-Ex certificate of protection against explosions issued by an US-based lab. 
As a consequence, most MODUs would be certified in the US although they are 
operated mostly in EU waters. 
It is difficult to predict how the market may react on such a scenario. On the one hand 
the increased requirements and costs may drive some MODU owners and operators 
away, resulting in higher extraction costs. On the other hand the same requirements 
may result in the development of a new market of highly specialised manufacturers and 
operators/owners targeting the EU offshore industry. In both cases the option implies 
increased business opportunities for the certification bodies.  
8.2.3 Extending the scope of the MD and the PED to all oil and gas 
equipment not covered by the IMO MODU Code and specifically 
intended to be installed on MODUs, and extending the scope of the 
ATEX Directive to all oil and gas equipment not covered by the IMO 
MODU Code installed on MODUs 
‘Oil and gas equipment installed on mobile offshore drilling units that is not covered 
by the IMO MODU Code’ is equipment referenced in point 6 of the Preamble of the 
IMO MODU Code as “this Code does not include requirements for the drilling of subsea 
wells or the procedures for their control. Such drilling operations are subject to control 
by the coastal State”. This equipment refers to the six main categories of equipment 
proposed in Section 3 of this study, which are in general, with the common exception of 
the protection against explosions, not covered by the IMO MODU Code (see info from 
Table 2 to Table 7). Specifically, 1. Drilling equipment, 2. well intervention equipment, 
3. material handling equipment, 4. well-control equipment, 5. other pressure 
equipment, and 6. electrical equipment. Note that some equipment can be included in 
two or more categories. For example, the mud circulating system can be considered 
both 1. drilling equipment and 4. well-control equipment, whereas the main part of the 
system, the mud pump, is also 5. other pressure equipment.  
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Although the survey required the stakeholders to provide answers for a particular 
category of equipment among the six proposed categories, they could only supply very 
general information which was not useful to us to even assess qualitatively the impact 
of this option. 
According to the analysis of past accidents performed in this study, it seems that 
failures of specific pieces of equipment which might fall within the scope of EU product 
safety legislation did not account for a substantial proportion of events, compared to 
other causes of analyzed events. 
With the current situation, some equipment installed on MODUs meets certain 
standards, which however may not be harmonised with the EU Product Safety 
Directives and which may not meet the Directives’  essential safety requirements.  
This extension of scope would have the following advantages: i) a simplified legislation 
and regime which would facilitate practices and provide clear rules for both the industry 
and the regulators, ii) reduce uncertainty and save time when verifying applicable 
equipment and clarifying supervision roles, iii) give a common approach to the risks 
offshore and onshore for the same type of equipment and activity, iv) ensure 
compatible measures for reducing risks and protecting personnel wherever they are 
working, v) burden for companies would not increase since it is likely that company 
already deal with this type of equipment on fixed offshore platforms. 
The drawback of this option would consist in some incompatibilities with the legislation 
applied in third countries90.  
In the case of the MD and PED, the machinery and pressure equipment which may be 
installed on both mobile and fixed offshore units should be already compliant with the 
EU Product Safety Directives, even if installed on MODUs. So, the impact would be 
limited only to the currently non covered machinery and pressure equipment on 
MODUs, which is the machinery and pressure equipment specifically intended to be 
installed on MODUs.  
The extension of the ATEX Directive to cover MODUs would have only a small impact 
regarding electrical equipment even if it would apply to all oil and gas equipment on 
MODUs, since the requirements for its protection against explosive atmospheres are 
very similar to these currently applied by the IMO MODU Code/IEC-Ex scheme. 
However, there might be an increase of safety if mechanical equipment, for which 
currently the IMO MODU Code only sets out some recommendations regarding the 
installation of mechanical equipment in hazardous zones (without specifying any 
protection class), was better covered by the ATEX Directive. 
The impacts for the stakeholders are qualitatively addressed hereafter:  
Manufacturers: Most of the oil and gas equipment is manufactured in small batches or 
single pieces. Thus it might be easy to adapt the manufacturing processes in order to 
comply with the legislative extension.  
From the survey 55% of the manufacturers consider that the costs of compliance with 
the EU Product Safety Directives would not put their companies at a disadvantage vis-
à-vis their competitors from within EU/EEA because the equipment they manufacture is 
already compliant to a large extent with the EU Product Safety Directives and because 
the same rules would apply for all competitors.  
                                           
90 For instance, if a piece of equipment has to comply with certain requirements of two countries, of which 
one is non-EU, where the MODU unit periodically operates, being these incompatible, the equipment would be 
considered as non-compliant in one of the two countries. 
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The same share of manufacturers consider that the costs of compliance with the EU 
Product Safety Directives would not put their companies at a disadvantage vis-à-vis 
their competitors from outside EU/EEA because they already comply with the EU 
Product Safety Directives and manufacture according to them for many parts of the 
world. On the contrary, 18% of them think they will be at a disadvantage since in some 
cases non-compliant equipment from outside EU/EEA is imported as CE marked. 
In our opinion, the effect on the overall number of jobs would likely result in a small 
increase inside the EU/EEA as the equipment should have to be certified following the 
EU legislation.  
MODU owners and operators: Almost all MODU owners and operators are seriously 
concerned about the possible extension of the legislation and some of them even 
foresee a move to other markets outside European waters which are considered to be 
less demanding. According to them, most MODU owners and operators already make 
use of the best available technologies and technical standards worldwide, which should 
already ensure a high level of protection through the requirements of the Offshore 
Directive 2013/30/EU. Furthermore, in their opinion the enforced use of technical 
standards and the provision of the CE mark to equipment specifically intended to be on-
board MODUs91 would generate significant burden and additional costs, but it would not 
increase the overall level of safety (However, in relation to the costs of compliance with 
the EU Product Safety Directives, the survey and the personal interviews have not 
resulted in clear quantitative data  because of the huge variety of equipment on-board 
MODUs.  
Certification and Standardization Bodies: With this option a number of standards 
for specific equipment would need to be developed or harmonised with the EU Product 
Safety Directives. On the other hand, since all pieces of equipment that might fall 
within the scope of the Directives should go through a certification process, a possible 
increase in business for certification bodies can be expected. 
Public Authorities: According to the results of the survey and personal interviews, 
this would be an optimum option for Public Authorities. Around 71% of them finds the 
Directives suitable for the equipment specifically designed to be installed on-board 
MODUs and 85% of them think that the extension of the legislation would lead to a 
significant reduction of the risk. 
This option would also be favourable for the EU/EEA public authorities as they will be 
dealing with the same legislative framework both for equipment specifically designed to 
be installed on MODUs, on fixed platforms and onshore. Under this option, after a 
period of adaptation, there will be more consistency and the work of Public Authorities 
will be easier to manage and more efficient.  
8.3. Discussion of the Impacts of a Revised set of Options 
In the following we propose a revised set of options, structured in an additive way to 
facilitate cost-benefit considerations, as an alternative to the ones established in the 
Terms-of-Reference of the study.  
                                           
91 In case of the MD and the PED, the impact is limited to the MODU itself as well as to the equipment 
specifically intended to be installed on-board or the propulsion thereof. On the other hand, the extension of 
the ATEX Directive would impact on the MODU and on the equipment on-board, even if it is not specifically 
intended to be installed on-board MODUs. 
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8.3.1 Impact of the extension of the EU Product Safety Directives to 
cover oil and gas equipment installed on MODUs 
As pointed out above, the impact of extending the MD and PED is limited to the MODU 
itself and to the equipment specifically intended to be installed on-board or the 
propulsion thereof. On the other hand, the extension of the ATEX Directive would 
impact on the MODU and on the equipment on-board, even if it is not specifically 
intended to be installed on-board MODUs. 
Section 8.1 concluded that there might be scope for extending the MD in order to better 
protect workers on-board MODUs. Thus, the option of extending the MD to MODUs 
requires further more detailed investigation. 
On the contrary, the extension of ATEX to cover MODUs would have only a small impact 
regarding electrical equipment, since the requirements for its protection against 
explosive atmospheres are very similar to these currently applied by the IMO MODU 
Code/IEC-Ex scheme. However, there might be an increase of safety if mechanical 
equipment, for which currently the IMO MODU Code only sets out some 
recommendations regarding its installation in hazardous zones (without specifying any 
protection class), was better covered by the ATEX Directive. 
The extension of the PED is not so obvious and is not always expected a guaranteed 
safety gain.  
Finally, the evidence collected in this study does not allow concluding whether there is a 
gap in safety based on the current situation.  
It is therefore more logical to build the options around an extension of the Machinery 
Directive. 
The following alternative options are presented including their main impacts as follows: 
a. Extending the scope of the MD to all oil and gas equipment not covered by the IMO 
MODU Code and specifically intended to be installed on MODUs; 
b. Extending the scope of the MD and the PED to all oil and gas equipment not 
covered by the IMO MODU Code and specifically intended to be installed on 
MODUs; 
c. Extending the scope of the MD and the PED to all oil and gas equipment not 
covered by the IMO MODU Code and specifically intended to be installed on 
MODUs, and extending the scope of the ATEX Directive to all oil and gas equipment 
not covered by the IMO MODU Code installed on MODUs. This option is equivalent 
to that presented in section 8.2.3.  
(a). Extending the scope of the MD to all oil and gas equipment not covered by 
the IMO MODU Code and specifically intended to be installed on MODUs 
This option considers all oil and gas equipment not covered by the IMO MODU Code, 
that is to say the six categories of oil and gas equipment detailed in Section 3. As the 
objectives of the MD are not covered by the IMO MODU Code, there might be a gap in 
the safety of the equipment, which could in principle be covered by extending the MD 
to this type of equipment. 
Note that the majority of oil and gas equipment installed on MODUs is already 
compliant with the MD as this equipment is not specifically designed to be installed on 
MODUs, but is likely to also be installed on fixed offshore units. In our opinion this 
extension is likely to have certain safety gain since the essential health and safety 
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requirements of the MD would apply to this equipment, with limited design, installation, 
certification and administrative costs which would mainly fall on MODU owners.  
In our opinion, the potential safety gains from the extension of the MD will not always 
be the prevention of major accidents. Prevented undesired events might be limited to 
few injuries and/or fatalities and small-size environmental pollution. 
(b) Extending the scope of the MD and the PED to all oil and gas equipment 
not covered by IMO MODU Code and specifically intended to be installed on 
MODUs 
This option considers the extension of the MD and PED to the six categories of 
equipment detailed in Section 3, which are, with the common exception of the 
protection against explosions, not covered by the IMO MODU Code in case this 
equipment is specifically intended to be installed on MODUs. 
The extension of the PED to cover this specific equipment is likely to have a limited 
impact if we exclude well-control equipment. The extension of the PED to include well-
control equipment is described in section 8.3.2.d. 
The cost of equipment would likely to increase, as well as an increase of business for 
certification bodies could be expected. The results of the survey and the interviews with 
two companies show that this would be a suitable option for Public Authorities but 
neither for MODU owners nor for operators. 
8.3.2 Options to cover well-control equipment 
At the moment all kind of well-control equipment is in a kind of “grey zone” from the 
view of product safety legislation with the exception of the MD which applies to well-
control equipment installed both onshore and offshore (for those parts of this well-
control equipment which is classified as machinery, see Tables in section 3.1).  
The options related to the extension of the EU Product Safety Directives to cover well-
control equipment are the following: 
a. Maintaining the exclusion of well-control equipment from the scope of PED (‘do 
nothing’ option); 
b. Accepting a technical standard or set of standards to cover well-control equipment; 
c. Introducing a new European Directive to cover well-control equipment; 
d. Extending the scope of PED to well-control equipment; 
(a) Maintaining the exclusion of well-control equipment from the scope of PED 
(‘do nothing’ option) 
With this option well-control equipment installed either on mobile, fixed offshore units 
or on onshore units would remain excluded from the scope of PED. 
On the other hand, well-control equipment installed on-board MODUs would continue to 
be covered by the IMO MODU Code(which only covers its protection against explosions 
and the capability of closing the BOP and disconnecting its control unit from the well-
head arrangement or the accumulator battery during an emergency shut-down), and by 
other relevant legislation.  
Well control equipment would continue to be in a “grey zone” from the point of view of 
the product safety legislation. Prevention of major accidents related to well-control 
equipment installed offshore would continue to be under national legislation and the 
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Offshore Safety Directive, while onshore well-control equipment would remain in a 
“grey zone”.  
Currently, typical BOP control systems are built following standards, legislation and 
specifications such as ATEX, IEC-Ex, NORSOK, CE marking, EN ISO 10423:2001, EN 
ISO 13628-4: 1999, API 16D, etc92. Thus, according to this option, some pieces of well-
control equipment on-board MODUs may be CE-marked, meaning that are covered by 
the Machinery Directive (this could be the case for some components of the mud 
circulating and BOP systems, which can be treated as machinery (See Table 5)) and/or 
by the ATEX Directive. It has to be noted that the application of a CE mark implies 
conformity with all relevant Product Safety Directives93.  
According to the results of the survey and personal interviews, MODU owners and 
operators claim that the safety of the well-control equipment is currently very well 
covered by the Offshore Safety Directive and the widely used API standards, e.g. by the 
recently issued API standard 53 (Blow-out Prevention Equipment Systems for Drilling 
wells). As a consequence, this option would be the most favourable one for them. 
(b) Accepting existing technical standards to cover well-control equipment 
This option explores the possible inclusion of existing standards to cover well-control 
equipment in the current legislation. Compliance with technical standards could be 
enforced through the implementation and consistent application of best practices of the 
Offshore Safety Directive.  
Such enforcement of standards could be accomplished through the Technical 
Committee ISO TC 67 and further, through the Vienna agreement. The enforcement of 
the standards through the OSD would cover well-control equipment installed offshore 
but not well-control equipment installed onshore. For this latter, the compliance with 
the standards would have to be enforced in a different way.  
If standards were to be enforced in the legislation, MODUs in EU waters would gain 
acceptance of their Reports on Major Hazards (safety case) by demonstrating full 
adherence to such technical standards.  
Enforcement of standards could also be made through the Coastal States' or Member 
States' legislation, but it would not lead to a full harmonisation at European level as 
Member States could still add specific national requirements.  
International standards would easily be accepted by MODUs owners and operators who 
already comply with a variety of standards. 
This option is likely to imply an increase in the business for Certification and 
Standardisation Bodies. 
(c) Introducing a new European Directive to cover well-control equipment 
With this option the issue would be regulated more thorough and  prescriptive way at 
European level with respect to the previous option.  
A new Directive could cover well-control equipment both offshore and onshore, would 
have its own appropriate harmonised standards and would be in line with the goal-
oriented Offshore Safety Directive. 
                                           
92 www.efcgroup.net/downloads/BOP-Control-System-BC0114001A.pdf  
93 The 'Blue Guide' on the implementation of EU product rules 2016 (section 4.5.1.6); 
http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/16210 
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In that way, the new Directive would capture the very specific safety requirements and 
specificities of well-control equipment, having, as a consequence, much more detailed 
Essential Safety Requirements than the PED. The challenge would be to write the 
requirements in such a way that both safety and technological innovation are duly 
taken into account.  
A number of technical standards which are already applied in Europe for well-control 
equipment could possibly be harmonised with the new Directive, being this an 
additional value in comparison with the previous option “Accepting existing technical 
standards to cover well-control equipment”. 
According to this option Public Authorities would work under a clear legislative 
framework while the costs for MODU owners and operators would increase. As in the 
previous option, an increase in the workload of the Certification and Standardisation 
Bodies could be expected. 
(d) Extending the scope of the PED to cover well-control equipment 
Under this option we consider the possible extension of the PED to cover well-control 
equipment installed on mobile and fixed offshore units as well as on onshore units.  
Questions in the survey about the extension of the PED to well-control equipment have 
not attracted much interest from manufacturers/installers/suppliers and public 
authorities as most of them either did not answer or did not know. 
A clear position against the extension of the PED to well-control equipment has been 
observed by drilling contractors/operators which would expect difficulties and barriers 
to trade.  
Certification Bodies in general support the extension of the PED to cover well-control 
equipment. Two-thirds of those dealing with PED find this extension suitable and, 
contrarily to drilling contractors and operators, would not expect any barriers to trade. 
However, some inconsistencies have been found in their answers (see Section 6.3.2 for 
details).  
A general comment, even among those supporting the suitability of the PED for well-
control equipment, is that only part of the equipment would benefit from this extension 
because most of the well-control equipment follows very specific and extensive 
regulation and testing procedures that go beyond the requirements of the PED. 
 This option would be very complex to implement since specific essential safety 
requirements for well-control equipment should be defined and included in the 
Directive. In other words, the possible extension would not just be limited to removing 
a paragraph from the list of excluded equipment. Moreover, the same extension, which 
would only cover hazards due to pressure, would not solve other important aspects 
linked to operability and reliability of the well-control equipment.  
However, this option would not be in clash with the requirements of the IMO MODU 
Code, which “does not include requirements for the drilling of subsea wells or the 
procedures for their control. Such drilling operations are subject to control by the 
coastal State”.  
With this option some product safety issues not linked to the pressure hazard would 
remain unresolved.  
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9. Conclusions 
Following the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico on 
20th April 2010, the European Commission carried out a review of the adequacy of the 
provisions in force in the EU to prevent similar accidents occurring in the European 
offshore oil and gas industry. This resulted in the adoption of the Offshore Safety 
Directive 2013/30/EU (OSD). 
Up to now the OSD, which applies to both fixed and mobile offshore units, is the main 
instrument for ensuring that the safety and the environmental protection are fully 
regulated in the EU waters.  
Contrarily to onshore and offshore fixed units, oil and gas equipment specifically 
designed to be installed on mobile offshore units are currently excluded from the EU 
Product Safety Directives, namely the Machinery Directive (MD), the Pressure 
Equipment Directive (PED) and the ATEX Directive. It should however be noted that 
floating units intended for production and the machinery/equipment on-board such 
units, since are intended to be located on the oil field for the long term, are not 
excluded from the scope of the EU Product Safety Directives. Furthermore, machinery 
and pressure equipment which may be installed on both fixed and mobile offshore units 
is also subject to the EU Product Safety Directives. As mobile offshore units can be 
used, among other, for drilling or production, it follows that equipment designed 
specifically to fit needs to be installed on drilling units are excluded from the scope of 
the PED and Machinery Directive 94 . Consequently, this study will focus on mobile 
offshore drilling units (MODU). 
Additionally, well-control equipment used in the petroleum, gas or geothermal 
exploration and extraction industry and in underground storage which is intended to 
contain and/or control well pressure is also excluded from the scope of the PED. Well-
control equipment onshore as well offshore (both on fixed platforms and on-board 
MODUs) are currently excluded from the scope of PED but not necessarily from the 
scope of MD or ATEX. 
Under the IMO, several international maritime safety regulations, guidelines, and rules 
that have become part of the requirements for vessel and MODU registration have been 
developed and adopted by a number of countries. Included under the IMO umbrella are 
the following: Safety of Life at Sea – SOLAS (Deals primarily with safety issues and 
communications), MODU code (Deals primarily with construction and equipment), 
Maritime Pollution - MARPOL (Deals with pollution control and prevention), International 
Safety Management (Focuses on safety for self-propelled vessels and MODUs), etc. For 
this study, most important in particular is the 2009 IMO MODU Code (Resolution 
A.1023.(26)). The present edition of the MODU Code, in consideration of the inclusion 
of classification society and flag rules, addresses virtually all the structure, machinery 
and electrical systems of a MODU that can be included in the shipyard construction 
contract with exclusion of equipment intended to be used for oil and gas operations 
including, but not only limiting to drilling operation. The IMO MODU Code has been 
amended twice since the 2009 edition was approved and is currently under revision, in 
consideration of the results of the Macondo incident investigations. The IMO MODU 
code covers the integrity of the vessel itself and the essential equipment for seagoing 
operations and does not apply to fixed offshore platform including mobile units which 
can be treated as fixed if they are in one position for a long time (as it is very often 
case of mobile production units). The IMO MODU Code is not a compulsory piece of 
legislation. 
The IMO MODU CODE is correlated with the requirements of the Marine Equipment 
Directive 96/98/EC (MED), whose purpose is “to enhance safety at sea and the 
                                           
94 Neither ATEX nor its guidelines include this explicit mention of "specifically designed". 
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prevention of marine pollution” and “to ensure the free movement of the above-
mentioned equipment within the European Union, the European Economic Area (EEA), 
Iceland and Norway”. This directive applies to equipment installed and used on-board 
ships that are registered in the European Union, including Norway and Iceland.  
MODU Code, flag state requirements, Classification Society requirements, and coastal 
state requirements are all relevant for a MODU. 
Currently in the MODU sector there is a strong presence of certain standards like ISO 
standards, IEC standards, Norwegian standards NORSOK, British Standards BS, US 
standards (ASME and API), and also European harmonised standards (EN). 
To avoid any possible misunderstandings, moving equipment, lifting devices and similar 
equipment used for oil and gas operation is not covered by IMO MODU code (according 
to preamble of the IMO MODU code). 
With the aim of providing the European Commission with the information necessary for 
the assessment of the impacts of an extension of the EU Product Safety Directives, an 
exhaustive desk research on markets, legislation, and equipment on-board MODUs and 
fixed facilities (offshore and onshore) has been done. Additionally, an EU on-line survey 
“European Commission Survey on Offshore Oil & Gas Equipment 2015 – Cost of 
compliance with EU product safety legislation” was conducted by the JRC to collect 
more detailed information and data from the various stakeholders groups. In parallel to 
the on-line survey, stakeholders were interviewed. 
The on-line survey and the conducted interviews show that considerable 
divergences exist among the opinion of the various groups. Drawing a conclusion 
from this outcome is not easy. Some of this variation is in our view undoubtedly 
attributable to conflicts of interest, but we also feel that some of the responses are due 
to an inadequate comprehension and knowledge of the EU New Approach system. In 
addition, data collected through the survey or direct interviews was in some instances 
not representative of the whole population of stakeholders. For example the section on 
the extension of the PED to well-control equipment has not attracted much attention 
from manufacturers/installers/suppliers and only a low percentage of them have 
answered those questions. Also the number of replies from notified bodies is 
surprisingly low despite the fact that the subject matter might have an impact on their 
activities. 
The views of the various stakeholders groups are summarized hereafter. 
- Drilling contactors 
The drilling contractors (ECSA) believe that MODUs are already very well covered, not 
only by the Offshore Safety Directive and the IMO MODU Code, but also by the flag 
state requirements, the Classification Society requirements, the coastal state 
requirements, and the currently applied standards such as API. The survey has shown 
that 100% of the drilling contractors/operators consider that the current legislation 
guarantees an acceptable level of safety for the equipment on-board MODUs. This was 
also confirmed by the clear stance expressed by Saipem, a large international MODU 
owner and operator, during the interview conducted in its central headquarter in Italy. 
In general it can be said that, in their opinion, everything is already well covered and 
should not be touched upon. The following statements from the drilling contractors are, 
among many others, only two examples demonstrating this: 
o Well-control equipment is already well covered by the existing legislation and 
industry standards, specifically by API standards, in which the ESRs of the PED are 
already implicit.  
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o The acceptance and operation of well-control equipment follows very specific and 
extensive regulation and testing procedures that go beyond the scope of the EU 
Directives and which are more focused on verifying suitability of well-control-
equipment design to wellbore conditions.  
According to the drilling contractors (ECSA) the manufacturers/suppliers/installers 
would not likely perceive an extension of the Directives as a disadvantage since the 
cost would be offset to the MODU owners, though some of them might be concerned by 
additional legal liabilities. The drilling contractors (ECSA) also think that an extension of 
the Directives would not be perceived as a barrier to trade by the 
manufacturers/installers/suppliers, as their trade outside of the European Union is 
rather limited compared to drilling contractors. ECSA believes that all oil and gas 
equipment on-board MODUs should remain excluded from the scope of the EU Product 
Safety Directives. It should be noted however that the exclusion under PED only applies 
to the MODU itself and the equipment specifically designed for the installation on or the 
propulsion of such units. Also, in the Guide to the application of the Machinery Directive 
it is explained that machinery which can be used on both fixed and mobile offshore 
units is also subject to the Machinery Directive. Given the positions expressed by some 
stakeholders, the question can be raised whether these rules are actually fully applied. 
- Public Authorities 
The views of the Public Authorities and the drilling contractors are opposite. Whereas in 
the opinion of 100% of the drilling contractors/operators all the equipment on-board 
MODUs is well covered by the currently applied legislation and should not be touched 
upon, 71.4% of the Public Authorities, which is the most optimistic group towards the 
extension of the Directives, find the EU Product Safety Directives suitable for the oil and 
gas equipment specifically designed to be placed on-board MODUs. Also 86% of the 
Public Authorities think that the extension of the scope of the legislation would lead to a 
significant/very important reduction of the risk. Some Public Authorities have provided 
examples of near misses, accidents and events that could, but for mm or seconds (i.e. 
luck), could have resulted in a major event, and their analysis have shown that 
equipment (including the lack of good instructions for use and maintenance) fell short 
of EU requirements i.e. the Machinery Directive. 
Related to the API standards currently applied in the MODU sector, the experience of 
the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority shows that these standards have not in 
many cases proven to be “good enough”, are deficient in a number of areas, cover 
mainly technical requirements but say little about operational requirements and, among 
other shortcomings, completely lack “defined requirements” for the reliability of safety-
critical functions/equipment. As a consequence the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway 
affirms that there is a gap between the API relevant requirements and the Essential 
Health and Safety requirements (EHRS) of the Machinery Directive.  
- Manufacturers/installers/suppliers 
The opinion of the manufacturers/installers/suppliers towards the extension of the 
Product Safety Directives is positive. More than 50% of them think their companies 
would not be at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their competitors from either within or outside 
EU/EEA in case of extension of the legislation. In the same way, only around 1/3 would 
expect time delays in their business if the legislation is extended.  
However, an inconsistency has been specifically found for manufacturers: around 50% 
finds the EU Product Safety Directives suitable, whereas only a very low percentage of 
them think these Directives would increase the safety of the equipment. 
The section on the extension of the PED to well-control equipment has not attracted 
much attention from manufacturers/installers/suppliers and only 16% of them have 
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answered those questions. The low interest of the manufacturers/suppliers/installers in 
the well-control equipment questions could be due to the fact that not very many of 
them manufacture or assemble well-control equipment.  
On the other hand, considering the small number of manufacturing/installing/supplying 
companies who answered the survey (11), and the fact that most of them (64%) deal 
with only one or two categories of equipment, out of the six big categories identified in 
the report, it is difficult to provide conclusions of general validity.  
- Certification Bodies 
Although an important percentage of the Certification Bodies (62.5%) considers the EU 
Product Safety Directives suitable for the equipment on-board MODUs, only a small part 
of them could foresee an improvement in the safety of the equipment due to the 
extension of the Directives. 
Considering that very few Certification bodies replied to the survey, we find the 
obtained answers not representative of this specific stakeholder. In particular, we did 
not receive any answers from Standardization Bodies: their answers would have been 
very valuable as, currently, most of the stakeholders are concerned about the lack of 
harmonised standards in the sector, which is foreseen as not achievable in a short time. 
The answers of the Certification Bodies are very well elaborated and there was no 
indication that these were driven by some interest. However, the extension of the 
Directives could be interpreted as an extra source of income for the Certification 
Bodies, in contrast with the opinion of the drilling contractors and operators, which find 
it difficult to estimate the impact in term of costs but define it as extremely high. 
Additional considerations 
Related to the non-compliance of some of the currently applied standards and codes 
with the Essential Safety Requirements (ESRs) of the EU Product Safety Directives, in 
our opinion it would be necessary to review, in consultation with the stakeholders, the 
ESRs themselves, or the standards, to take into account specificities in their 
application. The drilling companies think it would be necessary that major Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) advise them in maintaining worldwide API compliance 
whilst adding the specific requirements of the European Directives. 
The drilling companies argued that, since the applicability of the possible extension of 
the Directives had not been clarified, it was not possible to specify the costs of 
compliance of the equipment with these. Related to the concern expressed by the 
drilling contractors/operators, it has to be clarified that the new legislation cannot be 
retroactive. New legislation would only apply to new equipment95 and would only be 
applicable as of a certain point in time after the adoption of revised legislation and 
taking into account a transitional period allowing the industry to adapt to the new or 
changed requirements. 
We have observed a very common misunderstanding among the drilling 
contractors/operators in what makes reference to the procedures for assessing the 
conformity of the equipment according to the EU Product Safety Directives. In case of 
the extension of the legislation to MODUs, an important part of the drilling 
contractors/operators are concerned about the “self-certification” of equipment as 
                                           
95 Opposite to the Offshore Safety Directive that exceptionally applies retroactively i.e. all oil and gas facilities 
in the EU waters have to comply with the provisions of the Directive. In that way for MODU operators who 
currently use uncertified and possibly non-compliant equipment specifically designed for MODUs, better 
option would be extension of the EU product safety Directives, rather to cover product safety through practice 
of implementation of the OSD 
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allowed for some equipment by the EU Product Safety Directives, since it would lower 
the safety standards. We have to clarify that it is true that in some cases the 
manufacturer declares that the equipment satisfies the Directive requirements 
(“Declaration of conformity”) without the involvement of a Notified Body but this is only 
allowed for equipment in the lowest hazard category. For the large majority of the 
products a notified body is involved in the conformity assessment procedure, including 
those based on quality assurance modules (such as module H of PED). 
There are contrasting opinions of the different stakeholders about the existence of 
safety issues requiring immediate attention from the equipment point of view. From the 
statistical analysis of past accidental events between 1970 and mid-2013, it seems that 
failures of specific pieces of equipment which might fall within the scope of EU product 
safety legislation did not account for a substantial proportion of events, compared to 
other causes of analysed events. In addition, it must be pointed out that – due to the 
limitations in the dataset used (i.e. WOAD) – it was not possible to make a distinction 
between the failures of pieces of equipment/systems due to design faults and unsafe 
system components, and those which were due, for instance, to lack of maintenance or 
improper use of the equipment, which might suggest procedural deficiencies. Thus, 
from the results of the statistical analysis it is not possible to state that there is a safety 
issue that could be attributed to the non-coverage of MODUs by the product safety 
legislation. 
Most of oil and gas equipment on-board MODUs are already covered by the EU Product 
Safety Directives. A possible extension of scope would cover only a minor subset of all 
oil and gas equipment which is not currently covered and which are specifically 
designed for MODUs. Although such equipment is not frequently involved in accidents, 
lack of implementation of the product safety measures can lead to escalation to major 
accidents. Moreover, accidents caused by equipment specifically designed for MODU in 
which less than 5 people died will not be treated as major accidents. Therefore, a 
safety gap could exist, which might be offset by extending the product safety legislation 
to cover such small subset of equipment at a moderate cost. A more difficult situation 
concerns the extension of the PED to well-control equipment which is now excluded 
both offshore and onshore. In this case, the cost of the possible extension of the PED to 
cover well-control equipment could be high yet possibly producing significant safety 
gain. Some piece of well-control equipment might already be covered by the MD. 
In the light of the analysis performed and of the evidence gathered – which include 
analysis of the relevant legislation and standards, survey results, interviews with 
stakeholders, analysis of past accidents, and literature - some conclusions regarding 
the socio-economic and environmental impacts of different policy options have 
been made.  
The analysis is limited to a qualitative assessment. Even though the study collected 
important information, some aspects are still missing and would require further 
examination before being able to conclude whether an action is required or not. For 
example, the actual safety record should be further examined based on information 
from the competent authorities and other stakeholders. The application of the product 
safety legislation in the offshore oil and gas industry could be further examined based 
on information from the national market surveillance authorities. Such information 
would be essential to have a better understanding of the current situation on the 
market and to assess which policy or regulatory initiative would be the most 
appropriate. 
The existence of a wide range of products in the offshore industry, the complex cost 
structure of the equipment, the lack of data on cost of equipment and the lack of 
information on potential additional costs to make equipment compliant with the Product 
Safety Directives make a full quantitative impact assessment of the options impossible. 
In practice, it appeared extremely difficult to collect quantitative data on costs via the 
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survey or the interviews. Moreover, the numerous items of equipment on-board such 
installations would require a substantial effort to calculate the impact of the scenarios. 
We believe that case studies based on well-identified policy options should be carried 
out to be able to obtain such information.  
The conclusions of this study may be used as an input to a detailed impact assessment 
according to the established Commission standards that could be carried out by the 
services of the European Commission. 
- Extension of scope to MODU for ATEX, MD, PED 
The report discusses about the possible extension of scope of the EU Product Safety 
Directives, namely ATEX equipment Directive, Machinery Directive and Pressure 
Equipment Directive in order to cover offshore equipment installed on-board MODUs.  
1. There is no evidence that the current exclusion of MODUs from ATEX decreases 
their safety in terms of protection against explosions regarding electrical 
equipment. However, there might be an increase of safety if mechanical equipment 
were covered by ATEX. An extension of ATEX to cover MODUs would allow a 
common legislative framework for mobile and fixed units to exist with limited 
incremental costs for double certification.  
2. The offshore equipment installed on-board MODUs, which can also be installed on 
fixed offshore platforms, is already under the scope of MD. On the other hand, for 
equipment which is specifically designed for MODUs (e.g. supplied with movement 
compensators), an extension of scope of the MD could be an option. The extension 
of scope of MD would have positive impact on safety and environment, limited 
impact on costs for ship owners, no impact foreseen for SMEs and increased 
business for certification bodies. 
3. All oil and gas equipment under pressure, which is not classified as well-control and 
is not specifically designed or modified for use on MODUs, is currently under the 
scope of PED. A reasonable option could be the extension of scope of PED to cover 
such limited number of equipment under pressure specifically designed or modified 
for MODUs. In our opinion, this extension could be achieved with reasonable costs 
for certification because of the limited set of equipment currently not covered by 
the PED and we suspect that the overall impact of this extension would be rather 
limited.  
- Extension of scope of PED to include well-control equipment 
The specific case of extension of the PED to well-control equipment has been 
considered in detail. In the current situation well-control equipment is explicitly out of 
scope of PED, but not out of scope of MD and ATEX. In particular, well-control is out of 
scope of PED both onshore and offshore (on fixed platforms or on-board MODUs). Four 
options have been considered that cover well-control equipment: 
1. Maintaining the exclusion of well-control equipment from the scope of PED (‘do 
nothing’ option);  
With this option well-control will remain in a “grey zone” from the legislative point 
of view. This means that prevention of major accidents would continue to be 
covered by the Offshore Safety Directive, while product safety legislation would not 
be harmonised at EU level. However, local regulations of Member States and wide 
number of technical standards would continue to apply. 
2. Accepting existing technical standard to cover well-control equipment 
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Technical standards for well-control equipment could be adopted as obligatory in 
practice to obtain license for offshore oil and gas operation in the EU’s waters 
according to the Offshore Safety Directive. However, in that way well-control 
equipment installed onshore would remain uncovered, as the OSD is related to 
offshore. For onshore well-control equipment, the standards would have to be 
enforced in a different way. Enforcement of technical standards could also be made 
through the Coastal States’ or Member States’ legislation, but it would not lead to a 
full harmonisation at European level as member States could still add specific 
national requirements. International standards could be easily accepted by MODUs 
owners and operators who already comply with a variety of them. 
3. Introducing new Directive for well-control equipment 
With this option the issue would be regulated more thoroughly and in a prescriptive 
way at European level with respect to the previous option. A new Directive would 
capture the very specific safety requirements and specificities of well-control 
equipment, having as a consequence much more detailed Essential Safety 
Requirements than the PED. The challenge would be to write the requirements in 
such a way that both safety and technological innovation are duly taken into 
account. Public Authorities would work under a clear legislative framework while 
the costs for MODU owners and operators would increase. As in the previous 
option, an increase in the workload of the Certification and Standardisation Bodies 
could be expected. 
4. Extending the scope of PED to well-control equipment 
This option would be very complex to implement since specific essential safety 
requirements for well-control equipment should be defined and included in the 
Directive. In other words, the possible extension would not just be limited to 
removing a paragraph from the list of excluded equipment. Moreover, the same 
extension, which would only cover hazards due to pressure, would not solve other 
important aspects linked to operability and reliability of the well-control equipment.  
In case any extensions of the EU Product Safety Directives would be put in place, this 
extension would only apply to new equipment or to equipment imported in Europe. The 
options described in this report provide a generic overview of the potential legislative 
efforts that can be undertaken and, correspondingly, the qualitative impacts assessed 
have general validity. However, specific changes in legislation (such as 
inclusion/removal of certain articles in given Directives) would require detailed and 
structured cost-benefit analyses which are impossible to cover in this study. 
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Annexes 
Important information related to the Product Safety Directives (ATEX, PED and MD) and 
the guides to the application of these is included in Annex A. 
An extensive overview of the answers provided by the 
manufacturers/installers/suppliers of equipment and by the drilling 
contractors/operators is found in Annexes B and C, respectively. The answers coming 
from the Certification Bodies are reflected in Annex D, while Annex E contains the 
replies from Public Authorities. Finally, answers submitted by “Other types of entities” 
are shown in Annex F. 
Annex G contains the list of the top ten offshore drilling contractors by number of 
MODUs managed in January 2015. 
Annex H shows the list of the thirty one stakeholders contacted for an interview. 
Annex I shows a statistical analysis of offshore accidents and incidents which have 
occurred on MODUs since 1970 with the purpose of identifying – if possible – specific 
types of equipment, structural components, and systems which were more frequently 
involved in accidental situations, and to acquire information on the consequences of 
such events, in terms of fatalities, injuries, and cost of damage. Results from the study 
could be used as input in future discussions on the extension of the scopes of EU 
product safety legislation to include equipment installed and used on MODUs. Data for 
the analysis was obtained from the Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank (WOAD), 
operated by DNV-GL. An Analysis of WOAD major accidents and its comparison with 
data from OGP is also included. 
The list of the abbreviations contained in the report is shown in Annex J. 
The list of annexes is show below: 
A. Product safety legislation – exclusion in ATEX, PED and MD and guidance 
B. Companies (equipment manufacturers): Overview of their answers 
C. Companies (MODU owners/ operators): Overview of their answers 
D. Certification Bodies: Overview of their answers 
E. Public Authorities: Overview of their answers 
F. Other types of entities: Overview of their answers 
G. Leading companies in the MODU market 
H. List of the contacted stakeholders for a personal interview 
I. Statistical analysis of offshore accidents and incidents on MODUs since 1970 
J. List of abbreviations 
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A. Product safety legislation – exclusion in ATEX, PED and 
MD and guidance 
1. ATEX  
DIRECTIVE 2014/34/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 26 
February 2014 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
equipment and protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive 
atmospheres (recast) (Text with EEA relevance) (OJ L 96/309, 29.3.2014) 
Article 1 (Scope) 
2. This Directive shall not apply to: 
… 
(e) seagoing vessels and mobile offshore units together with equipment on-board such 
vessels or units; 
… 
o The full text of the ATEX Directive can be consulted in: 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/mechanical-engineering/atex/index_en.htm 
o In the same website, the 4th edition of the ATEX guidelines is available to assist 
those who need to apply the Directive: 
In the guidelines is explained the reason for which the mobile offshore units are out 
of the scope of the Directive: "seagoing vessels and mobile offshore units together 
with equipment on-board such vessels or units, as they are already covered by the 
IMO Convention." (source: ATEX Guidelines - see section 5 of the ATEX guidelines 
for more information) 
And specifies in the guidelines, ATEX Directive specifically excludes from its scope 
"seagoing vessels and mobile offshore units together with equipment on-board 
such vessels or units", and equipment for use on-board a ship is subject only to the 
Marine Equipment Directive (MED) 96/98/EC, excluding all others. Nevertheless, 
the constructional requirements for explosion-protected equipment at sea are 
generally the same as onshore: this is illustrated by the reference of the MED to 
the same or very similar standards, as harmonised under the ATEX Directive. In 
fact, certain products (as gas detection equipment) are used offshore and onshore, 
thus requiring certification per the ATEX Directive and/or by the MED, according to 
their intended use. (source: ATEX Guidelines - see 6.10 of the ATEX guidelines for 
more information) 
2. Pressure Equipment Directive (PED) 
DIRECTIVE 2014/68/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 15 
May 2014 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the 
making available on the market of pressure equipment (recast) (Text with EEA 
relevance) (OJ L 189/164, 27.6.2014) 
Article 1. (Scope) 
2. This Directive shall not apply to: 
… 
(i). well-control equipment used in the petroleum, gas or geothermal exploration and 
extraction industry and in underground storage which is intended to contain and/or 
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control well pressure; this shall comprise the wellhead (Christmas tree), the blow out 
preventers (BOP), the piping manifolds and all their equipment upstream; 
(j). equipment comprising casings or machinery where the dimensioning, choice of 
material and manufacturing rules are based primarily on requirements for sufficient 
strength, rigidity and stability to meet the static and dynamic operational effects or 
other operational characteristics and for which pressure is not a significant design 
factor; such equipment may include: (1) engines including turbines and internal 
combustion engines; (2) steam engines, gas/steam turbines, turbo-generators, 
compressors, pumps and actuating devices; 
… 
(n). ships, rockets, aircraft and mobile off-shore units, as well as equipment specifically 
intended for installation on-board or the propulsion thereof; 
o The full text of the Pressure Equipment Directive can be consulted in: 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/pressure-gas/pressure-
equipment/directive/index_en.htm 
o In the same website the Pressure Equipment Guidelines, which represent a 
reference for ensuring consistent application of the Directive, are available. They 
represent, unless otherwise directed, the unanimous opinion of the Member States 
experts: 
More in particular, PED Guidelines relevant for this study are: 
o Guideline 1/37 (related to Article 1, 2(i)) addresses the following question: 
Are items of pressure equipment such as manifolds, valves and piping used as 
well-control equipment and placed between a subsea well template and the 
processing platform for the oil and gas extraction and processing industry 
covered by the Pressure Equipment Directive (PED)? 
o Guideline 1/27 (related to Article 1, 2(n)) addresses the following question: 
What is meant by the term mobile offshore unit? 
And answers: 
A mobile offshore unit is an offshore unit that is not intended to be placed 
permanently or long term on the field, but is designed to be moved from 
location to location whether or not it has a means of propulsion or of lowering 
legs to the seafloor (e.g. a unit used solely for exploration). 
For example, floating units intended for production, such as FPSO's (Floating 
Production, Storage and Offloading installations usually based on tanker 
designs) and FPP's (Floating Production Platforms based on semi-submersible 
vessels), are not considered to be mobile. 
Note Items of pressure equipment specifically intended for mobile offshore 
units are excluded from the PED. However, items of pressure equipment 
intended to be installed on both FPSO’s/FPP’s and mobile offshore units are not 
excluded from the PED. 
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3. Machinery Directive 
DIRECTIVE 2006/42/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 17 
May 2006 on machinery, and amending Directive 95/16/EC (OJ L 157/24 of 9.6.2006) 
Article 1 (Scope) 
2. The following are excluded from the scope of this Directive: 
… 
(f) seagoing vessels and mobile offshore units and machinery installed on-board such 
vessels and/or units; 
o The full text of the Machinery Directive can be consulted in: 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/mechanical-
engineering/machinery/index_en.htm 
o In the same website it can be also seen the Guide to the application of the 
Machinery Directive (2nd edition June 2010). It has to be considered in particular 
the point § 58 related to the exclusion of Seagoing vessels and mobile offshore 
units and machinery installed on-board such vessels and/or units (as mentioned in 
the Article 1, 2(f) of the Machinery Directive):  
Seagoing vessels and mobile offshore units such as, for example, mobile drilling 
rigs, and machinery installed on them are excluded from the scope of the 
Machinery Directive by Article 1, 2(f) since they are subject to the Conventions of 
the International Maritime Organisation. Some of the equipment concerned by this 
exclusion may also be subject to the Marine Equipment Directive 96/98/EC as 
amended by Directive 2002/75/EC. 
A mobile offshore unit is an offshore unit that is not intended to be located on the 
oil field permanently or for the long term, but is designed to be moved from 
location to location, whether or not it has a means of propulsion or of lowering legs 
to the seafloor. 
However, floating units intended for production, such as, for example, FPSOs 
(Floating Production, Storage and Offloading installations - usually based on tanker 
designs) and FPPs (Floating Production Platforms - based on semi-submersible 
vessels) and the machinery installed on such units are not excluded from the scope 
of the Machinery Directive. 
Machinery intended to be installed on fixed offshore platforms such as, for 
example, oil production rigs, and machinery which may be used on both fixed and 
mobile offshore units is also subject to the Machinery Directive. 
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B. Companies (equipment manufacturers /installers 
/suppliers): Overview of their answers 
o 100% of the manufacturers /installers /suppliers are present at least in one 
European country. 5/11 are present only in EU/EEA while 6/11 are present also 
abroad (US, Canada, Asia Pacific, Africa/Middle East, Central/South America and 
Russia). 
o 1/11 is a small company (up to 49 employees), 1/11 is a medium size company 
(50-249 employees) and 9/11 are large enterprises (> 250 employees). 
o 4/11 companies do not consent to the publication of their replies, 5/11 consent but 
in an anonymous form and 2/11 consent with its data included. 
o MODUs vs offshore fixed and onshore platforms (Comparison of the 
equipment): 81.8% of the equipment manufacturers /installers /suppliers agree 
that the equipment for MODUs is almost identical, with small adaptations, to the 
equipment for fixed offshore or onshore installations. On the other hand the 
remaining 19.2% says that there are significant differences. It has to be noted that 
only 63.6% of the equipment manufacturers /installers /suppliers produce 
equipment for MODUs and for fixed offshore or onshore installations although the 
question was answered by the 100% of the equipment manufacturers /installers 
/suppliers. 
The small differences found by the equipment manufacturers /installers /suppliers 
are: 
1. Modifications to allow for pitch and roll 
2. Minor adaptations related to health, safety and environment (HSE) 
3. The equipment for fixed platform and jack-up units are almost identical (the 
main difference is related to the legs). Conversely there is a substantial 
difference between fixed platform/jack-up rigs and floater-based rigs (i.e. 
semisubmersibles and drill-ships), such as but not limited to the heave 
compensation systems. Likewise the BOPs used in jack-ups and fixed rigs are 
different from those used in floaters.  
In Figure B-1 it is shown the opinion of the manufacturers/installers/suppliers 
related to the equipment for MODUs in comparison with the equipment for fixed 
offshore and onshore installations. 
 
Figure B-1. Opinion of the manufacturers/installers/suppliers related to the equipment on-board MODUs 
in comparison with the equipment for fixed offshore and onshore installations 
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o The origin of the manufacturers of the equipment their companies deal with is 
mainly EU/EEA. See Table B-1. 
Table B-1. Manufacturers/installers/suppliers: Origin of the manufacturers of the equipment their 
companies deal with 
Manufacturers: 
Origin share 
EU/EEA US 
Asia/ 
Pacific 
Canada 
Africa/ Middle 
East 
Central/ South 
America 
Russia 
<20% 0 4/11 3/11 3/11 2/11 2/11 1/11 
20-40% 3/11 3/11 0 0 0 0 0 
40-60% 3/11 0 1/11 0 0 0 0 
60-80% 4/11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
>80% 1/11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
o In Figure B-2a the countries/regions of origin of the equipment bought by 
the manufacturers are shown. In Figure B-2b it is shown the percentage of 
equipment bought by the manufacturers in the EU/EEA area. 
 
Figure B-2a. Countries/regions of origin of the equipment bought by the manufacturers; Figure B-2b. 
Percentage of equipment bought by the manufacturers in EU/EEA 
All the manufacturers/installers/suppliers buy at least a percentage between 20 
and 40% of the equipment they deal with in EU/EEA and 1/11 buys more than the 
80% of the equipment in EU/EEA. Related to other regions in the world, in 
decreasing order; 7/11 of the manufacturers/installers/suppliers buy equipment in 
the US, 4/11 in Asia/Pacific, 3/11 in Canada, 2/11 in Africa/Middle East and Central 
/South America and only 1/11 of the manufacturers/installers/suppliers buys 
equipment in Russia. 
o The origin of the revenues of the manufacturers/installers/suppliers of 
equipment is mainly EU/EEA. See Table B-2. 
Table B-2. Manufacturers/ installers/ suppliers: Origin of their revenues 
Revenue: 
Origin 
share 
EU/EEA US 
Asia/ 
Pacific 
Canada 
Africa/ Middle 
East 
Central/ South 
America 
Russia 
<20% 2/11 4/11 4/11 3/11 4/11 1/11 3/11 
20-40% 3/11 1/11 1/11 0 0 2/11 0 
40-60% 3/11 0 1/11 0 1/11 0 0 
60-80% 1/11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
>80% 2/11 0 0 0 1/11 0 0 
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In Figure B-3a the countries/regions from which the manufactures obtain revenue 
are shown. In Figure B-3b it is shown the share of the revenue obtained in EU/EEA 
by the manufacturers. 
 
Figure B-3a. Countries/regions from which the manufacturers obtain revenue; Figure B-3b. Share of the 
revenue obtained in EU/EEA by the manufacturers 
All the manufacturers/ installers/ suppliers obtain revenue from EU/EEA, 3/11 
obtaining a percentage higher than 60% of their total revenue. Related to other 
regions in the world, in decreasing order; 6/11 of the manufacturers/ installers/ 
suppliers obtain revenue from Asia Pacific and from Africa/Middle East, 5/11 from 
the US and 3/11 from Canada, Central / South America and from Russia. 
o Expected changes in the origin of the revenue in the next years: 
1. 2/11 have answered that they do not expect changes in the origin of their 
revenues. 
2. 1/11 cannot predict the origin/share of its future revenues. 
3. 1/11 expects a higher activity in the North Sea (UK/Norway) due to the new 
fields like Johan Sverdrup in Norway but also due to a lot of brown fields where 
old rigs are being upgraded to extend their lifetime. 
4. 2/11 expects a general decrease in their revenues. 1/11 does not specify the 
cause and 1/11 thinks that it will be due the fact that the building of new 
equipment for drilling facilities will be reduced. 
5. 1/11 predicts a slight growth in the Asia Pacific region, a sharp decline in the 
EU/US area and a stable situation or slight decrease in the rest of the regions 
of the world. 
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o Categories of equipment manufactured/installed/supplied:  
In Figure B-4 the main categories of equipment the manufacturers/ installers/ 
suppliers are dealing with are shown. 
 
Figure B-4. Categories of equipment the manufacturers/installers/suppliers are dealing with 
Drilling equipment (5/11), well intervention equipment (1/11), material handling 
equipment (6/11), well-control equipment (3/11), other pressure equipment (3/11) 
and electrical equipment (8/11).  
The BOP is manufactured or supplied by 2 of the 3 companies dealing with well-
control equipment.  
3/11 manufacture/ install/ supply only electrical equipment, 1/11 only drilling 
equipment, 3/11 manufacture/ install/ suppliers two categories of equipment, 1/11 
manufacture/ install/ supply three different categories of equipment, 2/11 four 
categories of equipment and 1/11 manufacture/ install/ suppliers five of the six 
categories of equipment. 
o Current compliance with the EU Product Safety Directives (ATEX, MD and 
PED): 
According to the manufacturers/installers/suppliers the current compliance of the 
equipment manufactured, installed, supplied with the EU Product Safety Directives 
is as follows, see Table B-3. 
Table B-3. Current compliance of the equipment manufactured/installed/supplied with the EU Product 
Safety Directives (according to the manufacturers/ installers/ suppliers) 
 
Equipment 
manufactured/installed/supplied 
ATEX MD PED 
Compliant and certified 6/11 4/11 4/11 
Compliant but not certified 4/11 4/11 3/11 
Not compliant 1/11 2/11 1/11 
Unknown 0/11 1/11 3/11 
In Figure B-5 and in Figure B-6 the compliance of the equipment manufactured/ 
installed/ supplied with the EU Product Safety Directives (according to the 
manufacturers/ installers/ suppliers) is shown. 
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Figure B-5. Current compliance of the equipment manufactured/ installed/ supplied with the EU Product 
Safety Directives (according to the manufacturers/ installers/ suppliers) 
 
Figure B-6. Current compliance of the equipment manufactured/ installed/ supplied with the EU Product 
Safety Directives (according to the manufacturers/ installers/ suppliers); comparison 
Most of the equipment manufactured/ installed/ supplied is, according to the 
manufacturers/ installers/ suppliers, compliant with the EU Product Safety 
Directives, although the equipment manufactured/ installed/ supplied by some 
companies is not certified. The percentage of equipment compliant and certified 
according to ATEX Directive is higher than in the case of MD and PED. Only two 
companies manufacture/ install/ supply equipment compliant and certified with the 
3 Directives. 
Three companies of the same family sited worldwide but also in Europe, have 
declared different compliance of the equipment with the EU Product Safety 
Directives. The equipment manufactured/ installed/ supplied by two of these 
companies is compliant but is not certified with the Directives while in the case of 
the third company, the equipment is not compliant/ certified with the Directives. 
This third company manufactures four categories of equipment which do not 
comply with any of the Directives because are compliant with US standards; US 
OSHA related to machinery and US API regarding to pressure equipment.  
o Legislation the manufacturers/installers/suppliers currently apply: ISO 
standards (9/11), EN ISO standards (3/11), IEC standards (8/11), EN-harmonised 
standards (8/11), Norwegian standards NORSOK (4/11), British standards BS 
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(3/11) and US standards such as ASME and API (7/11) and private standards such 
as DNV-GL and ABS (2/11). These are: 
1. ISO and EN ISO: ISO 1127, ISO 6742-1, ISO 6743-9, ISO 9001, ISO 12924, 
ISO 13534, ISO 13535, ISO 14693, EN ISO 9614-2, EN ISO 12100, EN ISO 
13849-2, EN ISO 13849-5 and EN ISO 13850.  
2. IEC standards: IEC 60034, IEC 60079 Series, IEC 60204, IEC 80079-34, IEC 
80079-36 and IEC 80079-37. 
3. EN-harmonised standards: EN 334, EN 13463, EN 14382, EN 60079 Series and 
EN 60204. 
4. Norwegian standards NORSOK: D-001, S-002 and R-002. 
5. US standards (ASME, API, etc.): API 4F, API 6A, API 7, API 7K, API 8C, API 
16A, API 520, API 619, API 672 and ASME VIII pressure vessel.  
On the other hand the manufacturers/ installers/ suppliers also apply the following 
legislation: Low voltage Directive 2006/95/EC, Electromagnetic Compatibility 
Directive 2004/108/EC, Simple pressure vessel Directive 2009/105/EC, US ASTM 
standards, Guidelines for dropped objects and Russian maritime register of 
shipping (RS). 
o Currently applicable legislation and safety of the equipment: (3/11) think 
that currently applied legislation guarantees safety. (1/11) finds the US standards 
as safe as the EU Product Safety Directives with the exception of the legislation 
related to explosive atmospheres and points out that while US standards only 
consider the electrical sources of ignition, ATEX Directive considers all sources of 
ignition (e.g. static electricity, friction, etc.). (2/11) thinks that ATEX Directive is 
not sure as it allows “self-certification”. (5/11) did not reply the question. 
As explained above it has to be pointed out that the ATEX Directive does not speak 
about “self-certification” but about “Declaration of Conformity” which is always 
mandatory. The manufacturer or his authorized representative is always obliged to 
draw up a written “Declaration of Conformity” which shall enable the conformity of 
the equipment with the relevant requirements of the Directive to be assessed. For 
category 2 of equipment (equipment for zone 1) the technical documentation 
created to draw up the written “Declaration of Conformity” has to be communicated 
to a Notified Body. 
o Solved problems with the extension of the EU Product Safety Directives to 
cover MODUs:  
1. (1/11): The consideration of all sources of ignition, taken into account by ATEX 
Directive, but not by the US standards. 
2. (1/11): Documentation related to HSE issues. The extension will enforce more 
documentation to prove that equipment safety has been considered, but 
without contributing significantly more to the actual equipment safety. 
3. (2/11): Think the extension of the Directives will not solve any problem. 
4. (1/11): Does not know. 
5. (6/11) Did not reply to the question. 
o Suitability of the EU Product Safety Directives for equipment on-board 
MODUs: (5/11) consider the Directives appropriate for MODUs, (2/11) do not 
consider them pertinent and (1/11) does not know. (3/11) did not reply to the 
question. This information is shown in Figure B-7. 
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Figure B-7. Suitability of the EU Product Safety Directives for equipment on-board MODUs according to 
manufacturers 
o Would the extension of the scope of the ATEX Directive result in safer 
equipment?: (5/11) say no because they think that IEC and US standards are 
more suitable (although US standards should be updated in order to consider all 
sources of ignition).  
(2/11) think that ATEX Directive would increase safety in equipment because 
currently when it is not legally required only electrical risks are considered (but not 
other risks). On the other hand despite considering ATEX Directive a safer 
legislation, they do not agree with the fact that ATEX allows “self-certification”. 
As explained above it has to be pointed out that the ATEX Directive does not speak 
about “self-certification” but about “Declaration of Conformity”. A Declaration of 
conformity is issued by the manufacturer for all equipment and has nothing to do 
with self-certification. 
(2/11) do not know and (2/11) did not reply to the question. 
 These results are shown in Figure B-8 together with these related to MD and PED. 
o Would the extension of the scope of the MD result in safer equipment?: 
(5/11) say no because they think that O&G companies already have a very high 
safety standards, like US OSHA regulations, as well as third parties inspecting the 
equipment. They also think that the extension of the legislation will enforce more 
documentation related to HSE without contributing to the actual level of safety of 
the equipment. (0/11) think that MD would increase the safety of the equipment in 
MODUs and (3/11) do not know. (3/11) did not reply. 
These results are shown in Figure B-8 together with these related to ATEX Directive 
and PED. 
o Would the extension of the scope of the PED result in safer equipment?: 
(4/11) say no because they think the currently applied standards are more suitable 
(e.g. ASME standards). They point out that API standards, which have been 
improved since Macondo, are exhaustive for BOPs. They also think that the 
extension of the legislation will enforce more documentation related to HSE without 
contributing to the actual level of safety of the equipment. No one thinks that PED 
would increase the safety of the equipment in MODUs and (3/11) does not know. 
(4/11) did not reply. 
These results are shown in Figure B-8 together with these related to ATEX Directive 
and MD. 
 Study on the impacts of possible amendments to the ATEX, the Machinery, and the 
Pressure Equipment Directive with respect to equipment intended for use in the 
offshore oil and gas industry 
 
 
 
126
 
Figure B-8. Would the extension of the EU Product Safety Directives result in safer equipment? Opinion 
of the manufacturers 
o Is it necessary to modify the currently applied standards to meet the 
EHSRs (or ESRs) of the Directives?: (4/11) say no because they consider the 
requirements of the O&G companies much higher than the minimum requirements 
of the Directives. (2/11) thinks that the currently applied standards may require 
some modifications: e.g. to ensure that documentation requirements are met (but 
not to improve the safety of the equipment) and to add clarity in the field. A 
company purposes that any specific standard which contain very good information 
(e.g. DNV and ABS) would, when accepted an international standard, add clarity in 
the field. (2/11) do not know and (3/11) did not reply.  
o Barriers to trade: For (3/11) of the companies the extension of the EU Product 
Safety Directives would not create any barrier to trade. On the other hand (4/11) 
of the companies think the extension could create barriers to trade. (2/11) do not 
know and (2/11) did not reply to the question. These results are in Figure B-9. 
 
Figure B-9. Extension of the EU Product Safety Directives and its impact on the trade according to 
manufacturers 
o Will the costs of compliance put your company at a disadvantage vis-à-vis 
their competitors from within EU/EEA?: (6/11) of the companies consider that 
the costs of compliance with the EU Product Safety Directives will not put their 
company at a disadvantage. The reasons are: 1. The equipment they 
manufacture/install/supply is already compliant with the Directives; 2. The same 
rules will theoretically apply for all competitors. (2/11) think they will be at a 
disadvantage, being their products withdrawn from sale within the EU due to the 
high compliance costs. (1/11) does not know and (2/11) did not reply to the 
question. 
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o Will the costs of compliance put your company at a disadvantage vis-à-vis 
their competitors from outside EU/EEA?: (6/11) of the companies consider 
that the costs of compliance with the EU Product Safety Directives will not put their 
company at a disadvantage because they already comply with the EU Product 
Safety Directives and they manufacture according to them for many parts of the 
world. (2/11) think they will be at a disadvantage as in some cases products from 
outside the EU are likely not compliant but are imported as being CE marked. 
(1/11) does not know and (2/11) did not reply to the question. 
o How would you offset the costs of compliance?: (1/11) company, whose 
equipment is compliant and certified with all 3 Directives, does not expect any cost. 
(7/11) companies would pass the costs to the clients and would increase the price 
of the equipment. (1/11) company would offset the cost only by passing it to the 
clients. (2/11) did not reply to the question. 
o Do you expect any benefit of compliance?: (2/11) companies do not foresee 
any benefit or opportunity in case of compliance of the equipment they 
manufacture/install/supply. (1/11) company expects some benefit when specific 
harmonised standards for the sector are developed. For example, this company 
would expect a harmonised standard for lifting lugs and eyes as this is a grey area 
due to the many existing industry standards conflicting in this area. This may result 
in a situation that the safest methods become a harmonised standard. This 
company expects the same for fasteners (bolts, nuts), use of chains versus cables, 
etc. (1/11) company also expects some kind of benefit although it does not explain 
which. (7/11) did not reply to the question. 
o Societal impact /employment: (4/11) companies, whose equipment is compliant 
and certified with the EU Product Safety Directives, think that the extension of the 
legislation will not have any impact on employment. For (2/11) companies it would 
facilitate the creation of new job positions in the company because the EU Product 
Safety Directives will enforce more documentation. (1/11) companies, whose 
equipment is not compliant with any Directive, expects a direct or indirect loss of 
jobs as the withdrawal of products from the EU market will lead to reduced sales. 
(3/11) companies expect no change in the number of post but a qualitative impact 
on the necessary workforce (e.g. more skilled personnel). (2/11) did not reply to 
the question. 
o Substantive and administrative costs regarding to the compliance of the 
specific subcategory of equipment: (6/11) companies do not know the impact 
in terms of cost that the extension of the legislation would have for their business. 
One of this companies, which is not manufacturer but it is supplier/renter/installer, 
says that this question is in their vendors territory to detail. Drillmec, whose 
equipment is compliant and certified with ATEX Directive and MD but not with PED, 
as they do not manufacture pressure equipment but bought it from suppliers, 
declares that if PED comes into force their suppliers would transmit the cost of 
compliance with the PED to them. Drillmec cannot estimate this cost. (1/11) 
company, whose equipment is compliant and certified with the 3 Directives, says 
the extension of the legislation would not have any cost for them. (3/11) 
companies of the same family sited worldwide but also in Europe, have declared 
different compliance with the EU Product Safety Directives for the equipment they 
manufacture/install/supply: 
One of these, whose equipment is compliant but not certified with the Directives, 
does not estimate any cost of compliance for the selected subcategory of 
equipment (material handling equipment).  
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A second company, whose equipment is also compliant but not certified with the 
Directives, which has selected the drilling equipment as the specific category to 
estimate the costs and which produces 2,400 pieces of drilling equipment per year, 
expects the following qualitative costs:  
Related to ATEX Directive:  
Substantive Costs: New material (one-off), changes in production lines (per unit 
produced) and certification process (one-off). 
Administrative costs: familiarization with new regulation (one-off and frequency) 
and certification process (one-off and frequency). 
Related to MD:  
Substantive Costs: Changes in production lines (one-off and per unit produced) and 
certification process (one-off). 
Administrative costs: familiarization with new regulation (one-off and frequency) 
and certification process (one-off). 
Related to PED:  
Substantive Costs: Changes in production lines (one-off and per unit produced) and 
certification process (one-off). 
Administrative costs: familiarization with new regulation (one-off and frequency) 
and certification process (one-off and frequency). 
Finally the third company, whose equipment is not compliant with any of the 3 
European Directives, and which manufactures up to 350 units/sets of drilling 
equipment (hoisting, lifting, handling and rotary systems) per year evaluates the 
costs of compliance in 12,500,000€ per year. The cost is broken down as follows: 
Related to ATEX Directive:  
Substantive Costs: New design (one-off cost: 500,000€ and per unit produced 
cost: 100,000€); new materials (per unit produced cost: 20,000€) and certification 
process (per unit produced cost: 10,000€). 
Administrative costs: Familiarization with new regulation (one-off cost: 100,000€) 
and certification process (frequency cost: 30,000 € although the frequency is not 
specified). 
Related to MD:  
Substantive Costs: New design (one-off cost: 50,000 € and per unit produced cost: 
50,000€) and certification process (per unit produced cost: 10,000€). 
Administrative costs: Familiarization with new regulation (one-off cost: 100,000 €) 
and certification process (frequency cost: 20,000 € although the frequency is not 
specified). 
Related to PED:  
Substantive Costs: New design (one-off cost: 300,000 € and per unit produced 
cost: 60,000€) and certification process (per unit produced cost: 10,000€). 
Administrative costs: Familiarization with new regulation (one-off cost: 100,000€) 
and certification process (frequency cost: 20,000€ although the frequency is not 
specified). 
o Significant time delays: (3/11) companies expect time delays in their business if 
the legislation is extended.  
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One company placed in Europe manufacturing 2,400 pieces per year of drilling 
equipment (hoisting, lifting, handling and rotary systems) not compliant/certified 
with any of the 3 European Product Safety Directives, estimates the lead time 
between 8 and 20 months as the equipment would be stocked and could not be 
used.  
On the other hand (2/11) companies of the same family placed in Europe, whose 
equipment is compliant but not certified with the 3 European Directives, do not 
expect any time delay. (1/11) company, whose equipment is compliant and 
certified with the 3 Directives, do not expect any time delay. 
(5/11) did not reply to the question. These results are shown in Figure B-10. 
 
Figure B-10. Extension of the EU Product Safety Directives and the expected time delays according to 
manufacturers 
o Difficulties of compliance for the selected specific subcategory of 
equipment: The difficulties the companies find are: to comply with ATEX Directive 
because all electrical equipment is considered for hazardous zones (instead of US 
classes) and in general to comply with the 3 European Product Safety Directives 
because of the required documentation. 
o Extension of PED to well-control equipment. Solved problems?: (1/11) 
companies thinks that the documentation related to the safety of the product will 
be improved if PED is extended. The European Product Safety Directives are stricter 
and require more HSE documentation than the currently applied legislation (DNV-
GL and ABS), especially in the case of the MD, although without contributing 
directly to equipment safety/ quality. Some documentation is related to the 
equipment itself and affects the equipment suppliers. However, the greater part of 
the documentation requirements are related to the overall drilling systems (and 
other rig systems) and affect the rig operators/owners.  
(10/11) companies have not answered the question. 
o Extension of PED to well-control equipment. Is PED suitable for well-
control equipment?: (1/11) companies thinks that it is not suitable and (10/11) 
have not answered the question. Only 3/11 manufacturers/ installers/ suppliers 
deal with well-control equipment. Results are shown in Figure B-11. 
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Figure B-11. Extension of the PED to well-control equipment. Is it suitable? (According to 
manufacturers) 
o Extension of PED to well-control equipment. Difficulties for companies and 
affection to the market: (3/11) companies would have difficulties due to the 
extension of the PED to well-control equipment. These are: Conflict of standards as 
PED can conflict with API and ASME US standards; market segregation between 
geographical areas; and for a company buying pressure equipment to different 
suppliers, an increased cost of the equipment bought.  
(8/11) companies have not answered the question. 
o Extension of PED to well-control equipment. Is it necessary to modify the 
standards currently used to meet the EHSRs of the PED?: (2/11) companies 
think that it is not necessary. (9/11) companies have not answered the question. 
o Extension of PED to well-control equipment. Barriers to trade?: (1/11) 
company thinks that the extension of PED to well-control equipment will create 
barriers to trade. (1/11) company thinks that it will not be any barrier. (9/11) 
companies do not have opinion about this issue. 
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C. Companies (MODU owners/ operators): Overview of their 
answers 
o A total of 19 companies owning/ operating a MODU have answered the survey. 
17/19 companies are drilling contractors owning a rig or owning/ operating/ 
providing drilling services to Oil and Gas (O&G) companies. 2/19 answers have 
arrived from the Exploration and Production (E&P) Business unit of O&G companies 
operating a MODU, always by means of contractors. 
o 17/19 owners/ operators are present at least in one European country while 2/19 
companies are placed only in the US. 12/19 owners/ operators are present only in 
EU/EEA (10/19 in UK or Norway) while 5/19 are present also abroad (US, Canada, 
Asia Pacific, Africa/ Middle East, Central/ South America and Russia). 
o 2/19 of the companies are medium sized (50-249 employees) and 17/19 are large 
enterprises (> 250 employees). 
o 5/19 companies do not consent to the publication of their replies, 12/19 consent 
but in an anonymous form, 1/19 (Dolphin Drilling Ltd, Aberdeen) consents with its 
data included and 1/19 company has not answered the question. 
o MODUs vs offshore fixed and onshore platforms (Comparison of the 
equipment): 1/19 of the owners/ operators agree that the equipment for MODUs 
is almost identical to the equipment for fixed offshore or onshore installations. On 
the other hand 6/19 say that there are significant differences and 12/19 say that 
there is a huge variety of equipment onboard MODUs, so they cannot state if all 
equipment is similar to that in fixed offshore or onshore installations.  
The differences described by the owners/operators are: 
1. Differences in the operations; risk profiles; appropriate standards; and in the 
certification requirements. 
2. Marine, positioning and navigation equipment. 
3. MODUs have increased well-control equipment and BOP is subsea. 
4. Derrick and riser compensators. 
5. Fixed platforms have no marine systems (ballast, bilge, mooring, etc.) at all. 
6. Some systems (drilling machinery, mud processing machinery) are similar but 
also contain differences (e.g. Motion compensation systems, etc.). 
7. Power generation and distribution systems vary between MODUs so even more 
if it is compared to fixed facilities. 
8. Hotel services may be similar, but small differences remain due to e.g. vessel 
motion. 
9. Equipment in MODUs that is not on present in a fixed or onshore installation: 
part of hull and machinery; power plant; accommodation and heliport; part of 
auxiliary equipment; and marine equipment: mooring/ballasting equipment. 
10. Typical in jack ups: Jacking equipment. 
11. Typical in semisubmersibles/ drill-ships: Motion compensating equipment 
(marine riser compensation, drill string compensation); and remote BOP and 
control systems (MUX/ Pod hose system). 
12. Typical in jack up/ semisub/ ship further systems: Jacking systems; 
main/auxiliary/emergency generator power plant and distribution systems 
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(fixed platforms mostly gas turbine engines); marine systems (ballast/ bilge, 
etc.); mooring systems; positioning and position keeping/ propulsion systems 
and all IMO/ Flag state/C lass systems required for floating barges/ ships. 
13. Typical equipment on a MODU (Jack up/ semi/ ship) but not on a fixed offshore 
drilling+production platform: Marine riser system; motion compensating-
tensioning systems, riser and drill string; riser tensioning systems; cantilever/ 
drilling substructure skidding systems (some fixed platforms have drilling 
substructure skidding systems); subsea BOP and Lower Marine Riser Package 
(LMRP) systems; BOP launching systems; ultra-high pressure air systems; and 
nitrogen systems. 
The opinion of the drilling contractors and operators related to the equipment on-
board MODUs in comparison with the equipment for fixed offshore and onshore 
installations is shown in Figure C-1. 
 
Figure C-1. Opinion of the drilling contractors and operators related to the equipment on-board MODUs 
in comparison with the equipment for fixed offshore and onshore installations 
o The origin of the manufacturers of the equipment their companies deal 
with is mainly EU/EEA, US and Asia Pacific. See Table C-1. 
Table C-1. MODU owners/operators: Origin of the manufacturers of the equipment their companies deal 
with 
Manufacturers: 
Origin share 
EU/EEA US 
Asia/ 
Pacific 
Canada 
Africa/ 
Middle 
East 
Central/ 
South 
America 
Russia 
<20% 4/19 2/19 6/19 2/19 0/19 1/19 0/19 
20-40% 10/19 7/19 3/19 0/19 1/19 0/19 0/19 
40-60% 3/19 7/19 6/19 0/19 0/19 0/19 0/19 
60-80% 1/19 1/19 1/19 0/19 0/19 0/19 0/19 
>80% 1/19 0/19 0/19 0/19 0/19 0/19 0/19 
o In Figure C-2a the countries/regions of origin of the equipment bought by 
the drilling contractors/operators are shown. In Figure C-2b it is shown the 
percentage of equipment bought by the drilling contractors/operators in 
the EU/EEA area. 
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Figure C-2a. Countries/regions of origin of the equipment bought by the drilling contractors/ operators; 
Figure C-3b. Percentage of equipment bought by the drilling contractors/ operators in EU/EEA 
All MODU owners buy a part of the equipment in the EU/EEA area. 
The 2 companies sited only in the US buy a percentage lower than 20% of the 
equipment in EU/EEA.  
The most important part of the MODU owners/operators (10/19) buy a percentage 
between 20 and 40% of the equipment in EU/EEA.  
Related to other regions in the world, in decreasing order; 17/19 of the MODU 
owners/operators buy equipment in the US, 16/19 buy equipment in Asia/ Pacific, 
2/19 in Canada and only 1/19 in Africa and Central/ South America.  
Approximately 1/3 of the MODU owners/ operators buy a percentage between 40 
and 60% of their equipment either in the US or in Asia/Pacific.  
It can be said that in general the MODU owners/operators buy the equipment in a 
diversified way as only 3/19 companies buy more than 60% of the equipment in 
the same region.  
It has to be noted that for the two O&G companies this data is referred to their 
(E&P) Business units. 
o The origin of the revenues for the MODU owners/operators is diverse, see 
Table C-2. 
Table C-2. MODU owners/operators: Origin of the revenues 
Revenue: 
Origin share 
EU/EEA US Asia/Pacific Canada 
Africa/Middle 
East 
Central/South 
America 
Russia 
<20% 1/19 4/19 8/19 3/19 4/19 6/19 0/19 
20-40% 9/19 2/19 2/19 0/19 8/19 1/19 0/19 
40-60% 0/19 3/19 1/19 0/19 1/19 0/19 0/19 
60-80% 4/19 0/19 0/19 0/19 0/19 0/19 0/19 
>80% 3/19 0/19 0/19 0/19 0/19 0/19 0/19 
Not specified 2/19 1/19 1/19 1/19 1/19 1/19 0/19 
o In Figure C-a the countries/regions from which the drilling contractors/ 
operators obtain revenue are shown. In Figure C-b it is shown the share of the 
revenue obtained in EU/EEA by the drilling contractors/ operators. 
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Figure C-3a. Countries/regions from which the drilling contractors/operators obtain revenue; Figure C-
3b. Share of the revenue obtained in EU/EEA by the drilling contractors/ operators 
All MODU owners/operators obtain revenue from EU/EEA: 9/19 companies obtain a 
percentage between 20 and 40%, 4/19 between 60 and 80%, and 3/19 obtain a 
percentage higher than 80% of their total revenue.  
Related to other regions in the world, in decreasing order; 14/19 of the MODU 
owners/operators obtain revenue from Africa/Middle East, 12/19 from Asia Pacific, 
10/19 from the US, 8/19 from Central/ South America and 4/19 from Canada.  
It has to be noted that for the two O&G companies, which obtain revenues at least 
from 4 different regions, this data is referred to their (E&P) Business units. 
As expected due to the mobile nature of MODUs it can be said that the MODU 
owners/operators work in a diversified way as only 7/19 companies obtain a more 
than 60% of the revenue in the same region. Related to the drilling contractors; 
4/17 obtain revenue only from  one area, 2/17 from 2 different regions, 3/17 from 
3 regions, 3/17 from 4 regions, 2/17 from 5 different areas and 3/17 from 6 
different areas. 
o Expected changes in the origin of the revenue in the next years: 
1. 3/17 of the drilling contractors have answered that they do not expect changes 
in the origin of their revenues. 
2. 3/17 of the drilling contractors cannot predict the origin/share of its future 
revenues. 
3. 9/17 of the drilling contractors expect a decrease in their revenues: 7/17 
expect a decrease in the EU/EEA area because of the current economic 
situation and the low oil and gas reserves; 1/17 forecasts a general decrease; 
and 1/17 expects a decrease in the North Africa area and an invariant revenue 
from the EU area. 
4. 1/2 of the O&G companies says that a decrease in the revenue could be 
expected for the Asia Pacific area.  
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o Current compliance with the EU Product Safety Directives (ATEX, MD and 
PED): 
Table C-3 shows the current degree of compliance of the rigs of the drilling 
contractors with the EU Product Safety Directives. 
Table C-3. Current compliance of the rigs of the drilling contractors with the EU Product Safety 
Directives 
 
Compliance of the rigs of the 
drilling contractors 
ATEX MD PED 
Compliant and certified 3/17 1/17 2/17 
Compliant but not certified 1/17 3/17 8/17 
Not compliant 9/17 9/17 3/17 
Unknown 4/17 4/17 4/17 
In Figure C- and in Figure C- the compliance of the rigs of drilling contractors/ 
operators with the EU PSDs (Product Safety Directives) is shown. 
 
 
Figure C-4. Current compliance of the rigs of the drilling contractors/operators with the EU Product 
Safety Directives 
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Figure C-5. Current compliance of the rigs of the drilling contractors/operators with the EU Product 
Safety Directives; comparison 
Approximately only 1/5 of the drilling contractors own rigs which are compliant with 
the ATEX Directive. 13/17 of the drilling contractors either own rigs which are not 
compliant with the ATEX Directive or do not know if they are.  
The number of companies owning rigs compliant and certified with the MD is lower 
than in the case of the ATEX Directive. 
10/17 drilling contractors own rigs compliant with the PED and the rigs owned by 8 
of these are not certified. Only one company owns rigs compliant and certified with 
the 3 Directives.  
The O&G companies, operating a MODU always by means of drilling contractors, 
have not answered this question. 
The reasons for which the rigs are not compliant with the EU Product Safety 
Directives are: 
1. MODUs operate globally while the EU Product Safety Directives are not globally 
accepted. The compliance with the EU Directives would limit the options for 
trade, e.g. the US authorities do not consider EU standards to warrant 
equivalent levels of safety and require global standards (IEC). 
2. The currently used standards have been proven in service to provide robust 
levels of safety, equivalent or even higher. 
3. Rigs and equipment came into service long before the Directives were issued 
and any retrospective compliance would be technically and financially 
challenging.  The extension of the European Product Safety Directives should 
be addressed to the manufacturer rather than the end user. 
4. The equipment has been manufactured outside the EU/EEA area. 
5. MODUs will rarely encounter hydrocarbons so it is not perceived any safety 
benefit because of the compliance with the Directives.  
6. The EU Product Safety Directives are addressed mainly to equipment 
manufacturers. 
7. The EU Product Safety Directives are implemented country by country and are 
usually not understood in the same way in all the countries. 
8. The European “CE mark” in the equipment will not decrease the number of 
accidents; the human factor has to be also considered. 
9. Taking into account the huge variety of equipment onboard MODUs it is difficult 
to comply. A gap analysis to know the compatibility between the currently used 
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equipment/standards and the UE Product Safety Directives should be done. 
That would be more convenient than a recertification process. 
o Legislation the MODU owners/operators currently apply: ISO standards are 
used by (13/19) of the drilling contractors/ operators, EN ISO standards by (3/19), 
IEC standards by (15/19), EN-harmonised standards by (11/19), Norwegian 
standards NORSOK by (10/19), British standards BS by (11/19) and US standards 
such as ASME and API by (15/19) and private standards such as DNV-GL and ABS 
by (4/19). These are: 
1. ISO: ISO 4309, ISO 6385, ISO 8383, ISO 9000, ISO 9001 Quality Management 
Systems, ISO 10407, ISO 10423, ISO 11064, ISO 13354, ISO 13533, ISO 
13535, ISO 13624, ISO 13628, ISO 13628-7, ISO 13702, ISO 13704, ISO 
13920, ISO 14000, ISO 15156, ISO 17631, ISO 18000, ISO 19901 and ISO 
19905. 
2. EN ISO: EN ISO standard for piping material, ISO 10407, ISO 10423, ISO 
13354, ISO 13533, ISO 13624, ISO 13628-7, ISO 13704 and ISO 15156. 
3. IEC standards: IEC 60112, IEC 60228, IEC 60056, IEC 60079 Series, IEC 
60092 Series, IEC 60092-34, IEC 60092-504, IEC 60470, IEC 60526, IEC 
60529, IEC 60533, IEC 60945, IEC 60947, IEC 61000, IEC 61508, IEC 61511, 
IEC 61892. 
4. EN-harmonised standards: EN 953, EN 12079, EN TS 13001-5, EN 13478, EN 
13852 and EN 60079.  
5. Norwegian standards NORSOK: C-001, C-002, D-001, D-010, S-001, S-002, R-
002, R-003 and Z-013. 
A MODU owner/operator has pointed out that not all NORSOK standards are 
related to MODUs as they are chiefly in effect for production units. A few 
NORSOK standards are normative, given that the areas they cover (working 
environment, drill floor equipment, personnel lifting devices, etc.) are not 
considered sufficiently addressed by maritime frameworks, but most are not. 
6. British standards: BS EN 60079, BS 31.3, BS 5045 and Provision and Use of 
Work Equipment Regulations 1998 (PUWER). 
7. US standards (ASME, API, NFPA, NEMA, NACE, etc.): API 4F, API 6A, API 6D, 
API 7G, API 7K, API 7L, API 8B, API 8C, API 9A, API 9B, API 14B, API 14E, API 
16A, API 16C, API 16D, API 16F, API 16J, API 16R, API 53, API 530, API S53, 
API RP 16Q, API RP 53, API RP 64 and API/DS1/NS2 Standard. ASME B31.1, 
ASME I, ASME IV, ASME VIII pressure vessel, ASME B 31.3. US NEC 505/500. 
NACE MR075. 
8. DNVGL standards: D202, C101, E101, D201, C401, D301, E401, D203, D101, 
B101, E303, E403, E302, E304, E201, E301, A101, C301, C105, C103, C106, 
C102, C201, C104 and A201. 
On the other hand the MODU owners/operators also apply the following legislation: 
SOLAS, MARPOL, Class Society requirements, Flag State requirements, CAP 437 
(Standards for Offshore Helicopter Landing Areas), Guidance and best practice 
standards, State Authorities regulations (Netherlands, Denmark, UK, Norway, US 
and Canada offshore regulations), and IEEE standards96 (Advancing technology for 
humanity). The association is chartered under this name and it is the full legal 
name. IEEE is designed to serve professionals involved in all aspects of the 
electrical, electronic, and computing fields and related areas of science and 
                                           
96 IEEE standards for the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
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technology that underlie modern civilization. Industry standards and own 
performance standards are also applied.  
MODUs operating at the Norwegian Continental Shelf have to apply the Norwegian 
Maritime Administration´s regulations for Mobile Offshore Units; IMO MODU Code; 
and compliance with Self State Authorities (Petroleum Safety Agency Norway). 
o Does 2009 MODU Code (IMO Resolution A.1023 (26)) apply to your 
company?:(16/19) companies apply the MODU Code. Of these, (3/19) explain that 
the applied version of the MODU Code depends on the year the MODU was built 
and on if the MODU was updated according to a later code. In that way other 
versions of the MODU Code the companies apply are: 1979 MODU Code (IMO 
Resolution A.414 (XI)) and 1989 MODU Code (IMO Resolution A.649 (16)). (1/19) 
One drilling contractor sited in the EU/EEA area says that MODU Code does not 
apply to its fleet. (2/19) companies have not answered the question. 
A drilling contractor highlights that the MODU Code is in essence a drilling rig 
specific version of SOLAS and that it is supported by international and national 
standards such as ISO, IEC and industry specific standards such as API. 
o Currently applicable legislation and safety of the equipment: (19/19) of the 
MODU owners/ operators think that currently applied legislation guarantees safety 
of equipment. This rotund affirmation is based on: 
1. The currently applied national and international legislation (Class, MODU Code, 
API, Directive 2013/30/EU, Performance standards for each of the Safety Case 
and Environmentally Critical Systems (SECS), etc.) warrant an equivalent level 
of safety and are used globally with a good track record in the field. 
2. In the majority of Root Cause Analysis the main causes are connected to 
human factor, not to equipment design or certification. 
3. There are sufficient controls/ inspections based on international standards 
already applied on a global basis to MODUs. 
4. MODUs are built according to Class Society requirements and comply with 
many API recommended practices, which cover the majority of issues with 
respect to the drilling equipment not covered under IMO MODU Code. 
5. There is no evidence of systemic defects under current global standards. 
6. An O&G company points out that MODUs are certified before the spud of a new 
well by means of a recognized third part. 
On the other hand an O&G company says that the extension of the legislation 
would facilitate the certification of the equipment under a unique standard in 
Europe as well as the definition of responsible parties and liabilities. It would set a 
clear frame for O&G operations across Europe. 
o Solved problems with the extension of the EU Product Safety Directives to 
cover MODUs: (18/19) MODU owners/ operators say that the extension of the 
legislation will not solve any problem because: 
1. Safety, health and environmental problems are already addressed as the 
currently applied MODU standards are equivalent to ATEX Directive, MD and 
PED. 
2. One company points out that they have never had any problem with the 
currently used MODUs. 
3. It could be though that the “men-machine interface safety” aspect would be 
improved as MD is more specific to men-machine interface safety than some of 
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the current used standards, which have a starting point of unit/system 
integrity. However the currently applied standards also address similar aspects 
on men-machine safety as the MD, although it cannot be stated that they are 
fully covered under MD without an in depth review. 
o Suitability of the EU Product Safety Directives for equipment in MODUs: 
(13/19) companies do not consider the Directives appropriate for MODUs because: 
1. The EU Product Safety Directives cannot stand alone and replace the existing 
normative references. Other recognized standards should be considered 
instead. 
2. For most drilling related equipment and MODU related equipment there are 
more specific regulations available. European Product Safety Directives would 
be handled as an additional requirement on top of the existing legislation. 
3. There is no perceived advantage of extending the legislation from a safety 
perspective. 
4. Related to ATEX Directive many markets in the US and Australia have banned 
ATEX certified equipment for its use offshore. 
5. The issue that MODUs not only comply with Flag State, IMO and Class (DNV/ 
ABS/ Lloyds) requirements but also with a selection coastal state requirements 
pending on the area of operation (such as UK PUWER) would complicate the 
bases (what regulations will be included) for such assessment. 
(3/19) companies consider the Directives pertinent but: 
1. The extension of these should be applied only to the new equipment and not to 
the existing one. 
2. In order to formulate the legislation appropriately, a gap analysis of the 3 
Directives with the standards and Codes that are being followed should be 
made. Extensions of the current Directives should be done to adapt them to 
the MODUs specific case.  
(2/19) companies do not know. Of these, one company, currently using some 
equipment covered under some of the EU Product Safety Directives, finds it difficult 
to determine if a general application of these Directives would be suitable. 
(1/19) companies has not answered the question. 
In Figure C- these results are shown. 
 
Figure C-6. Suitability of the EU Product Safety Directives for equipment on-board MODUs according to 
drilling contractors/ operators 
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o Would the extension of the scope of the ATEX Directive, MD and PED result 
in safer equipment?: (15/19) say that the extension of ATEX Directive would not 
result in safer equipment because: 
1. “Self-certification”, as allowed by ATEX Directive, will very likely lower the 
safety standard. Independent verification as per IEC is a must. 
It has to be pointed out that the ATEX Directive only allows self-certification for 
some specific type of equipment with a lower hazard. The involvement of a 
third party (notified body) in the conformity assessment is required for the 
majority of the equipment. The above statement that ATEX allows "self-
certification" is therefore misleading as it gives the impression that all 
equipment is self-certified. Most of the Ex equipment already in use comes 
from ATEX origins but without the certification, or an equivalent international 
standard. 
2. Zone ratings and equipment safety already exists within Class, Flag and HSE 
Case regimes. 
3. Electrical safety is already covered by other standards and recommended 
practices. Mechanical requirements of ATEX will be additional. 
4. ATEX Directive is not giving any added value to the current implemented 
MODU standards. 
5. Current design basis provide equivalent or higher level of safety. 
(2/19) companies do not know if the extension of the ATEX Directive would result 
in safer equipment because the benefits are unclear and an in depth review is 
required. 
(13/19) and (15/19) of the companies say that the extension of MD and PED 
respectively would not result in safer equipment because: 
1. Existing global standards have a track record in the field that allows the 
companies to assess their reliability based on date. The same robust basis is 
not available for equipment subject to the MD and PED. 
2. MD and PED are not giving any added value to the current implemented MODU 
standards. 
3. Equipment safety already exists within Class, Flag and HSE Case regimes. 
4. There are already sufficient internationally recognized standards and 
recommended practices. 
5. Current design basis provides equivalent or higher level of safety. 
(4/19) companies do not know if the extension of MD would result in safer 
equipment. Of these (2/19) do not know if their extension would result in safer 
equipment because the benefits are unclear and an in depth review is required. 
Similarly (2/19) companies do not know if the extension of the PED would result in 
safer equipment and for one of these the benefits are unclear. 
Finally (2/19) companies consider ATEX Directive, MD and PED pertinent but, in 
order to formulate the legislation appropriately, a gap analysis with the standards 
and codes that are being followed is suggested. A frame to clearly specify the 
requirements that are now dispersed under several standards should be set. 
These results are shown in Figure C-. 
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Figure C-7. Would the extension of the EU Product Safety Directives result in safer equipment? Opinion 
of the drilling contractors/ operators 
o Is it necessary to modify the currently applied standards to meet the 
EHSRs of the Directives?: (16/19) companies do not agree with the modification 
of the currently applied standards because: 
1. This is already the case. Standards are constantly being developed, and 
significant amendments have and are still taking place after Macondo. 
2. Existing Class, Flag and HSE Case regimes plus associated verification schemes 
cover EHSRs adequately. 
3. An O&G company: There are a wide range of inspections based on international 
rules and standards to follow. O&G industry has large experience to manage 
this equipment. MODUs are certified before the spud (initial drilling) of a new 
well, by means of a recognized third part. 
(1/19) company thinks that may be the currently applied standards should be 
modified but not at large. Modifications should consider mechanical requirements of 
ATEX Directive and should verify the relation men-machine safety interfaces 
regarding to MD. 
(2/19) companies have not answered the question. 
o Barriers to trade: For (18/19) of the companies the extension of the EU Product 
Safety Directives would create barriers to trade because: 
1. The extension would incur significant cost and time to initially determine 
existing levels of compliance across a massive variety and quantity of 
equipment, followed by further significant cost and time in replacing or re-
certifying non-compliant equipment, which may not be practicable or even 
achievable in some cases. It has to be considered the downtime while MODUs 
replace their equipment and the labor of removal of the existing equipment 
and installation of new equipment. Has the potential to be a major barrier to 
economic trading as these expenses would incur both when entering and 
leaving the EU market. 
2. Putting these Directives in place may make the MODU less suitable for other 
areas of the world. ATEX compliant equipment may not be accepted in the US. 
3. Compliance across the variety and quantity of systems onboard existing 
MODUs would have massive cost and time impacts, and may not even be 
possible in some aspects (significant drilling and well-control systems are 
designed and manufactured in USA, to API standards, not to EU standards). If 
compliance could be achieved, the associated cost would have to be attempted 
to be recovered through operational day rates in an already depressed market 
place (MODUs are already being cold-stacked and scrapped). To move or retain 
units into an EU area would therefore become prohibitively expensive. Worth 
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noting that EU/EEA is already one of the most expensive operating areas 
without application of yet further legislation. 
4. The cost of compliance for EU MODUs may put them at a competitive 
disadvantage in non-EU markets. On the other hand the cost of compliance 
could create a disincentive to new entrants into the EU market. 
5. The majority of the equipment comes from different parts of the world, 
constructed following oil and gas international standards. So, that could create 
a real trade barrier. 
6. It may also be detrimental to EU manufacturer´s options to sell their products 
outside of the EU, such as in places where the Directives are not accepted as a 
standard. 
7. It will create significant issues on the supply chain for both owners and 
operators. 
(1/19) company has not answered the question. 
These results are shown in Figure C-. 
 
Figure C-8. Extension of the EU Product Safety Directives and its impact on the trade according to 
drilling contractors/ operators 
o Would the costs of compliance put your company at a disadvantage vis-à-
vis their competitors from within EU/EEA?: (12/19) think they will be at a 
disadvantage because: 
1. The approach to compliance and the associated costs may differ between 
MODU owners.  
2. The age of the rig will be a significant factor in the cost to comply. For 
example, TDS4 top drive system will in all probability not be upgradeable as it 
has been substituted by TDS8. Therefore the upgrade cost on a TDS8 may be 
relatively low compared to a 2-3 million dollar investment to upgrade a TDS4.  
3. For small companies the compliance would be achieved in a more difficult way. 
4. Especially for MODUs entering the EU/EEA area. 
On the contrary, (3/19) companies consider that the costs of compliance with the 
EU Product Safety Directives will not put their company at a disadvantage as if 
competitors are within EU then a level playing field exists, although it would be a 
higher and unsustainable level. 
(3/19) companies do not know what to expect because: 
1. For a drilling contractor company operating MODUs, as end user, the costs are 
not yet clear. 
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2. The fact that a very un-balance competition arises will depend on the 
applicability of the Directives: Will the Directives… 1. Never be applicable to 
existing units?; 2. Be applicable to existing units after a period?; or 3. Be 
applicable to MODUs constructed after a future date?. 
3. An O&G company, as client of the equipment manufacturer/ drilling contractor, 
will probably have additional costs transferred to the equipment rates. 
However these additional costs will be charged in the same way to their 
competitors inside the EU. 
(1/19) company has not answered the question. 
o Would the costs of compliance put your company at a disadvantage vis-à-
vis their competitors from outside EU/EEA?: (15/19) think they will be at a 
disadvantage because: 
1. In many areas of operation the EU Product Safety Directives will not be 
accepted. 
2. MODUs have a certain level of international compliance and anything above 
this creates additional operating cost which would have to be recouped through 
the day rate. Additional cost creates financial disadvantage. 
3. When the rigs in EU will be compliant the significant cost of upgrade for a rig 
from outside would have to be factored in the proposed day rate. This would be 
a TAX on incoming rigs that would have to be borne by the owner or by the 
client. Otherwise the particular rig would stop from being tendered. 
4. It will be an unfair advantage for units which do not have to comply with the 
EU safety product Directives when competing for working outside EU. 
5. For a drilling contractor sited in UK, and with rigs currently operating outside of 
the EU/EEA area, compliance requirement disparities could potentially create a 
disincentive to move into the EU market. 
6. For small companies the compliance would be achieved in a more difficult way. 
(1/19) company considers that the costs of compliance with the EU Product Safety 
Directives would not put its company at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their competitors 
from outside EU/EEA. 
(2/19) Two companies do not know what to expect. 
(1/19) company has not answered the question. 
o How would you offset the costs of compliance?: (15/19) companies would 
move to other markets outside of the EU/EEA area. Of these, one company thinks 
that as an end user the cost would be prohibitive and another one is concerned 
about the non-availability of all the equipment on board MODUs in an EU-compliant 
format. In both cases the exit of the European MODU market is seen as the best 
option. (7/19) companies would pass the costs to the clients. (5/19) companies 
would increase the investment flow. (1/19) company points out that the costs of 
compliance are not recoverable. Thus these costs would reduce its capacity for 
spending elsewhere on safety improvements. (6/19) companies point out that it is 
not possible offset the cost as compliance is a baseline for all their operations. 
o Do you expect any benefit of compliance?: (12/19) MODU owners/operators 
do not foresee any benefit or opportunity in case of compliance but they see other 
possible beneficiaries like equipment manufacturers, sellers and installers. The 
possibility to select the suitable applicable regulation (including ATEX Directive, MD 
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and PED) is considered a much more beneficial option for system optimization. 
(7/19) companies have not answered the question. 
o Societal impact/ employment: For (2/19) companies, a drilling contractor and 
an O&G one, it would not have any impact on employment. (5/19) companies think 
that the extension of the legislation would not change the number of posts but 
might have a qualitative impact on the necessary workforce (the existing personnel 
should be trained in order to achieve a more specific skills related to the 
compliance with the EU Product Safety Directives). On the contrary (10/19) drilling 
contractors believe that the extension of the legislation would lead directly or 
indirectly to a loss of jobs. The causes are:  
1. The significant cost increase would make it harder to offer prices that the 
clients would be willing to pay. Thus a loss of market is foreseen. 
2. The extension of the legislation and its associated prohibitive costs, as 
expected by the drilling contractors, could push the MODUs out of the EU/EEA 
market to a more cost effective market. 
3. The older rigs may in fact never become compliant either from a technical point 
of view (not possible to upgrade) or from an economical point of view (too 
costly to justify spending several million dollars on a 30 year old rig). Thus it is 
foreseen by the drilling contractors a reduction in the companies´ EU fleet and 
hence in the number of jobs. 
(2/19) companies have not answered the question. 
o Substantive and administrative costs regarding to the compliance of the 
specific subcategory of equipment: The general comment is that question is 
addressed mainly to the equipment manufacturers/suppliers and not to the drilling 
contractors and O&G companies. (12/19) companies do not know the impact in 
terms of cost that the extension of the legislation would have for their business. 
The related comments to this question are: 
1. It is not possible to specify the costs unless the applicability is clarified (Never 
applicable to existing units?; Applicable to existing units but after xxx future 
date?; or Only applicable to MODUs constructed after xxx future date?). Also 
depends on the possibility that the equipment is reviewed for certification 
compliance or need replacement by new. 
2. It is difficult to provide a number as most of the vendors the drilling contractor 
is speaking with have no proposal to comply or are unwilling to give figures at 
this stage. Typical cost for a standard jack up or semi-submersible rig to 
comply with the EU Product Safety Directives would be in the range of million-
tens of millions of dollars. Moreover this cost does not consider the loss of 
revenue whilst the rigs would be off contract in a shipyard working towards 
compliance. 
3. There will be additional costs linked to these proposals which cannot be 
justified by an increased level of safety. As an example, compliance issues are 
expected on other continental shelfs where the EU Directives are unknown. 
4. The costs would be related to new equipment costs, testing costs, re-
certification costs, retrofitting costs, downtime costs, surveys, etc.  
5. Certification according to ATEX Directive, MD and PED is normally good only 
between 3 and 5 years so re-certification of the compliant equipment is also 
expected. 
On the other hand (3/19) companies have provided the following rough 
approximations of the costs: 
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1. A company selecting the BOP (including its control units) as the subcategory of 
equipment to estimate the costs and which is currently planning the 
replacement of the BOPs and its controls to comply with the latest API 
specifications says that this operation would have an approximated associated 
cost of USD$25 MM. This company is not aware of any EU Directives compliant 
BOPs currently available in the market. Related to the substantive and 
certification cost of the BOPs and its control units to comply with the EU 
Directives this company has said: 
Substantive costs: Can be termed as extremely high (10,000€ per component 
as minimum). It has to be noted that there are dozens of main sub-
components in the BOP and in the BOP control systems. Cost likely to lead to 
MODUs departing EU sector.  
Administrative costs: See Table C-4. 
Table C-4. Administrative costs for a BOP and its control unit to comply with the EU Product Safety 
Directives 
 
Familiarization with 
new regulation 
Additional 
consulting 
Certification 
process 
To comply with 
ATEX Directive 
50,000 € (one-off cost) 
20,000 
€/subcomponent 
(once per year) 
20,000 
€/subcomponent 
(once per year) 
To comply with MD 50,000 € (one-off cost) 
20,000 
€/subcomponent 
(once per year) 
20,000 
€/subcomponent 
(once per year) 
To comply with PED 50,000 € (one-off cost) 
20,000 
€/subcomponent 
(once per year) 
20,000 
€/subcomponent 
(once per year) 
2. Another drilling contractor, which has not selected a specific category of 
equipment but instead has considered the whole rig, has estimated the total 
cost of compliance with the EU Product Safety Directives in 28,000,000€ per 
MODU. The breakdown of the total amount is shown in Table C-5. 
Table C-5. Costs for a MODU to comply with the EU Product Safety Directives 
 Substantive costs Administrative costs 
 
Purchase of 
equipment 
Certification 
process 
Familiarization 
with new 
regulation 
Additional 
consulting 
Certification 
process 
To comply with 
ATEX Directive 
5,000,000€ 
(one-off 
cost) 
1,000,000€ 
(one-off 
cost) 
300,000€ (per 
year) 
300,000€ 
(per year) 
300,000€ 
(per year) 
To comply with 
MD 
5,000,000€ 
(one-off 
cost) 
1,000,000€ 
(one-off 
cost) 
300,000€ (per 
year) 
300,000€ 
(per year) 
300,000€ 
(per year) 
To comply with 
PED 
15,000,000€ 
(one-off 
cost) 
1,000,000€ 
(one-off 
cost) 
300,000€ (per 
year) 
300,000€ 
(per year) 
300,000€ 
(per year) 
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3. Another drilling contractor which is placed in Europe and has selected the 
drilling equipment (hoisting, lifting, handling and rotary systems) as the 
specific equipment subcategory, has roughly estimated the costs of compliance 
for this subcategory in the range 10-75 million € per MODU rig, depending on if 
current equipment can be reviewed for certification compliance or need 
replacement by new. This drilling contractor, with 10 MODUs in European 
waters, is concerned about the low level of standardization between equipment 
on MODUs (although same model, there are small differences). As the 
equipment make-model and sub models have a large variety on existing 
MODUs, performing type approvals (grouping of equipment) will be very 
difficult or not possible, hence it will require individual assessment. This will 
increase cost/effort/time, etc.  
The substantive and administrative costs shown in Table C-6 and in Table C-7 
have been considered. 
Table C-6. Substantive costs for drilling equipment (hoisting, lifting, handling and rotary systems) to comply 
with the EU Product Safety Directives 
 
Redesign for 
new 
equipment 
interface 
New 
materials 
Changes 
in 
testing 
New 
production 
machinery 
Purchase of 
the specific 
subcategory 
of equipment 
Certification 
process 
To comply 
with ATEX 
Directive 
1,000,000€ 
(one-off 
cost) 
75,000,000
€ including 
installation 
costs (one-
off cost) 
Up to 
10,000€ 
(one-off 
cost) 
10,000,000€ – 
75,000,000€ 
(one-off cost) 
3,000,000€ 
(one-off 
cost) 
4,000,000€ 
(one-off 
cost) 
To comply 
with MD 
1,000,000€ 
(one-off 
cost) 
75,000,000
€ including 
installation 
costs (one-
off cost) 
Up to 
10,000€ 
(one-off 
cost) 
10,000,000€ – 
75,000,000€ 
(one-off cost) 
3,000,000€ 
(one-off 
cost) 
5,000,000€ 
(one-off 
cost) 
To comply 
with PED 
500,000€ 
(one-off 
cost) 
1,000,000€ 
(one-off 
cost) 
Up to 
10,000€ 
(one-off 
cost) 
Up to 
1,000,000€ 
(one-off cost) 
Up to 
500,000€ 
(one-off 
cost) 
Up to 
1,000,000€ 
(one-off 
cost) 
Table C-7. Administrative costs for drilling equipment (hoisting, lifting, handling and rotary systems) to 
comply with the EU Product Safety Directives 
 
Familiarization with new 
regulation 
Additional consulting 
To comply with ATEX Directive 8,000€ (every five years) 50,000€ (every five years) 
To comply with MD 8,000€ (every five years) 50,000€ (every five years) 
To comply with PED 8,000€ (every five years) 10,000€ (every five years) 
(4/19) companies have not answered the question. 
o Significant time delays: (13/19) companies expect time delays in their business 
if the legislation is extended. The related comments are shown below: 
1. At least 18 months of delays.  
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2. When last ordered, the main BOP sub-components were on a lead time of 2.5 
years to API standards (normal world-wide industry standards). Therefore 
would be fair to estimate a far longer lead time to order the same components 
to any new EU Directive requirements.  
3. Delays would be expected for equipment suppliers as many of them are not 
sited in the EU/EEA area.  
4. Enough transition time should be allowed in case of extension of the EU 
Product Safety Directives in order to manufacture, test and provide results to 
appropriate bodies. At a very minimum 3 years should be considered.  
5. It could take as minimum 5 years and up to 10 years to re-certificate or renew 
the equipment in all the units.  
6. No MODU in operation at the current point in time complies fully with the EU 
Product Safety Directives, given the fact that they operate in an international 
environment, and will thus be assessed against internationally known and 
recognized standards. Requiring an entire industry to utilize EU Product Safety 
Directives certified equipment could mean that the entire drilling industry will 
face severe delays, which would be debilitating to the security of the European 
energy supply and the industry in general. Also, double certification (which 
would be required to retain global mobility) would add administrative burdens 
and cost with no proven added values. 
(1/19) company, taking into account the numerous pieces and types in its assets, 
finds it difficult to estimate the time delays. 
(5/19) companies have not answered the question. 
These results are shown in Figure C-. 
 
Figure C-9. Extension of the EU Product Safety Directives and the expected time delays according to 
drilling contractors/operators 
o Difficulties of compliance for the selected specific subcategory of 
equipment: (7/19) companies find it difficult to comply with all three Directives 
(ATEX Directive, MD and PED), (1/19) to comply with ATEX Directive and MD and 
(1/19) to comply with ATEX Directive. One company is concerned about the 
mechanical implications of the ATEX Directive. Another company is concerned 
about the compatibility between worldwide used industry API standards, as BOPs 
are currently designed to these, and the PED.  It would be needed major Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) to advise of anticipated difficulties in maintaining 
worldwide API compliance whilst adding EU specific Directives requirements. 
The difficulties the companies think they could find to comply with all 3 European 
Product Safety Directives are:  
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1. Equipment suppliers lack of knowledge, extensive reviews and Notified Bodies 
lack of capacity. 
2. The replacement/re-certification of most of the equipment. 
3. New equipment probably would not be an issue but any retrospective 
application of the Directives on existing equipment would be technically and 
financially challenging. 
4. Additional costs that are not justified, delayed delivery of equipment and 
downtimes. 
5. Important costs for any new certification/equipment changes which could lead 
to a significant loss of revenue. 
6. The majority of the equipment comes from different parts of the world and is 
manufactured according to international standards but not exclusive from the 
EU. So, manufacturers will have to be adapted to the EU standards before 
starting the operations. 
(10/19) companies have not answered the question. 
o Extension of PED to well-control equipment. Solved problems?: (1/19) O&G 
company thinks that the extension of the PED would clarify the criteria in the 
EU/EEA area on acceptance of equipment and suggests a gap analysis of the PED 
with the standards currently followed in the industry in order to formulate the 
legislation appropriately. On the contrary (13/19) companies do not expect any 
problem to be solved because: 
1. Well-control equipment is already well covered by the existing legislation and 
industry standards. 
2. In particular for well-control equipment (BOPs, etc.) the already applied API 
standards go in great detail regarding to equipment required configuration and 
performance including pressure ratings and safety devices, next to fabrication 
and in use testing requirements. The application of PED would not add any 
value as PED is not specific enough for equipment and does not consider these 
specific requirements. 
3. Well-control equipment is adequately managed by the recently issued API 
Standard 53 (Blow-out Prevention Equipment Systems for Drilling Wells). 
4. Application of a generic Directive to critical emergency equipment to which the 
industry is committed to updating specific standards would be wholly 
counterproductive. 
(5/19) companies have not answered the question. 
o Extension of PED to well-control equipment. Is PED suitable for well-
control equipment?: (12/19) companies think that the PED is not suitable for 
well-control equipment because it is already covered by the currently applied API 
standards, in which the EHSRs of the PED are implicit. On the other hand (1/19) 
O&G company thinks that PED is suitable for well-control equipment only on what 
relates to safety on-board (affecting control lines and koomey unit). The 
acceptance and operation of well-control equipment follows very specific and 
extensive regulation and testing procedures that go beyond the scope of the EU 
Directives, more focused on verifying suitability of well-control-equipment design to 
wellbore conditions. (6/19) companies have not answered the question. These 
results are shown in Figure C-. 
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Figure C-10. Extension of the PED to well-control equipment. Is it suitable? (According to drilling 
contractors/operators) 
o Extension of PED to well-control equipment. Difficulties for companies and 
affection to the market: (14/19) companies would have difficulties due to the 
extension of the PED to well-control equipment. The expected difficulties are:  
1. EU Directives and standards are not recognized in many regions of the world. 
PED is not a recognized standard in the industry and specifically in the 
countries where most well-control equipment is manufactured which refer to 
internationally recognized standards like API standard 53. This will cause 
additional administrative work and cost for no tangible benefit.  
2. The huge investments that companies should do in order to recertify and 
replace the equipment would have a negative impact on the market. 
3. More legislation and costs will make the market in the UK even less attractive 
that it is now. 
4. Costs, equipment availability and lead time (in descending order). EU/EEA 
market is already one of the most expensive to operate in. 
5. The insufficient capacity of vendors/suppliers will result in a none-availability of 
MODUs for drilling and thus abandoned work as scheduled by operators. 
Increase of costs for operators. 
6. Equipment upgrades for older equipment, but this is a problem that companies 
are facing already from the issuance of more restrictive international 
Directives.  
7. An O&G company foresees the following process coming out the application of 
the Directives: a. Revision to identify the equipment which would not comply 
(by a certification company), b. Upgrades needed to meet the requirements, 
etc., c. Recertification by the same or different 3rd party. This may cause 
temporary delays in operations, market restrictions and cost increases. 
(5/19) companies have not answered the question. 
o Extension of PED to well-control equipment. Is it necessary to modify the 
standards currently used to meet the EHSRs of the PED?: (14/19) companies 
think that it is not necessary. One company points out that the ESRs of the PED are 
already implicit within the relevant API standards. Another company says that the 
standards are modified as required on a running basis and the EC regulation does 
not need to attempt to drive this development. (1/19) A company placed in UK 
thinks that API standards could be reviewed or gap analyzed against ATEX Directive 
and MD. (4/19) companies have not answered the question. 
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o Extension of PED to well-control equipment. Barriers to trade?: (13/19) 
companies think that the extension of PED to well-control equipment will create 
barriers to trade. The affirmation is based on: 
1. PED is not a recognized standard in the industry and specifically in the 
countries where most well-control equipment is manufactured. 
2. The extension can only increase the costs, which will make the UK less 
attractive than other areas for MODUs to operate. 
3. The extension would incur significant cost and time to initially determine 
existing levels of compliance across a massive variety and quantity of 
equipment, followed by further significant cost and time in replacing or re-
certifying non-compliant equipment, which may not be practicable or even 
achievable in some cases. If compliance could be achieved, the associated cost 
would have to be attempted to be recovered through operational day rates in 
an already depressed market place (MODUs are already being cold-stacked and 
scrapped). To move or retain units into an EU area would therefore become 
prohibitively expensive. Worth noting that EU/EEA is already one of the most 
expensive operating areas without application of yet further legislation. 
4. We are going to have to increase effort to ensure we comply with both EU and 
API requirements (as an industry we are totally committed to the industry 
recognized standards as API Standard 53). 
5. The majority of the equipment comes from different parts of the world and is 
manufactured according the O&G international standards. So, the extension 
could create a real trade barrier. 
(6/19) companies do not have opinion about this point. 
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D. Certification Bodies: Overview of their answers 
o Eight Certification Bodies have provided an answer to the Survey and any of them 
agreed to publish its answer with its data included. 5/8 Certification Bodies are 
large sized, one is medium and two are small.  
o 1/8 Certification Body certifies equipment only for onshore installations, 1/8 for 
fixed offshore, 1/8 for offshore installations (both fixed and MODUs), 4/8 for all 
types of installations (MODUs, fixed offshore, and onshore). Finally 1/8 Certification 
Body is certifying according to the PED but is not involved in the O&G rig sector. 
Thus, in total 5/8 Certification Bodies certify equipment for MODUs, 6/8 for fixed 
offshore installations, and 5/8 for onshore installations. 
o Other activities carried out by the Certification Bodies are: 
1. (1/8) Certification according to PED and RCD (Recreational Craft Directive) 
2. (1/8) Maritime/ship related activities 
3. (1/8) Certification of any O&G and non O&G assets, either onshore and 
offshore (including subsea) 
4. (1/8) Working as Notified Body 
o 6/8 Certification Bodies are dealing with PED, 3/8 with ATEX, and only 2/8 with MD. 
5/8 Certification Bodies are dealing also with IMO MODU Code and in three cases 
with the Marine Equipment Directive. Other mentioned legislation is: Classification 
Society Rules, UK Safety Case Regulations, Shelf state regulations, Maritime 
authority regulations, National and Industrial standards, etc.  
In Figure D-1a and Figure D-1b the main activities and Directives/Codes the 
Certification Bodies are dealing with are shown. 
 
Figure D-1a. Main activities carried out by the Certification Bodies; Figure D-1b. Main Directives and Codes 
used by the Certification Bodies 
o The main origins of the manufactures of the equipment the Certification 
Bodies are certifying are: EU/EEA with at least 60-70%, then US with 30-40% 
and Asia/Pacific with less than 30%. The revenue for the Certification Bodies comes 
mainly from the EU/EEA area and then the US. Some increase in the level of 
revenue are seeing in a movement towards Asian equipment (Singapore, Korea 
and China) as reported in one of the replies.  
o The importance (low importance: <40%; medium importance: 40-70%; high 
importance >70%) of the main categories of equipment for the Certification 
Bodies, according to the share in their revenue, is presented in Table D-1: 
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Table D-1. Importance of the main categories of equipment for the Certification Bodies 
Number of answers High Medium Low 
Drilling equipment 3 2 3 
Well intervention equipment 2 0 6 
Material handling equipment 2 3 3 
Well-control equipment 4 2 2 
Other pressure equipment 2 4 2 
Electrical equipment 3 3 2 
Every category of equipment is of high importance for at least 2/8 Certification 
Bodies. Additionally, 2/8 Certification Bodies expect an overall decrease of the 
supply chain market driven by the oil price and the general depression in the 
offshore market worldwide. 
o In Figure D-2 the main categories of equipment (with high importance in 
terms of revenue) the Certification Bodies are dealing with are shown. 
 
Figure D-2. Main categories of equipment (with high importance in terms of revenue) the Certification 
Bodies are dealing with 
o Differences between the equipment installed on MODUs and on fixed 
platforms: For 50% of the Certification Bodies the equipment is almost identical 
with small modifications due to the adverse conditions of use (e. g. salt water, 
strong vibrations, ice...), and the fact that must endure the dynamic behaviour 
from wave actions, etc. 25% Certification Bodies replied that the question is not 
applicable since there is a variety of equipment that is identical while some have 
different requirements due to special functions or additional load of moving vessels. 
The other 25% of the Certification Bodies did not reply. The opinion of the 
Certification Bodies related to the equipment on-board MODUs in comparison with 
the equipment for fixed offshore and onshore installations is shown in Figure D-3. 
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Figure D-3. Opinion of the Certification Bodies related to the equipment on-board MODUs in comparison with 
the equipment for fixed offshore and onshore installations 
o Standards: 7/8 Certification Bodies use ISO standards and six use IEC standards.  
5/8 Certification Bodies use EN standards while three do not (one Certification Body 
uses IEC standards evaluated by EN). 5/8 Certification Bodies use NORSOK 
standards and one Certification Body reported that uses NORSOK standards only 
for the equipment in the Norwegian shelf. 5/8 Certification Bodies use BS and 6/8 
Certification Bodies use US standards such as ASME, ASTM, ANSI, and API.  
For 4/8 Certification Bodies it would be necessary to modify technical standards in 
order to meet the Essential Health and Safety Requirements (EHSRs) of the EU 
Directives, while 4/8 believe that it would not be necessary. The reasons are 1. all 
the modifying that was needed has already been done, and 2. the Essential Health 
and Safety Requirements (EHSRs) should be solved rather through Safety Case 
assessments under the national regulations implementing the EU Offshore Safety 
Directive. 
o Foreseen impacts on the equipment (in terms of design, manufacturing, 
conformity assessment etc.) of the extension of scope of the EU Product 
Safety Directives (ATEX, MD and PED):  
(3/8) Certification Bodies are certifying equipment according to the ATEX Directive. 
According to its experience with the Directive in fixed installations, the expected 
impact due to the extension of ATEX Directive to MODUs would be: for (3/3) 
changes in the testing, (2/3) to undergo a certification process, and (1/3) new 
design and low impact related to new materials. 
(2/8) Certification Bodies are certifying equipment according to the MD. According 
to its experience with the Directive in fixed installations, the expected impact due 
to the extension of the MD to MODUs would be: for (2/2) changes in the testing, 
(2/2) to undergo a certification process, and (1/2) new design and low impact 
related to new materials. 
(6/8) Certification Bodies are certifying equipment according to the PED but of 
these, (1/6) is not involved in the O&G rig sector. According to its experience with 
the Directive in fixed installations, the expected impact due to the extension of the 
MD to MODUs would be: for (4/5) to undergo a certification process, (3/5) changes 
in the testing, (3/5) new materials, (2/5) new design, (2/5) changes in the 3rd 
party as with the new legislation it would be the a Notified Body, (1/5) changes in 
the production lines, and for (1/5) the changes would be mainly on paper and no 
necessarily technical. 
Thus, the expected changes due to the extension of the EU Product Safety 
Directives would be mainly related to changes in the testing and to the certification 
process. 
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o Would the extension of scope of the EU Product Safety Directives (ATEX, 
MD and PED) create barriers to trade?: 4/8 Certification Bodies believe that the 
extension of scope of the EU Product Safety Directives to cover equipment installed 
on MODU would create barriers to trade. The reasons are 1.the incompatibility of 
some items with the Directives (some API materials used by major US companies 
may not meet the PED traceability assessment), 2. Activities should be focused at 
international level in ISO, since there is already activity done, e.g. in the drilling 
and production equipment (TC67/SC4)97 which would not need duplication of effort. 
 On the other hand, 3/8 Certification Bodies believe that the extension of scope of 
the EU Product Safety Directives would remove barriers to trade. 
 1/8 did not provide any answer to this question. 
 The opinion of the Certification Bodies related to the impact of the extension of the 
EU Product Safety Directives on the trade is shown in Figure D-4. 
 
Figure D-4. Extension of the EU Product Safety Directives and its impact on the trade according to 
Certification Bodies 
o Would the costs of compliance with the EU Safety Directives put EU/EEA 
companies at a disadvantage compared to their competitors from 
within/outside EU/EEA (e.g. by creating an uneven playfield)? 
Within EU/EEA: (6/8) Certification Bodies think that the EU/EEA companies would 
not be at a disadvantage compared to their competitors from within EU/EEA 
because 1. The same legislation would apply to all, 2. The EU companies already 
know the Directives, and 3. The EU supply chain is already under threat from Asia 
(due to costs). The increase in standards should help the EU by forcing Asian 
manufacturers towards higher quality. (2/8) do not know.  
Outside EU/EEA: (3/8) Certification Bodies think the EU/EEA would not be at a 
disadvantage compared to their competitors from outside EU/EEA. (1/8) thinks the 
opposite because MODUs are used worldwide and EU based units would be at 
disadvantage when competing for work outside EU. (4/8) do not know. 
o Safety of equipment: For 100% of the Certification Bodies the current exclusion 
of MODUs from the scope of the EU Product Safety Directives (ATEX, MD, and PED) 
doesn´t create any safety problem. The reasons are: the IMO MODU Code is 
enough; the safety is adequately covered by the existing legislation (i.e. through 
IACS Maritime Class Society 98  and shelf state regulatory compliance); and the 
physics of explosion protection are the same but the requirements for the 
equipment on-board MODUs are higher. This last point could be solved by the new 
                                           
97www.iso.org/iso/standards_development/technical_committees/other_bodies/iso_technical_committee.htm?
commid=49570 
98 www.iacs.org.uk 
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standards IEC TC31 (Equipment for explosive atmospheres) 99  and IEC TC18 
(Electrical installations of ships and of mobile and fixed offshore units)100.  
3/8 Certification Bodies say that the currently applicable legislation sufficiently 
guarantees the safety of equipment installed on-board MODUs.2/8 Certification 
Bodies think the opposite and one of these bases its answer in the fact that there is 
a room for analysis and improvement to make the industry safer. 1/8 Certification 
Body is not sure as it claims that the level of safety depends mostly on the 
manufacturer of the equipment and on the third party. 2/8 Certification Bodies did 
not reply. 
5/8 Certification Bodies believe that the EU Product Safety Directives (ATEX, MD, 
and PED) would be a suitable legislation to cover equipment installed on MODUs 
although one of these think that it would not make the equipment safer. For 2/8 
Certification Bodies the EU Product Safety Directives would not be a suitable 
legislation for the equipment on-board MODUs, and 1/8 Certification Body has not 
reply. 
Only 3/8 Certification Bodies certify equipment according to the ATEX Directive. Of 
these, one thinks that the extension of the ATEX Directive would result in safer 
equipment, the second one thinks the opposite because safety is adequately 
covered by the existing regulations, and the third one has not reply to the 
question. Obviously 5/8 Certification Bodies did not reply as they are not working 
with the mentioned piece of legislation. 
Only 2/8 Certification Bodies certify equipment according to the MD. Of these, one 
thinks that the extension of the MD would not result in safer equipment because 
safety is adequately covered by the existing regulations, and the second one has 
not reply to the question. 6/8 Certification Bodies did not reply to the question as 
they do not work with the mentioned piece of legislation. 
The most common EU product safety Directive among the Certification Bodies is 
the PED since 6/8 Certification Bodies certify equipment according to it. Of these, 
two Certification Bodies think the extension of the PED would result in safer 
equipment whereas another one does not know. The other three think the 
extension of the PED would not improve the safety of the equipment because 
currently safety is adequately covered by the existing regulations and because PED 
would accept some equipment to be self-certified (under module H 101 ). 2/8 
Certification Bodies did not reply to the question as they do not work with the 
mentioned piece of legislation. 
o Costs due to the certification process: The Certification Bodies were asked 
about the expected costs for the companies due to the certification process of one 
sub-category of equipment. The selected sub-category was treated as a typical 
case or example and detailed information on costs were asked. They were also 
asked about the expected cost for the Public Authorities. Only (2/8) Certification 
Bodies answered the question. The first one said that some extra costs could be 
expected for companies but not for Public Authorities. The second one said that the 
well-control equipment would increase its price in 20%. As in the case of the 
companies, only incomplete information was obtained. 
                                           
99 www.iec.ch/dyn/www/f?p=103:7:0::::FSP_ORG_ID,FSP_LANG_ID:1232,25 
100 www.iec.ch/dyn/www/f?p=103:7:0::::FSP_ORG_ID,FSP_LANG_ID:1284,25 
101 With regard to module H of PED: module H is a full quality assurance module and is not – as the operators 
claim- self certification. A module H is based on a quality management system approved and supervised by a 
Notified Body. 
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o Expected benefits due to the extension of the EU Product Safety Directives 
to cover equipment on-board MODUs: 3/8 Certification Bodies have not 
provided any answer while 2/8 cannot foresee any benefit. 3/8 Certification Body 
can foresee the following benefits: 
• (1/8) New developed products; 
• (1/8) Training for specific certification requirements, associated with EU only. 
  The opinion of the Certification Bodies related to the benefits due to the extension 
of the EU Product Safety Directives is shown in Figure D-5. 
 
Figure D-5. Extension of the EU Product Safety Directives and its potential benefits according to 
Certification Bodies 
o Expected time delays due to the extension of the EU Product Safety 
Directives to cover equipment on-board MODUs. 
5/8 Certification Bodies don´t foresee any problem related to time availability. CE-
marking would be included in line with other regulatory compliance and should not 
cause delays, when known from the ordering time. It should not make difference in 
the long run which legislation applies, it may be different legislation than now but 
the basic process should be the same. Only 1/8 Certification Body foresees such 
impact. It explains that coordination and additional certifications for EU vs. non-EU 
service could become complicated. Differences between Certification Bodies could 
cause problems, particularly in interpretations. 2/8 Certification Bodies do not know 
if there would be some impacts on time availability. 
 The opinion of the Certification Bodies related to the possible time delays due to 
the extension of the EU Product Safety Directives is shown in Figure D-6.  
 
Figure D-6. Extension of the EU Product Safety Directives and the expected time delays according to 
Certification Bodies 
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o Is the PED suitable to cover well-control equipment?: As pointed out above 
2/8 Certification Bodies don´t use the PED as they don´t work with pressure 
equipment.  
(4/6) Certification Bodies dealing with the PED consider it appropriate to cover 
well-control equipment. Of these, (1/4) thinks the Directive would be appropriate 
only for a part of the equipment because it accepts some equipment to be self-
certified (under module H which is a full quality assurance module and is not – as 
the operators claim- self certification) while the drilling rules should require more 
involvement of a third party. (2/6) Certification Bodies which deal with the PED are 
not sure about the suitability of the PED for well-control equipment. 
In Figure D-7 the suitability of the PED to cover well-control equipment according 
to Certification Bodies is shown. 
 
Figure D-7. Extension of the PED to well-control equipment. Is it suitable? (According to Certification 
Bodies) 
o Would the extension of the PED to cover well-control equipment solve any 
problem?: 3/6 Certification Bodies (2/8 Certification Bodies don´t use the PED) 
think that the extension of the scope of the PED Directive could solve problems. Of 
these, one Certification Body suggests the application of the PED across the UKCS 
for all the O&G installations. The potential solved problems would be: 
• As currently national standards are used, the extension would lead to a 
harmonization of the legislation across the EEA area. 
• Safety and environmental problems (without specifying which) 
1/6 Certification Body does not foresee any solved problem due to the extension of 
the PED to cover well-control equipment. 2/6 Certification Bodies find it difficult to 
foresee the potential solved problems. 
In Figure D-8 the opinion of the Certification Bodies regarding the potential solved 
problems due to the extension of the PED to cover well-control equipment is 
shown. 
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Figure D-8. Extension of the PED to well-control equipment and its potential solved problems according 
to Certification Bodies 
o Expected difficulties due to the extension of the PED to cover well-control 
equipment: (4/6) Certification Bodies would expect the following difficulties:  
• Purchasing of PED compliant material; 
• Change of the design code to a “PED friendly code”; 
• Equipment is to a large extent manufactured outside EU according to non-
harmonised standards. Thus, certification costs and difficulties due to the 
change of the technical references. 
• Lack of availability of approved personnel outside EU. 
(1/6) Certification Body would not expect any difficulty and (1/6) did not know. 
o Would it be necessary to modify the technical standards currently in use to 
meet the EHSRs of the PED?: (4/6) Certification Bodies would expect the 
following difficulties:  
4/6 Certification Bodies say that it would be necessary to modify the existing 
standards to meet the EHSRs of the PED. Of these, (1/6) suggests the inclusion of 
an annex in the currently applied standards in order to show how to achieve 
compliance with the EHSRs. On the contrary 2/6 say that it would not be necessary 
any modification. Another one thinks that more harmonised standards are needed.  
o Would the extension of the PED to cover well-control equipment create 
any barrier to trade?: (4/6) Certification Bodies do not foresee any barrier. Of 
these, one Certification Body does not expect long-term barriers although there 
could be some difficulties in the beginning. On the contrary, 2/6 Certification Bodies 
foresee such barriers. The opinion of the Certification Bodies about the potential 
barriers to trade due to the extension of the PED to cover well-control equipment is 
shown in Figure D-9. 
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Figure D-9. Extension of the PED to well-control equipment and its impact on the trade according to 
Certification Bodies 
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E. Public Authorities: Overview of their answers 
o Seven Public Authorities have answered the Survey. (1/7) Public Authority does not 
consent the to the publication of its reply, (5/7) agree with the publication of the 
results in an anonymous form, while the Health and Safety Executives Authority 
from UK consents to the publication of its reply with its data included.  
o According to their size, (2/7) Public Authorities are large, (4/7) medium while 
(1/7) is small (taking into account only the offshore section of that Authority). All 
Public Authorities have their main activities within EU/EEA and (6/7) with a share 
higher than 80%. 
o All Public Authorities supervise the implementation of ATEX 2014/34/EU, MD 
2006/42/EC and PED 2014/68/EU, and (3/7) also supervise the implementation of 
the EU Offshore Safety Directive 2013/30/EU. (4/7) deal with the IMO MODU Code 
and (2/7) with the Marine Equipment Directive 96/98/EC. Other activities the Public 
Authorities are dealing with are: 
1. Independent government regulator with responsibility for safety, emergency 
preparedness, and the working environment in the oil and gas industry; 
2. Responsible market surveillance authority within the petroleum industry for EU 
product safety legislation (ATEX, MD and PED) and other harmonised Product 
Safety Directives. In these cases the Public Authorities give guidance to the 
industry on how to understand and apply the various Directives which have 
been implemented at a national level and carry out market surveillance 
activities; 
3. Ensuring compliance with domestic health and safety legislation; 
4. Supervision of compliance with the Mining Act, the Metrology Act and the Gas 
Act; 
5. Supervision of compliance with environmental legislation; 
6. Supervision of compliance with occupational health and safety, working hours 
and commodities legislation. 
 In Figure E-1 the main activities carried out by the Public Authorities are shown. 
 
Figure E-1. Main Directives and Codes the Public Authorities are dealing with 
o (6/7) Public Authorities use the ISO standards (some of the ISO standards are 
actually EN ISO as reported by three Authorities) and the IEC standards. (4/7) 
Public Authorities use the NORSOK standards, (4/7) the US standards such as API 
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or ASME, (2/7) the DNV standards while none of them uses BS. Additionally, the 
following legislation is used: 
• Domestic health and safety legislation; 
• Health and safety at work legislation; 
• Rules prepared by classification institutions; 
• Regulations prepared by other Public Authorities that do not directly apply to 
the petroleum activities, but which are still relevant for the field; 
• Regulatory requirements that are not directly applied to the petroleum 
activities, but which govern corresponding or adjacent areas, e.g. requirements 
stipulated by the Maritime Authority. 
o Main categories of Equipment: The number of Public Authorities which find the 
compliance of the equipment categories with the EU product safety legislation of 
high importance is shown in Table E-1. 
Table E-1. Number of Public Authorities which find the compliance of the equipment categories with the 
EU product safety legislation of high importance 
 ATEX MD PED 
Drilling equipment 5/7 6/7 3/7 
Well intervention equipment 6/7 5/7 3/7 
Material handling equipment 5/7 6/7 1/7 
Well-control equipment 5/7 5/7 6/7 
Other pressure equipment 5/7 1/7 6/7 
Electrical equipment 6/7 0/7 0/7 
The Public Authority Health and Safety Executives did not reply the question, but 
thinks that all such equipment should comply with relevant technical standards, 
reflecting a good industry practice. 
o Is the fact that MODUs are out of the scope of the EU Product Safety 
Directives creating a safety problem?: 
(4/7) Public Authorities think the current situation in which MODUs are out of the 
scope of the EU Product Safety Directives is creating a safety problem because: 
• (1/4) Workers on MODUs are less protected than their counterparts on land; 
• (2/4) Different safety standards apply to the equipment being used on fixed 
platforms and MODUs undertaking similar work, with the latter falling short of 
the Essential Health and Safety Requirements (EHSRs) of the relevant 
Directives; 
• (1/4) gives specific examples of unsafe situations on MODUs, where the EU 
Product Safety Directives cannot be currently enforced: 
 Some equipment is not ATEX compliant in an area where it should have 
been; 
 Automation of drilling equipment where the control systems are not built 
according to the Machinery Directive. 
On the contrary, the Public Authority Safety, Health and Safety Executive from the 
UK thinks that the current situation does not cause any safety problem.  
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(1/7) Public Authority makes reference to safety statistics without giving a clear 
answer and (1/7) did not answer. 
o Possible solved problems due to the extension of the legislation: 
(4/7) Public Authorities think that the following problems would be solved: 
• Safety and environmental problems (without specifying which); 
• Bring both MODUs and fixed platforms under the same safety and 
environmental requirements that meet the EU relevant Directives and also 
equate them to similar equipment used onshore. It would facilitate the 
achievement of the product safety through the application of the harmonised 
standards. At present, some equipment used on MODUs only meet standards 
that are not harmonised in the EU and which do not meet all the EHSRs of the 
relevant Directives thus undermining the safety system in the EU;  
• Provide a simplified legislation and regime to increase practicality for both the 
industry and the regulators. In a common regime the Regulator could 
supervise more consistently; 
• Reduce uncertainty and save time when verifying applicable equipment and 
clarifying supervision roles; 
• Give a common approach to the risks offshore and onshore for the same type 
of equipment and activity, thus facilitating and improving the risk identification, 
management and communication process; 
• Ensure compatible measures for reducing risks and protecting personnel 
wherever they are working; 
• Provide harmonization of the scope of the relevant Product Safety Directives so 
work equipment´s status would be consistent. 
Additionally (1/7) Public Authorities feels that no problem would be solved due to 
the extension of the legislation, (1/7) makes reference to accident statistics without 
giving a clear answer, and (1/7) did not answered the question.  
The opinion of the Public Authorities about the possible solved problems due to the 
extension of the legislation is shown in Figure E-2. 
 
Figure E-2. Extension of EU Product Safety Directives and its potential solved problems according to 
Public Authorities 
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o Would the EU Product Safety Directives be a suitable legislation for 
equipment on MODUs? 
(5/7) Authorities say that the EU Product Safety Directives would be a suitable 
legislation for the equipment installed on MODUs since they are already applied to 
similar equipment used on fixed platforms and it is illogical for the same process 
and equipment to be subject to different safety requirements when used in the 
same location for the same process in the EU. Safety, Health and Safety Executives 
from the UK thinks that the EU Product Safety Directives would not be suitable for 
the equipment on-board MODUs. (1/7) Public Authority did not reply the question. 
These results are shown in Figure E-3. 
 
Figure E-3. Suitability of the EU product safety legislation for equipment on-board MODUs according to 
Public Authorities 
o What particular difficulties companies may face and how this could affect 
the market? 
(6/7) Public Authorities think that companies may face difficulties due to the 
extension of the legislation to cover equipment on MODUs, and these are: 
• MODUs may only spend a limited time in EU waters and may otherwise operate 
elsewhere in the world. In such situation, companies may have to upgrade 
some of their equipment and/or reprogram their activities.  
• Demanding compliance with the EU Product Safety Directives (ATEX, MD and 
PED) would most likely mean high cost implications. There would be two 
categories of MODUs, with and without implemented harmonised standards. 
This would potentially limit the competition in a worldwide perspective as these 
MODUs would be more expensive than MODUs not complying with the EU 
regulation. A side factor could be that drilling contractors would offer to EU-
operators old rigs at cheap daily rates. 
• The difficulties that companies would face go beyond the limits of the EU 
legislation, and the problem would be how to enforce EU legislation in a 
worldwide market. 
• Additional tests to demonstrate compliance. 
(1/7) Public Authority did not reply. 
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o Is it necessary to modify the technical standards which are in use in the 
sector in order to meet the Essential Health and Safety Requirements 
(EHSRs) of the Directives? 
(4/7) Public Authorities think that it is necessary to modify the standards to meet 
the EHSRs of the Directives. One of these proposes a gap analysis because the 
necessary extent of modification is unknown. 
(2/7) think that the answer depends on the Directive considered. On the one hand 
if ATEX is considered, technical standards within it would not need to be modified 
as IMO MODU Code refers to IEC standards and most of these standards are 
harmonised with ATEX. On the other hand, in the case of the Machinery Directive 
this is not a simple question as there are currently no harmonised technical 
standards for much of the equipment used offshore. This is the reason for the draft 
mandate to CEN (TC12) to draw up such standards, e.g. under the Vienna 
Agreement. For these Public Authorities it would be enough with the standards that 
do apply to equipment on fixed platforms, as those would not require modification 
for use on MODUs. 
o Barriers to trade 
The opinion of the Public Authorities related to the creation of barriers to trade is 
quite divided. (2/7) Public Authority believes that the extension of the legislation 
would not create barriers to trade because many companies are already supplying 
CE marked items to fixed platforms. On the contrary, (4/7) Public Authorities think 
the extension of the legislation would create barriers to trade. One of these thinks 
that manufacturers outside the EU would find it more difficult to supply equipment 
into the EU market place. (1/7) Public Authorities has not answered the question. 
The opinion of the Public Authorities about the extension of the EU Product Safety 
Directives to equipment on-board MODUs and its impact on the trade is shown in 
Figure E-4. 
 
Figure E-4. Extension of the EU product safety legislation and its impact on the trade according to Public 
Authorities 
o Would the cost of compliance to the EU Product Safety Directives likely to 
put EU/EEA companies at a disadvantage compared to competitors from 
within EU/EEA (by creating an uneven playfield)? 
(3/7) Public Authorities think an uneven playfield would not be created within the 
EU/EEA. Another (3/7) do not know what to think. Only (1/7) Public Authorities 
think the EU/EEA companies would be at a disadvantage in comparison with their 
competitors from within EU/EEA, especially the small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs). 
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o Would the cost of compliance to the EU Product Safety Directives likely to 
put EU/EEA companies at a disadvantage compared to competitors from 
outside EU/EEA (by creating an uneven playfield)? 
(3/7) Public Authorities think the EU/EEA companies would not be at a 
disadvantage compared to their competitors from outside EU/EEA. One of these 
says that most of the equipment is produced in small or single batches and thus, 
the EU/EEA companies supplying to outside the EU would find it easy to modify 
individual designs to a significant extent with minimal extra cost. In addition, the 
EU/EEA companies are already supplying CE marked items to fixed platforms. 
Only (1/7) Public Authorities think the EU/EEA companies would be at a 
disadvantage in comparison with their competitors from outside the EU/EEA. The 
demanding compliance with the EU Product Safety Directives would potentially limit 
the competition in a worldwide perspective as these MODUs would be more 
expensive than MODUs not complying with the EU legislation.  
(3/7) do not know what to think. 
o Would the compliance with the EU Product Safety Directives generate a 
disproportional amount of administrative burdens compared to the 
benefits? 
For companies: (2/7) Public Authorities would expect administrative burdens for 
companies. For one of these, the demonstration of compliance with the EU Product 
Safety Directives would require a significant amount of administrative effort 
compared to the benefits over current arrangements. (2/7) Public Authorities think 
that no administrative burdens would exist because the requirements are already 
there for fixed installations offshore and onshore. The administrative burden would 
be significant only for companies which are currently violating the EU/EEA 
legislation by supplying non-compliant equipment to fixed platforms. (2/7) did not 
reply and (1/7) did not know. 
For Public Authorities: (1/7) Public Authority would expect administrative 
burdens for Public Authorities as the enforcement of compliance with the EU 
Product Safety Directives would require a significant amount of administrative 
effort compared to the benefits over current arrangements. (2/7) Public Authorities 
think that no administrative burdens would exist for Public Authorities because 
these are already dealing with the Directives for fixed installations and the 
requirements would be the same. (3/7) did not reply and (1/7) did not know. 
o Would the compliance of products/services of certain companies with the 
EU Product Safety Directives have a negative impact on the on-time 
availability of products/services of those companies? 
(2/7) Public Authorities think that the extension of the legislation would have 
negative impact on the availability of the equipment. The reason, according to one 
of these Public Authorities, would be the fact that companies may have to upgrade 
some of their equipment and/or to reprogram their activities.  
On the contrary, (4/7) Public Authorities don´t foresee any delay. For the 
Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) the reason is that such equipment is 
already in use on fixed platforms and sufficient time would be provided for the 
industry to adapt to the new requirements. Additionally, in its opinion taking into 
consideration e.g. compliance with the ATEX Directive, in 99.5% of the cases an 
IEC Test Report (ExTR) could underpin an ATEX EC-Type Certificate as the technical 
requirements (IEC and EN standards) are normally identical. A manufacturer 
elsewhere in the world could obtain IEC reports (ExTR and Quality Assessment 
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Report-QAR) locally and submit them to a Notification Body for issue of ATEX 
documentation. 
(1/7) Public Authorities would not know what to expect. The results are shown in 
Figure E-5. 
 
Figure E-5. Extension of the EU product safety legislation and its impact on the on-time availability of 
products/ services according to Public Authorities 
o Impact of compliance of offshore O&G equipment with the EU Product 
Safety Directives on risks to health and the environment (including the 
risk of fire and explosion and the protection of sea water quality) 
(6/7) Public Authorities believe that the extension of the scope of the EU product 
safety legislation would lead to a significant/very high reduction of the risk. One of 
these thinks that the reduction of the risk would vary depending on the equipment 
considered, on average it would be significant but in some cases it would only have 
a small impact.  
For the Public Authority Health and Safety Executives from the UK the extension of 
the legislation would have only a small impact on the risks to the health and the 
environment. Indeed, it thinks that there are a number of incidents where 
compliance with relevant standards may have been a factor.  
The opinion of the Public Authorities about the impact of the extension of the EU 
product safety legislation on risks to health and the environment is shown in Figure 
E-6. 
 
Figure E-6. Extension of the EU product safety legislation and its impact on risks to health and 
environment according to Public Authorities 
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Some Public Authorities have provided examples of accidents/near misses 
which could have been prevented if the EU Product Safety Directives had 
been applied: 
• Deepwater Horizon; 
• A typical example of such incident is an accident which occurred in the 
Netherlands in May 2010, during a workover on an "live" offshore gas 
production well of a normally unmanned platform with a Hydraulic Workover 
snubbing Unit (HWU), an unexpectedly very serious incident occurred. During 
the insertion of a new production tubing the operator lost the control of the 
HWU. As a result several production tubings were blown out of well and ended 
up on the platform deck area. By a quick intervention of the operator the well 
was shut in, the blow-out preventer (BOP) was immediately closed and the 
production was stopped by using the emergency push button.  
• The blown out production tubings damaged the methanol injection line of the 
export gas production pipeline and caused a major gas leak. No persons were 
injured. In support of the operation a mobile jack-up unit was stationed beside 
the platform. At the time of the incident there were 71 people aboard of the 
mobile jack-up unit. This high potential incident could have resulted in multiple 
fatalities, severe damage to installation and the environment. The incident 
investigation revealed that, a safety critical part of the HWU was not designed 
to be ‘fail safe’, by not implementing inherently safe design measures; 
• Lifting equipment: A number of incidents have occurred where the design did 
not follow the principles of safety integration as required by EU Product Safety 
Directives. For example non-fixed lifting attachments, such as manually 
operated side door elevators and riser running tools, where the consequence of 
failure is the dropping of a very heavy casing and could result in a serious or 
fatal injury. However, such an incident has the potential of resulting in a major 
incident involving serious personal injury, the integrity of the drilling rig 
(installation), or the integrity of the well itself. 
 Well casing elevator case: The locking mechanism of this lifting accessory 
relied on a procedure of work to ensure it was correctly locked to secure a 
casing that is to be lifted above the well prior to lowering it into it. The 
design of the elevator followed the API 8C standard. EN ISO 13535 is a 
non-harmonised standard based on API 8C and thus not listed in the EU OJ 
under the Machinery Directive. In the working conditions it was foreseeable 
that errors could be made in following the system of work. Such an error 
has occurred on a number of occasions, resulting in a number of casings 
being dropped. Due to the very heavy nature of the casing (in the area of 
12 – 23 metric tonnes), there is clear potential for fatal and other injury 
accidents. However there was also the possibility of damage to vital 
components such as well-control equipment and hence a chain of events 
leading to a more major incident. Discussions took place with 
manufacturers and a modified design that met the principle of safety 
integration and hence the requirements of the Machinery Directive Annex I 
paragraph 1.1.2, was produced.  
 Riser running tool case: A similar root cause to the elevator case above as 
the design relied on work procedures to ensure the tool was secured for 
lifting. The procedures failed, resulting in the tool being dropped, and could 
have resulted in a more serious major incident. The riser running tool 
followed the design principles of API 8C standard which was then 
developed into the non-harmonised standard EN ISO 13535 (is not listed in 
the EU OJ under the MD), meaning that there is a clear potential for fatal 
and other injury accidents. However there was also the possibility of 
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damage to vital components such as well-control equipment and hence a 
chain of events leading to a more major incident. Discussions took place 
with manufacturers and a modified design that met the principle of safety 
integration and hence the requirements of the Machinery Directive Annex I 
paragraph 1.1.2, was produced. 
According to the Public Authority which has provided the examples of 
incidents/near misses for lifting equipment, these two cases demonstrate that 
drilling hoisting equipment designed manufactured according to the non-
harmonised standard EN ISO 13535 (API 8C) do not meet the Essential 
Health and Safety Requirements (EHSRs) of the Machinery Directive 
2006/42/EC. In consequence, in its opinion the level of safety for workers and 
the industry would be higher if the products were built according to standards 
supporting the ESHRs of the EU product safety legislation. 
o Societal and employment impact due to the compliance of offshore O&G 
equipment with the EU Product Safety Directives: According to the Public 
Authorities the impact on the society and on the employment would be mainly 
related to: 
• (4/7) Creation of new job positions in Certification Bodies; 
• (4/7) Increased capacity (posts, skilled staff) from Public Authorities; 
• (3/7) No change in the number of posts but a qualitative impact on the 
necessary workforce e.g. more skilled personnel. 
o Potential solved problems due to the extension of scope of the PED to 
cover well-control equipment:  
(2/7) Public Authorities think that the extension of the PED would solve some 
problems, and only make reference to general terms e.g. safety and environmental 
problems, and safer equipment. (2/7) Public Authorities did not know and (3/7) did 
not answer. 
o Suitability of the PED to cover well-control equipment: 
(4/7) Public Authorities think that the PED would be a suitable legislation to cover 
well-control equipment but according to one of these, it would depend on the type 
of equipment (not specified). (2/7) Public Authorities found it difficult to answer 
this question and (1/7) Public Authority did not reply. These results are shown in 
Figure E-7. 
 
Figure E-7. Suitability of the PED for well-control equipment according to Public Authorities 
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o Particular difficulties due to the extension of the PED to cover well-control 
equipment for companies and affection to the market 
(3/7) Public Authorities think that companies would face difficulties due to the 
extension of the PED to cover well-control equipment. For one of these the 
upgrade/recertification of the existing equipment would be the main difficulty, while 
for the other two it would be the lack of harmonised standards. (1/7) Public 
Authority thinks that companies would not face any problem, (2/7) do not know, 
and (1/7) did not answer. 
o Is it necessary to modify the technical standards currently in use in order 
to meet the EHSRs of the PED? 
(3/7) Public Authorities think that a modification of the currently applied standards 
is needed, although according to one of these, only a partial modification of the 
standards is needed. A second Public Authority claims a proper review of the 
standards. (2/7) Public Authorities did not answer and another (2/7) did not know. 
o Would the extension of the PED to cover equipment used for well-control 
create barriers to trade?: (1/7) Public Authority thinks that the extension of the 
PED to well-control equipment, in spite of providing a considerable level of safety 
for the workers and increasing the systems integrity, would create obstacles to free 
trade. On the contrary, (1/7) Public Authority thinks that the potential new 
legislation would not create any barrier to trade. (4/7) Public Authorities do not 
have an idea of the impact of the extension on the trade. One of these points out 
the requirements that the Offshore Safety Directive already introduces for the 
verification of well operations. (1/7) did not reply. See Figure E-8. 
 
Figure E-8. Extension of the PED to cover well-control equipment and its impact on the trade according 
to Public Authorities 
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F. Other types of entities: Overview of their answers 
European Community Shipowners´s Associations_ ECSA 
Related to the possible extension of the EU Product Safety legislation (ATEX, MD and 
PED) to cover MODUs and the equipment installed on such units, ECSA believes that 
the currently applicable international and national standards cannot be demonstrated to 
be inferior to the EU Product Safety legislation. Accidents that currently occur cannot be 
considered as evidence of systemic defects in global standards that could be remedied 
by these Directives. The application of the Directives can be justified for fixed 
installations as have hydrocarbons on deck for almost 365 days per year while MODUs 
are exposed to hydrocarbons for less than 20 days per year. ECSA believes that a 
general reduction of risk levels offshore is much more likely to be achieved through the 
Offshore Safety Directive than the EU Product Safety legislation.  
It also points out that just differentiating between mobile and fixed rig units is incorrect 
as in most cases applicable standards are activity related. Thus, production units and 
fixed platforms will be subject to the same requirements, while mobile drilling units will 
be subject to an entirely different set of rule parameters given the differences in 
operational modes and risk picture. 
ECSA has reported that the price increase for BOP compliance with PED and ATEX 
requirements is estimated at 30%. This information is coming from GE Oil & Gas, one 
of the world´s leading equipment and services´ providers in the oil and gas industry. 
ECSA is of the opinion that the extension of the EU Product Safety legislation to MODUs 
could have the following detrimental effects: 
o Reintroducing requirements which can to some extent be considered mandatory 
may push the industry back to a mind-set of compliance rather than safety. 
o It would introduce competitive disadvantage for European MODU owners since it 
limits the mobility of MODUs. 
o It would create significant issues on the supply chain side for owners and operators 
o It would constitute an obstacle for EU manufacturers as they would have to adopt 
double certification to sell their products outside the EU. 
o It would create substantial costs due to the need for design, certification, double 
certification or recertification, retrofit and downtimes. Such increase in the cost 
could lead to loss of business and inevitable loss of jobs. 
International Marine Contractors Association_IMCA 
IMCA is against the extension the European Product Safety Directives to MODUs. The 
reasons are: 
o It is not justified in terms of a demonstrated need or potential safety 
improvements. 
o Although the MODU Code does not include requirements for industrial equipment 
used for drilling, other international and national standards for machinery and 
equipment are in place (flag state, coastal state and classification society rules) to 
comply with relevant standards such as IEC, NORSOK, API and Class rules. These 
standards have been in use in the North Sea for over two decades and there is no 
evidence to suggest that they can be attributed to a major incident. Furthermore, 
the standards for equipment used on MODUs have been developed to address the 
specific risks associated with offshore O&G operations, which are not addressed by 
the more generic EU Directives. 
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o Under the Offshore Safety Directive (Directive 2013/30/EU), operators of MODUs 
working in the EU that undertake well operations are already required to have 
systems in place to identify, prevent, detect, control or mitigate, and respond to 
major safety and environmental risks, including ensuring that Safety and 
Environmentally Critical Systems (SECS) are meeting appropriate performance 
standards. Thus, MODU operators, which are already required to meet robust 
standards for machinery and equipment through other legislative requirements and 
to justify the risk mitigation measures they put in place would, through the 
extension of the EU Product Safety Directives, be required to comply with generic 
standards that do not address the specifics of MODU operations.  This fact could 
create conflict with the goal based approach on which the Offshore Safety Directive 
is based and potentially undermine safety. 
o The types of operations carried out and the potential exposure to hydrocarbons in 
terms of volume and duration are major differences between fixed or onshore 
production installations and mobile drilling units, being the likelihood of fires and 
explosions considerably lower for MODUs. 
o The MODU Code is applied more widely than just to drilling vessels. Some types of 
offshore vessels that do not have drilling capability but that are operated in a 
similar manner to drilling units (like well intervention vessels and offshore 
accommodation units) may be either designed, built to or certified entirely under 
the MODU Code or incorporate MODU design rules in addition to SOLAS. It would 
not be appropriate to extend the Product Safety Directives to MODU Code vessels 
that are not undertaking drilling because:  
a. Their activities, and therefore their risk profiles, differ from drilling operations.  
b. A semi-submersible or jack-up construction vessel carrying out installation, 
maintenance, upgrade or removal work, for instance, will not be connected to a 
live well, and will not encounter substantial hydrocarbon releases. On the 
occasions that a construction vessel works alongside a production platform, 
such operations are subject to project specific detailed hazard identifications 
and assessment, and it is the duty of the platform operator to demonstrate 
that the risks are ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable).  
c. Construction vessels built to the MODU Code may also be engaged in the 
renewable energy sector, installing offshore wind turbines for example, where 
the risk of hydrocarbon release is not present. While these vessel activities do 
not require a Report on Major Hazards, all vessels are subject to flag and Class 
requirements, and vessel operators are required under the IMO International 
Safety Management (ISM) Code to assess all identified risks to its ships, 
personnel and the environment and to establish appropriate safeguards, 
including specific measures aimed at promoting the reliability of safety critical 
equipment or systems.  
o Demonstrating compliance with the ATEX Directive is administratively burdensome 
as testing has to be carried out for individual components, which must otherwise be 
encased in explosion-proof housing. 
o MODUs are international assets, and the industry requires an international 
framework of rules. Requiring MODUs operating in the EU to comply with the EU 
Directives, which are not a globally accepted standard, could act as a barrier to free 
movement and undermine the MODU Code’s intent to facilitate international 
movement and operation. 
On the other hand IMCA has made the following comments related to the survey on 
offshore safety: 
o It focuses on drilling units, rather than all MODU Code vessels. 
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o Many of the questions are aimed at companies that manufacture and install 
equipment on MODUs, rather than the MODU and offshore support vessel 
operators. 
o It is extremely difficult for operators to obtain meaningful estimates from suppliers 
of relevant equipment and potential certifiers, and therefore specific cost impacts 
cannot be provided with any accuracy. Nevertheless, extending the EU product 
safety legislation is likely to create significant costs. 
o Resources would be better focused on ensuring a robust and consistent application 
of the Offshore Safety Directive and supporting general efforts at IMO to improve 
vessel safety. 
International Association of Drilling Contractors_IADC 
The IADC maintains that the exemption from ATEX Directive, MD and PED of MODUs 
was, and remains, entirely appropriate. This affirmation is based in the following 
arguments: 
o The fact that MODUs are vessels to which the IMO MODU Code applies and the EU 
legislation does not, does not mean that MODUs are under-regulated because in 
fact, drilling and well-control equipment are the most highly regulated safety 
critical systems in the sector. 
o Whereas the EU Product Safety Directives act upon manufacturers and suppliers, 
and therefore may be anticipated by the Commission to convey a net benefit to 
consumers in the EU, this is not the case for MODU owners. Indeed the reverse is 
true: barriers to trade can result, possibly in breach of the EU´s own treaties. 
o Suitability of existing standards: MODUs must comply with international 
requirements of Class Rules, ICE, API, ISO, NORSOK, etc. These standards and 
verification procedures have been used in Europe for over 20 years and are under 
continuous review and enhancement. There is no evidence anywhere that ascribes 
increased risk of harm to machinery and equipment standards on MODUs. Current 
international standards cannot be demonstrated as inferior to the EU Product 
Safety Directives as there is no evidence of systemic defects in global standards 
that could be remedied by the Directives coming into effect on MODUs. The safety 
benefits in this relentless overhaul of international standards are profound: the 
ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) threshold is continuously driven lower 
by the vigorous application of new knowledge and invention. 
The requirements of the recent Offshore Safety Directive 2013/30/EU (OSD) shall 
soon come into effect in all waters of the Union. The effects include the preparation 
of a report on major hazards, and associated corporate major accident prevention 
policy, scheme of independent verification of safety and environmental critical 
elements, independent verification of well plans and an encompassing safety and 
environmental management system. This rigorous system ensures that all 
pertinent equipment and machinery on the MODU is compliant with appropriate 
authoritative standards and schemes of maintenance, and independently verified. 
o Unsuitability of the Commissions Survey: The survey was directed at 
manufacturers and suppliers of relevant equipment and none of the questions were 
relevant to users. Members of IADC have reported that it has not been possible to 
get meaningful data from suppliers for them to summarize the cost impacts of the 
users coming into compliance with the Directives. When considered that on every 
MODU there are tens of thousands of subject components and systems, a matter of 
millions of Euros would certainly be required to be spent on every MODU. On the 
question of standards, the survey does not provide for a complete inventory from 
owners of the standards and verification systems applying to all machinery and 
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equipment on a MODU. The survey cannot yield appropriate information to guide 
the Commission towards a competent judgement in this matter. 
o Unsuitability of the EU Product Safety Directives to MODUs: The 
requirements of the Directives will not in every case be allowable as standards 
outside the EU. The situation would arise, should the EU Product Safety Directives 
be applied to MODUs, that owners could not maintain compliance to operate 
outside Union waters, and MODUs potentially coming to EU waters, including ultra- 
efficient latest generation installations, would be deterred by retrofitting costs. The 
net effect for EU waters would be a dedicated fleet of older generation rigs and a 
rather uncertain future for drilling in the EU; particularly in frontier areas such as 
deep water Mediterranean and the Atlantic rim where older rigs are unlikely to be 
effective. 
o Disproportionality: The Member States that publish risk data and trends do not 
identify machinery and equipment defects as primary objectives for intervention. 
Globally, the efforts of safety and environment regulators are on reforms of 
management systems and competency, and on risk based control systems.  
For the existing EU fleet, the cost of retrofitting, re-certification, modification, and 
maintaining compliance is grossly disproportionate to any safety benefit deriving 
from the application the EU Product Safety Directives. Recertification to ATEX would 
probably be unworkable. Displacement of international standards for BOP by the 
measures required under the Directives would go against industry best practice. 
Finally IADC suggest that a thorough analysis of the requirements of the EU Product 
Safety Directives against all the prevalent industry standard and authoritative practices 
applied to drilling and well-control systems on MODUs should be done. 
Norwegian Shipowners´Association_NSA 
The Norwegian Shipowners´ Association fully endorses the European Community 
Shipowners´ Association (ECSA) response and adds some comments in connection with 
the lack of questions in the survey regarding the use of standards and rules developed 
by the classification societies. IMO uses the term Recognized Organizations (RO) for the 
classification societies recognized by IMO. These include among others well-known 
classification societies such as DNV GL, Lloyd Register of Shipping (LR), and American 
Bureau of Shipping (ABS).  
The classification societies have general requirements which influence the design of the 
unit, the drilling system/equipment and the surrounding/supporting/auxiliary 
systems/equipment. Some classification societies have in addition specific requirements 
and standards for the same systems/equipment.  
The Norwegian Shipowners' Association considers the lack of questions regarding 
classification rules and standards that cover the systems and equipment on-board a 
MODU to weaken the evaluation of the safety regime of MODU equipment. The existing 
rules and standards for MODU equipment ensure a very high safety standard and the 
extension of EU product safety legislation to cover this equipment is unlikely to produce 
a higher safety standard. 
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A Notified Body (NB) and a Health and Safety (H&S) Consultancy  
The NB, located in Portugal, Africa/Middle East, and in Central/South America and with 
at least 250 employees, has a percentage between 40 and 60% of its activities located 
within EU/EEA. On the other hand, the H&S Consultancy, located in the UK and with a 
maximum of 49 employees, has more than the 80% of its activities located in the 
EU/EEA area. 
The NB deals with non-destructive testing related to the MD and PED and also applies 
the Low voltage Directive and the Electromagnetic Directive. It currently uses ISO/EN 
ISO standards, IEC standards and EN standards (EN 13450 and EN 13480). In terms of 
revenue the electrical equipment and the “other pressure equipment” are the most 
important subcategories of equipment for the NB. 
The H&S Consultancy is currently dealing with the 3 European Product Safety Directives 
as well as with IEC standards (IEC 80079-36 and IEC 80079-37), EN standards (EN 
13463-1, EN 13463-5, EN 13463-6 and EN 1127-1) and BS standards. The drilling 
equipment and the “other pressure equipment” are the most important subcategories 
of equipment for the Health and Safety Consultancy in terms of revenue. 
The H&S Consultancy thinks that the extension of the EU Product Safety Directives, 
although initially could create barriers to trade, would be suitable for equipment in 
MODUs and its extension would solve safety problems and improve features in its 
services. It cannot say if the currently applied standards in the sector should be 
modified to meet the EHSRs of the Directives as each assessment would differ. 
If the European Product Safety Directives are finally extended to cover MODUs, the NB 
does not foresee any change in the number of job positions although it could have a 
qualitative impact on the necessary workforce (more skilled personnel). On the 
contrary for the H&S Consultancy the extension of the legislation will facilitate the 
creation of new job positions related to technical conformity. 
None of the two entities have answered the part of the survey related to the extension 
of the PED to well-control equipment.  
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G. Leading companies in the MODU market 
In January 2015 the top ten offshore drilling contractors by number of MODUs 
managed were the following [8]: 1. Transocean, 2. Ensco, 3. Seadrill, 4. COSL, 5. 
Diamond Offshore, 6. Paragon Offshore, 7. Self-Drilling, 8. Hercules Offshore, 9. Noble 
Corporation, and 10. Rowan. 
In Table G-1 the top ten offshore drilling contractors by number of rigs managed and 
by number of rigs displayed in the different world markets are shown. It has to be 
noticed that “total rigs” includes working rigs, non-working rigs and under construction 
rigs. 
Table G-1. Top ten offshore drilling contractors by number of rigs managed (January 2015) [8] 
Company 
Total 
rigs 
Working 
rigs 
Under 
construction 
rigs 
Units displayed in the different world markets 
NW 
Europe 
South 
America 
US 
Gulf of 
Mexico 
West 
Africa 
Asian 
Pacific 
Eastern 
Mediterranean 
Rest 
of 
the 
world 
Transocean 86 52 7 19 6 13 14 26 0 8 
Ensco 72 53 7 12 4 17 9 16 12 2 
Seadrill 62 37 12 0 15 6 11 22 6 2 
COSL 46 39 3 3 3 0 0 36 4 0 
Diamond 
Offshore 
41 24 2 5 16 9 2 7 0 2 
Paragon 
Offshore 
40 26 0 8 14 3 5 1 9 0 
Shelf 
Drilling 
39 30 2 0 0 0 5 17 16 1 
Hercules 
Offshore 
35 15 1 1 0 24 3 4 3 0 
Noble 35 24 1 3 2 11 1 7 8 3 
Rowan 34 25 1 6 2 9 1 5 10 1 
Top ten 
Total 
490 325 36 57 62 92 51 141 68 19 
Entire fleet 1188 680 180 101 219 121 96 414 167 70 
Top ten of 
Total (%) 
41.2 47.8 20.0 56.4 28.3 76.0 53.1 34.1 40.7 27.1 
A small overview of some drilling contractors is presented below: 
o Transocean (www.deepwater.com) 
Transocean is by far the largest company in the MODU market, both in terms of 
fleet size and revenue. It is a leading international provider of offshore contract 
drilling services for energy companies, owning and operating among the world's 
most versatile fleets with a particular focus on deepwater and harsh-environment 
drilling. The company is active in all the world´s major offshore regions. The 
majority of Transocean´s deepwater floaters are active in the Gulf of Mexico and 
Africa while the European market is the prime location for the company´s midwater 
units. The current strategy of the company is to move towards more high-
specification MODUs. Its fleet of 63 MODUs includes the world's largest fleet of 
high-specification rigs consisting of ultra-deepwater, deepwater and premium jack-
up rigs. In addition, it has seven ultra-deepwaterdrill-ships and five high-
specification jack-ups under construction. 
The company has long-standing partnerships with many of the world´s leading oil 
and gas companies counting Petrobras, BP, ExxonMobil, and Chevron among its 
main customers. In the recent years Transocean´s financial performance has been 
tainted by the company´s involvement in the Deepwater Horizon accident in the 
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Gulf of Mexico and a minor spill in Brazil which forced the company to temporarily 
halt all operations in the country; 
o Ensco PLC (www.enscoplc.com) 
Ensco plc is a provider of offshore drilling services to the petroleum industry. Ensco 
plc owns one of the world's newest ultra-deeper water fleet, 4 years old average, 
and includes 9 drill-ships (and 1 under construction), 11 dynamically-positioned 
semisubmersibles, 3 moored semisubmersibles and 40 premium jack-up (and 3 
under construction), 2 deepwater and 3 shallow water units. Ensco plc also 
provides drilling management services for customer-owned rigs. Its rigs have 
drilled some of the most complex wells in virtually every major offshore basin 
around the globe, and they currently operate across six continents. Their 
customers are multinational integrated energy companies, national oil companies 
and independent operators; 
o Maersk Drilling (www.maerskdrilling.com) 
Maersk Drilling is part of the A.P. Moller - Maersk Group - a worldwide organisation 
with 110,000 employees and offices in 125 countries, headquartered in 
Copenhagen, Denmark. On 21 June 1972 Maersk Storm Drilling Company and 
Atlantic Pacific Marine Corporation were established with the purpose of purchasing 
two semi-subs and two barge rigs. These were the very early days of Maersk 
Drilling. Today, Maersk Drilling owns 26 rigs including six ultra-harsh environment 
jack-ups, six further jack-ups, four semi-submersibles and 10 drilling barge rigs. In 
addition, the company has ordered the world's most advanced jack-up drilling rigs, 
the Maersk Intrepid and the Maersk XL Enhanced 2, 3 and 4. The rigs are purpose-
built for weathering the ultra-harsh environment of the North Sea, and their 
technical features are beyond current state-of-the-art. The company has 
announced that it is investing in developing the technology that allows drilling in 
the Arctic; 
o Paragon Offshore (www.paragonoffshore.com) 
Paragon Offshore owns a fleet of 40 MODUs and conduct contract labour operations 
on the Hibernia Platform offshore eastern Canada. They operate for some of the 
largest oil and gas companies in the world, including National Oil Companies like 
Petrobras (Brazil), Pemex (Mexico), and ONGC (India). ExxonMobil and Total, who 
are among the largest major oil companies, and Centrica, Gaz de France and 
Wintershall, some of the world’s most active independent oil companies, are also 
among their customers. In all, Paragon provides services to more than 17 different 
customers in 12 countries on five continents. Their standard specification jack-ups 
provide drilling services in shallow water with capabilities up to a maximum water 
depth of 390 feet, being nine of them also capable of operations in harsh 
environments, which typically command higher dayrates than operations conducted 
in other environments. Paragon's semisubmersible rigs are capable of operating in 
water depths of up to 4,000 feet while its drill-ships operate in water depths of up 
to 7,200 feet depending on the design; 
o Noble Corporation (www.noblecorp.com) 
Noble Corporation is another of the traditional offshore drilling company that have 
been in the business for several decades. The company owns and operates a 
modern, versatile and technically advanced fleet in the offshore drilling industry. 
Noble´s fleet is composed of 32 offshore drilling units (8 semisubmersibles with a 
drill depth between 25,000 ft and 37,000 ft; 8 (of the 9) drill-ships with a drill 
depth of 40,000 ft, and 15 jack-ups with a drill depth comprised between 25,000 ft 
and 35,000 ft) focused largely on ultra-deepwater and high-specification jack-up 
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drilling opportunities in both established and emerging regions worldwide. Noble 
performs, through its subsidiaries, contract drilling services worldwide including the 
US Gulf of Mexico, Mexico, Brazil, the North Sea, the Mediterranean, West Africa, 
the Middle East, India and the Asian Pacific; 
o QGOG (www.qgogconstellation.com) 
QGOG is a market leading provider of oil and gas drilling and FPSO services in 
Brazil. It is also one of the ten largest drilling companies globally, based on drilling 
rigs in operation. Through its subsidiary QGOG, QGOG Constellation operates in the 
fast-growing Brazilian oil and gas industry, which requires substantial resources to 
explore the recent discoveries of vast potential oil and gas reserves off the coast of 
Brazil. 
QGOG owns and holds interests in a state-of-the-art offshore fleet, constructed by 
the world’s leading shipyards. Its modern fleet includes nine ultra-deepwater rigs in 
operation or under construction, one deepwater rig, two midwater rigs, nine 
onshore rigs and partnerships in six FPSOs; 
o Dolphin Drilling LTD (www.dolphindrilling.no) 
Dolphin Drilling is a well-established name in offshore drilling and has operated in 
all the major offshore oil and gas regions in the world. In recent years, Dolphin 
drilling LTD has carried out drilling operations in most of the major areas of 
offshore activity, including the North Sea, West Africa, East Africa, Mediterranean, 
India, Brazil and Gulf of Mexico. Dolphin drilling LTD provides services to a broad 
cross section of oil and gas companies including many of the majors, independents 
and national oil companies; 
o Stena Drilling (www.stena-drilling.com) 
Stena Drilling is part of the Stena Sphere, a conglomerate of Danish companies 
which apart from offshore drilling are also active in shipping and operating several 
ferry routes. Stena Drilling is focused on ultra-deepwater drilling and harsh 
environment midwater semi-submersibles. Stena’s drill-ships operate in Mauritania, 
Las Palmas de Gran Canaria and the Gulf of Mexico while the semi-submersibles 
are deployed in the North Sea and in offshore Australia. Due to the specialization 
within its fleet Stena is achieving high revenues and demand for Stena’s MODUs 
will continue to be strong; 
o Saipem (www.saipem.com) 
Saipem is a world leader in drilling services, as well as in the engineering, 
procurement, construction and installation of pipelines and complex projects, 
onshore and offshore, in the oil & gas market. The company has distinctive 
competences in operations in harsh environments, remote areas and deepwater. 
Saipem provides a full range of services with contracts on an Engineering, 
Procurement, and Construction (EPC) and/or Engineering, Procurement, 
Construction, and Installation (EPCI), often 'turn-key'basis, and has distinctive 
capabilities and unique assets with highest technological content. Saipem operates 
in more than 60 countries with about 46,000 people from more than 129 
nationalities, 11 fabrication yards in 5 continents and 29 engineering and project 
execution centers worldwide . In the Drilling Offshore sector, Saipem operates both 
in shallow and deep waters, using 14 MODUs, a state-of-the-art drilling fleet 
including the ultra-deepwater DP drill-shipsSaipem 10000 and, the new built 
Saipem 12000 and the fourth and fifth generation semisubmersible drilling units 
Scarabeo 5 and Scarabeo 7. Saipem has recently expanded its drilling fleet also 
thanks to the start of the operation of the ultra-deepwater sixth generation 
semisubmersible drilling units Scarabeo 8 and Scarabeo 9 and of the jack-ups Perro 
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Negro 8 and Perro Negro 7. Their MODUs are under flag of Portugal or Bahamas. 
Although Eni is the main shareholder of Saipem, only a small part of Saipem´s 
vessels are usually contracted to work for Eni. 
o Odfjell Drilling (www.odfjelldrilling.com) 
Odfjell Drilling, founded in 1973, is an international drilling, well service and 
engineering company with 3000 employees and operations in more than 20 
countries. The company has established expertise in the operation of ultra-deep 
water and harsh environment mobile offshore units in both Norwegian waters and 
internationally. In addition, it has built a position as a major supplier of personnel 
for drilling operations and maintenance on fixed and floating production platforms 
in the North Sea. Odfjell Drilling has developed a comprehensive portfolio of 
services - including world-class engineering services, well services and project 
management. It has a proven track record of successfully operating semi-
submersibles, drill-ships, jack-ups and modular drilling units across the world. 
Currently Odfjell Drilling owns and operates a fleet of technologically advanced 
semi-submersibles, operating in the North Sea and beyond; 
o North Atlantic Drilling (A Seadrill company) (www.nadlcorp.com) 
North Atlantic Drilling is an offshore harsh environment drilling company, which 
owns a fleet of eight harsh environment units in operation and one new-build under 
construction.  Its business strategy is to focus the company on modern state-of-
the-art offshore drilling units with main focus on harsh environments and the North 
Atlantic Basin. North Atlantic Drilling is a 70.4 percent owned subsidiary of Seadrill 
Limited; 
In general it can be said that there is a gradual increase in water depth capability as 
the fleet ages decrease. Regarding the composition of drilling companies’ fleets, the 
following considerations can be made [2]: 
o Smaller companies, such as Pacific Drilling and Vantage Drilling, have a very young 
fleet consisting mainly of deepwater capable MODUs. Such companies are likely to 
profit the most from the move towards deepwater drilling; 
o Companies like Maersk Drilling, Stena, Saipem and QGOG tend to have smaller 
fleets, mainly focused on high-tech rigs, but also include older midwater floaters. 
o Many of the traditional companies, such as Transocean and Noble, maintain a 
comprehensive fleet of floaters. Most companies in this group have a wide array of 
floaters servicing the complete range of the market from midwater to ultra-
deepwater operations.  
Related to the manufacturers/ suppliers/ traders/r enters and installers of 
equipment, some of the leading companies are shown below: 
o National Oilwell Varco (www.nov.com), 
National Oilwell Varco is also present in many European countries (Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, The 
Netherlands, UK, etc.). National Oilwell Varco manufactures a wide range of 
equipment as drilling equipment, well intervention equipment, material handling 
equipment, Blow-out Preventers (BOPs) and electrical equipment (electrical power 
systems and uninterruptible power systems); 
o Varco BJ BV (www.nov.com) 
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Varco BJ BV operates as a subsidiary of National Oilwell Varco and offers 
mechanical components for land and offshore drilling rigs, land drill and well 
servicing rigs, tubular inspection, drill string equipment, and lifting equipment. 
Varco BJ conducts downhole, handling, supply chain, and well services to 
customers throughout the Netherlands; 
o Drillmec (www.drillmec.com) 
Being part of the TREVl Group, a multinational organization with more than fifty 
years of activity that counts on more than 7000 employees, Drillmec is an 
international leader in design, manufacturing and distribution of drilling and 
workover rigs for onshore and offshore applications as well as a wide range of 
drilling equipment. Drillmec manufactures conventional and modular drilling 
packages, hydraulic rig packages as well as derricks and mast for fixed platforms, 
jack ups, semi-submersibles and drill ships. They also manufacture a full range of 
hydraulic and electric top drives, drawworks, rotation equipment, mud pumps, pipe 
handling equipment, control systems and drilling instrumentation; 
o Siemens (www.siemens.com/entry/cc/en) 
In the O&G sector, which comprises subsea, offshore drilling, offshore production, 
onshore production, pipelines, LNG, storage and refining/petro, Siemens offers 
made-to-measure products and technologies for electrification, automation, 
digitalization, water technologies, compression, and drives; 
o Expro (http://exprogroup.com/homepage/) 
Expro with more than 40 years of experience and innovation offers tailor-made 
solutions for customers across the energy sector. Expro’s mission is well flow 
management. It provides services and products that measure, improve, control and 
process flow from high-value oil and gas wells, from exploration and appraisal 
through to mature field production optimisation and enhancement. 
With a specific focus on offshore, deepwater and other technically challenging 
environments, Expro provides a range of mission critical services across three key 
areas: 1. well test & appraisal services; 2. subsea, completion & intervention 
services; and 3. production services. Expro provides a range of solutions including: 
exploration & appraisal testing; subsea safety systems; drilling & completion; 
flowback & clean-up; production; well integrity & intervention; 
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H. List of the contacted stakeholders for a personal 
interview 
The contacted stakeholders, mainly companies, in order to participate in the present 
study by means of an interview/meeting are presented below. Most of these companies 
have been identified in a web-site related to oilfield equipment [9]. 
The information facilitated for each company is: name, web address, contact email, 
size, country where it is located and the main categories of equipment the company 
deals with.  
Related to the equipment categories, the following designation has been used: a. 
drilling equipment, b. well intervention equipment, c. material handling equipment, d. 
well-control equipment, e. other pressure equipment and f. electrical equipment. 
1. Baker Hudges 
www.bakerhughes.com/products-and-services/pressure-pumping 
www.bakerhughes.com/contact 
Main equipment category: all, d, e 
Size: Large 
Location: Europe, US 
2. Cameron 
www.c-a-m.com 
www.c-a-m.com/contact-us 
Main equipment category: d, BOPs, e 
Size: Large 
Location: US 
3. Franks 
http://franksinternational.com/ 
http://franksinternational.com/contact-us/ 
info@franksintl.com 
Reception@franks-int.com 
Main equipment category: all, a 
Size: Large 
Location: US, Norway 
 
4. Saipem 
www.saipem.com 
Main equipment category: all 
Size: Large 
Location: Worldwide, Italy 
5. Gardner Denver 
www.gardnerdenver.com/brands/brands_overview 
www.gardnerdenver.com/locations/# 
Angelo.bottarini@gardnerdenver.com 
thomas.it@gardnerdenver.com 
er.it@gardnerdenver.com 
Main equipment category: all 
Size: Large 
Location: Worldwide, Italy 
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6. Hydril; GE Oil & Gas 
www.geoilandgas.com/who-we-are 
www.geoilandgas.com/contact-us 
Main equipment category: all 
Size: Large 
Location: Not specified 
7. National Oil Varco 
www.nov.com/Segments/Rig_Systems/Offshore/Offshore.aspx 
rig@nov.com 
www.nov.com/OTC_2015_XL_Systems_Contact_Form.aspx 
Main equipment category: all 
Size: Large 
Location: Not specified 
8. Oil Works Inc 
www.oilworksinc.com/corporate-overview 
www.oilworksinc.com/contact 
Main equipment category: a, c 
Size: Medium 
Location: US 
9. Texas International Oilfield Equipment 
www.texasinternational.com/index.html 
www.texasinternational.com/contact.html 
Main equipment category: all 
Size: Small 
Location: US 
10. Wison group 
http://en.wison.com/Offshore_Marine 
info@wison-offshore.com 
Main equipment category: MODUs 
Size: Large 
Location: China 
11. Atlas Copco 
www.atlascopco.it/itit/products/ 
http://www.atlascopco.com/us/contactus/contactgroupcenter/#faq_3 
Main equipment category: c, d, e 
Size: Large 
Location: Sweden 
12. INA Naftaplin 
www.ina.hr 
PR@ina.hr 
Main equipment category: Users 
Size: Large 
Location: Croatia 
13. Edison 
www.edison.it 
lucia.caltagirone@edison.it 
elena.distaso@edison.it 
Main equipment category: Users 
Size: Large 
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Location: Italy 
14. Viktor Lenac Shipyard 
www.lenac.hr 
lenac@lenac.hr 
design@lenac.hr 
Main equipment category: MODUs, Derricks 
Size: Medium 
Location: Croatia 
15. Gazpromneft 
www.gazprom-neft.com 
info@gazprom-neft.ru 
pr@gazprom-neft.ru 
Main equipment category: Users 
Size: Large 
Location: Russia 
16. ExxonMobil 
http://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/engineering/deepwater-drilling 
http://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/company/contact-us/email-us 
Main equipment category: Users, a 
Size: Large 
Location: Not specified 
17. Royal Dutch Shell 
www.shell.nl/nld/aboutshell/media-centre/contact-media-team.html 
media-nl@shell.com 
Main equipment category: Users 
Size: Large 
Location: Netherlands 
18. BP Norway 
www.bp.com/en_no/norway/about-bp-in-norway/who-we-
are/organisation/contact-us.html 
bpnorge@bp.com 
Main equipment category: Users 
Size: Large 
Location: Norway 
19. Statoil 
www.statoil.com/en/about/worldwide/belgium/pages/default.aspx 
eu-office@statoil.com 
Main equipment category: Users 
Size: Large 
Location: Belgium 
20. Halliburton 
www.halliburton.com 
http://www.halliburton.com/en-US/locations/halliburton-europe-
locations/halliburton-halliburton-europe-locations.page?node-id=hgeyxtaj 
Main equipment category: Users, all 
Size: Large 
Location: Europe (few countries) 
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21. Caterpillar 
www.caterpillar.com/en/company/brands.html 
http://www.caterpillar.com/en/contact/mx-au-gb-in-kr-id-se-za 
sa.html?type=en_GB&cat_lang=English&cat_site=www.cat.com/en_GB 
Main equipment category: Various 
Size: Large 
Location: US 
22. OilMan 
http://oilmangroup.com/ 
info@oilmangroup.com 
rfq@oilmangroup.com 
Main equipment category: c, d, e 
Size: Large 
Location: Not specified 
23. Anadarko 
www.anadarko.com 
ventures@anadarko.com 
Main equipment category: Users 
Size: Large 
Location: Not specified 
24. Chevron 
www.chevron.com 
www.chevron.com/contact/emailchevron/ 
Main equipment category: Users 
Size: Large 
Location: Not specified 
25. ConocoPhillips 
www.conocophillips.com 
www.conocophillips.com/Pages/contact-us.aspx 
Main equipment category: Users 
Size: Large 
Location: US 
26. Drillmec 
www.drillmec.com 
www.drillmec.com/en/p/contacts 
Main equipment category: a, c, f, as well as derricks and mast for fixed platforms 
and MODUs. 
Size: Large 
Location: Italy 
27. ENI Tecnomare 
www.eni.com/it_IT/azienda/attivita-strategie/altre-
societa/tecnomare/tecnomare.shtml 
info@tecnomare.it 
Main equipment category: Various 
Size: Large 
Location: Italy 
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28. Schlumberger 
www.slb.com/services.aspx 
www.slb.com/forms/contact/contact_inquiry.aspx?referringURL=http://www.slb.co
m/contact_us/default.aspx&context=Contact%20Information 
Main equipment category: Users 
Size: Large 
Location: Not specified 
29. Baiqiang Valves Group (China) Co., Ltd  
www.bekyvalve.com 
sale88@bekyvalve.com 
Main equipment category: Valves 
Size: Large 
Location: China 
30. SEA Europe_Ships and Maritime Equipment Association 
www.seaeurope.eu 
info@seaeurope.eu 
Oliver Derison: od@seaeurope.eu 
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I. Statistical analysis of offshore accidents and incidents on 
MODUs since 1970 
I1. Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank (WOAD) 
The Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank (WOAD) is an offshore accident and 
incident database operated by DNV-GL102. Information on offshore incident data has 
been gathered since 1970 and then stored in this databank for public use. 
The database contains information on more than 6000 events, including accidents, 
incidents and near misses, mostly from the UK and the Norwegian sectors and the US 
Gulf of Mexico. 
Typical users of WOAD comprise rig owners, drilling operators, insurance companies, 
consultants, salvage companies and regulatory authorities. 
Information on offshore events is continuously updated and is derived from a variety of 
sources – mainly public – such as Lloyds Casualty reports, rig owners and operators, 
newspaper articles, and official publications and reports. 
WOAD is not publicly available but access is granted through a database subscription 
(with charge). 
WOAD contains information on the following types of events: 
o accidents, i.e. hazardous situations which have developed into an accidental 
situation. All situations/ events causing fatalities and severe injuries have also been 
considered as accidents; 
o incidents/ hazardous situations, i.e. hazardous situations which have not developed 
into an accidental situation. Low degree of damage was recorded, but repairs/ 
replacements were usually required. This type of event also included events 
causing minor injuries to personnel or health injuries; 
o near misses, i.e. events that might have or could have evolved into an accidental 
situation. No damage and no repairs were required in these cases; 
o insignificant events, i.e. hazardous situations, with very minor consequences. In 
most cases, damages were registered and repairs were not required. Small spills of 
crude oil and chemicals were also included, as well as very minor injuries to 
personnel. 
WOAD also contains a damage categorization, which is applicable to all event types, 
i.e.: 
o insignificant damage: insignificant or no damage to part(s) of essential equipment; 
damage to towline, thrusters, generators and drivers; 
o minor damage: minor damage to single essential equipment; damage to more non-
essential equipment, and damage to non-loadbearing structures; 
o significant damage: significant/ serious damage to module and local area of the 
unit; minor damage to loadbearing structures; significant damage to single 
essential equipment, and damage to more non-essential equipment; 
o severe damage: severe damage to one or more modules of the unit; large/medium 
damage to loadbearing structures; major damage to essential equipment; 
o total loss: total loss of the unit, including constructive total loss from an insurance 
point of view; however, the unit may be repaired and put into operation again. 
Each accidental situation is assigned at least one contributing cause to the event. 
Causes are divided into two main groups, i.e. human cause and equipment cause. Table 
I-1 shows the types of human and equipment causes which are found in WOAD. 
                                           
102 www.dnvgl.com 
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Table I-1. WOAD database human and equipment causes 
WOAD Accident causes 
Human Causes 
Third party error Sabotage 
Act of war Unsafe act / No procedure 
Improper design Unsafe procedure 
Other 
 
Equipment causes 
Third party equipment failure Ignition by heat/exhaust 
Earthquake / volcanic eruption Ignition by open flame 
Electric equipment malfunction Ignition by cigarette/match 
Equipment malfunction / failure Ignition, electrical 
Exceeded design criteria Ignition, hand tool/sparks 
Foundation problem Ignition, lightning 
Machinery malfunction Ignition, weld/torch 
Safety system malfunction Ignition, unknown/other 
Structural failure / fatigue / corrosion Weather, general 
(Unspecified)  
I2. Analysis of accidental events involving Mobile Offshore 
Drilling Units 
In order to identify the systems, pieces of equipment and structural components which 
more frequently contributed to the occurrence of accidental events on offshore 
installations, an analysis of the information on 1989 events contained in the Worldwide 
Offshore Accident Databank (WOAD) was carried out. 
I2.1. Drawing the data sample 
The WOAD database contains technical and accident information on 6451 events, but 
only 1989 of them were used in the analysis, i.e.: 
o Events which occurred on MODUs and worldwide (Figure I-1); 
o Events categorized as “Accidents”, “Incidents/ hazardous situations”, and “Near 
misses”; 
o Events to which an “Equipment cause” (as defined in WOAD) was assigned, and 
also those in which no cause was identified. 
 
Figure I-1. Types of MODUs involved in accidental events 
All descriptions of the events for which no equipment or human cause was provided by 
WOAD were carefully analysed, in order to identify a cause – if possible.  
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I2.2. Consequences of past events and trends over time 
The analysis consisted of a general evaluation of the consequences associated with the 
occurrence of past offshore accidental events, and the identification of trends over 
time. 
Three categories of consequences of past events were considered: 
o Number of fatalities (both crew and 3rd party); 
o Number of injuries (both crew and 3rd party); 
o Cost of damages (when provided). 
Table I-2 summarises the number of fatalities and injuries sustained by workers (crew 
and 3rd party personnel103), sorted by cause of event. Since 1970, the total number of 
workers who died in offshore accidental events is 562, whereas 631 workers were 
injured. Of these 631 injuries, 86% (544) are considered as severe injuries104. 
Table I-2. Total number of fatalities and injuries and cost of damage, sorted by cause 
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*n/p: not provided. 
The vast majority of the fatalities concerned crew members (86.5%), whereas injuries 
sustained by the crew account for 76.9% of the total. 
Most of the fatalities are due either to the category “Unspecified” (43%) or “Weather, 
general”105 (34%). The first category includes miscellaneous events, which makes it 
almost impossible to attribute a unique cause to all the events belonging to that 
                                           
103 Third parties: Individuals, groups of people or companies, other than the principal contracted parties, that 
may be affected by or involved with the project. [Definition by OGP - Report 432 (December 2009)]. 
104  Note that all types of injuries were considered in the category “injuries”. According to the definition 
provided by WOAD, severe injuries are only those which have resulted from the occurrence of an accident. 
105 “Weather, general” refers to events in which the weather played an important role in the occurrence of the 
event, i.e. bad weather conditions were either the main event cause or a factor which contributed to the 
severity of the consequences. 
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category. In this case, the event descriptions in the database were properly analysed in 
order to identify possible causes for such events.  
Analogously to the number of fatalities, also the majority of injuries (55%) belong to 
the “Unspecified” category, followed by the category “Ignition, unknown/ other” (15%). 
The WOAD does not contain all information regarding the total cost of damage 
associated with past events. In most cases, figures were not provided. Therefore, Table 
I-2 only shows the cost of damages (in mln $) that could be calculated from the 
available data106. 
As expected, as for fatalities and injuries, the highest costs of damage are associated 
with the categories “Unspecified” and “Weather, general”. 
The evolution in time of the number of offshore events was also assessed.  
As shown in Figure I-2, the number of all types of offshore events (i.e. accidents, 
incidents, and near misses) increased during the 1970s until the mid-1980s, when a 
continuous decrease occurred up until the mid-1990s. For the periods between 1995-
1999 and 2005-2009, a significant increase in the total number of offshore events is 
noticed. 
 
Figure I-2. Number of offshore accidental events over time: all event types and accidents 
In the case of accidents, however, there was a continuous decrease in the number of 
events from the period 1980-1985 until the time interval 2000-2004 (when a 21.4% 
increase was recorded). After 2010, however, a new decrease in the number of events 
was recorded, perhaps as a consequence of enhanced safety measures (regulatory, 
technological, etc.) taken after the Macondo accident in 2010. 
In detail, a total of 345 events were recorded during 2005-2009. However, as shown in 
Figure I-3, of these events, 103 were accidents, 198 were incidents/hazardous 
situations, and 44 were near misses. In addition, more than half (around 65%) of 
these 345 events (224) were associated with insignificant/no damage, 15.6% 
with minor damages (54), 9.6% with significant damages (33), whereas events 
resulting in severe damages accounted for around 8.7% (30) of the total. Only on three 
occasions there was a total loss of the installation. 
Figure I-4 shows the evolution over time of the proportion (%) of accidents and 
incidents/hazardous situations for all the considered intervals. Note that the percentage 
of accidents over the total number of events which occurred over a certain time interval 
decreased until the late 1990s, then increased again during the period 2000 – 2004. A 
relevant increase has been taking place also since 2010. 
                                           
106 This means that the figures provided provide at least the minimum cost of damage associated to events 
belonging to a specific cause. 
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Figure I-3. Number of offshore accidental events over time, sorted by type 
 
Figure I-4. Percentage of accidents, incidents and near misses over the total events over time 
It seems that, for the most recent years (2010-2013), the total number of events 
decreased, but the proportion of accidents (over the total) which occurred has 
increased. This might then be reflected in an increase in the number of fatalities and 
injuries for that same time interval. However, most of the fatalities and injuries which 
occurred during the period 2010-2013 are due to a very small number of accidents. 
To sum up, it is evident that the offshore oil and gas industry and regulators carried out 
a process of enhancement of procedures, standards and safety systems that led to a 
substantial decrease in the number of accidents since the 1980s up until 2000. New 
technological advancements, updated and enhanced regulations and procedures were 
put in place after the Macondo blow-out in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Finally, Figure I-5 shows the distribution of fatalities and injuries over a 5-year interval. 
It can be noticed that both numbers of fatalities and injuries show similar trends over 
time, i.e.:  
o Fatalities and injuries increased until the period 1980 – 1984, then a decrease in 
these numbers occurred until the period 1990 – 1994; 
o Both fatalities and injuries increased again during the period 1995 – 1999; 
o Then, for the period 2000 – 2004, fatalities increased while injuries decreased: 
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o Since 2005, a continuous increase in the numbers of fatalities and injuries is 
noticed.  
 
Figure I-5. Total number of fatalities and injuries in offshore accidental events over time 
In conclusion, an overall decrease in the number of accidents was noticed from the 
mid-1980s until the year 2000, probably as a result of enhanced safety procedures, 
standards and measures which were put in place after the Piper Alpha accident in 1988. 
However, a continuous increase in the number of accidents was then recorded until 
2010, to drop again after the Macondo accident. 
It is also important to notice the steady increase in the number of fatalities and injuries 
since 1990. However, as will be later explained in Section I2.3.2, this increase is not 
attributable to events caused by equipment failures but rather to accidents involving 
systems and components which do not seem to be covered by EU product safety 
legislation. 
I2.3. Identification of systems, equipment and structural components 
involved 
Before proceeding with the calculation of the number of accidental events involving 
specific systems and equipment, it was important to read all the descriptions provided 
in the WOAD. It must be pointed out that, in many cases, an insufficient description of 
the causes was given, which made it impossible to identify specific equipment, 
structural components or systems. 
I2.3.1. Identification of specific equipment/ components and systems 
In order to perform the analysis in a correct and consistent way, all the categories 
belonging to the equipment causes main category used in the WOAD were studied. 
These categories are summarised in Table I-3. 
While analysing all equipment causes categories, it was extremely important to 
distinguish between events in which: 
o the failure of a specific piece of equipment was the main cause of the accidental 
event; 
o the failure of a specific piece of equipment was a consequence of the accidental 
event, i.e. the failure resulted from the occurrence of a different event, such as a 
hurricane or a severe storm. 
Therefore, for only 213 events out of a total of 1989 analysed events (10.7%) it was 
possible to identify a specific piece of equipment or structural component as the main 
cause of the accidental situation107. Figure I-5 summarizes the results of the analysis of 
213 events with the aim of identifying specific equipment and systems which were 
more frequently involved in offshore accidental events. 
                                           
107 Note that in many cases, “Unspecified equipment failures” were mentioned. 
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It must also be pointed out that, due to insufficiently detailed descriptions, in some 
cases it was only possible to identify the system to which the faulty equipment 
belonged. 
Table I-3. List of equipment/structural components and systems identified and number of events associated 
with them 
Piece of equipment Number of events System involved Total  
Ballast tank 3 Structure 
30 
Bracing (Leg or hull) 4 Structure 
Hull (cracks) 2 Structure 
Leg (Cracks or unspecified) 17 Structure 
Platform pin 1 Structure 
Spud can 2 Structure 
Tubular stem bar 1 Structure 
Anchor cable  3 Anchoring/Mooring/Towing system 
29 
Anchor chain 5 Anchoring/Mooring/Towing system 
Anchor winch braking system  1 Anchoring/Mooring/Towing system 
Anchor winch motor 1 Anchoring/Mooring/Towing system 
Anchor winch 8 Anchoring/Mooring/Towing system 
Mooring line 3 Anchoring/Mooring/Towing system 
Subsea fairleads 1 Anchoring/Mooring/Towing system 
Towline pennant 1 Anchoring/Mooring/Towing system 
Towline 6 Anchoring/Mooring/Towing system 
Unspecified electrical problem 6 Unspecified electric equipment 
18 Unspecified machinery failure 1 Unspecified equipment 
Unspecified failure 11 Unspecified equipment 
Chain 1 Crane – Lifting appliances 
16 
Crane boom – bracings  1 Crane – Lifting appliances 
Crane boom – clutch 1 Crane – Lifting appliances 
Crane boom – wiresling 1 Crane – Lifting appliances 
Crane boom wire 3 Crane – Lifting appliances 
Crane boom 4 Crane – Lifting appliances 
Crane (unspecified failed 
component) 
5 Crane – Lifting appliances 
Elevating rack 1 Elevating system 
13 
Elevating system (unspecified) 12 Elevating system 
Flexible hydraulic hose  4 Pipes for fluids  
11 
Gas line (unspecified) 2 Pipes for fluids 
High pressure line (unspecified) 1 Pipes for fluids 
Lubeoil return line 1 Pipes for fluids 
Oil line 2 Pipes for fluids 
Water hose 1 Pipes for fluids 
Casing joint 1 String/Pipes (Casing system) 
10 Casing 4 String/Pipes (Casing system) 
Crossover sub 1 String/Pipes (Drill string) 
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Drill bit 1 String/Pipes (Drill string) 
Drill string (unspecified) 1 String/Pipes (Drill string) 
Drill string joint 1 String/Pipes (Drill string) 
Tubing 1 String/Pipes (Tubing) 
BOP - Adapter stack 1 BOP equipment 
9 
BOP shear rams 2 BOP equipment 
BOP stack 2 BOP equipment 
BOP (unspecified) 3 BOP equipment 
Diverter valve 1 BOP equipment 
Marine riser 1 Riser/Marine riser 
9 
Riser 2 Riser/Marine riser 
Riser connection 2 Riser/Marine riser 
Slip/Telescopic joint 4 Riser/Marine riser 
Automatic steering system 1 Vessel (not MODU itself) 
9 
Thruster 1 Vessel (not MODU itself) 
Engine (Vessel) 5 Vessel (not MODU itself) 
Propulsion motor + Roller 
bearings 
1 Vessel (not MODU itself) 
Rudder 1 Vessel (not MODU itself) 
Crown-O-Matic system (COM) & 
Kinetic Energy Monitoring System 
(KEMS) 
1 Hoisting and rotary systems 
7 
Derrick head block 1 Hoisting and rotary systems 
Drawwork brake 1 Hoisting and rotary systems 
Drill line 2 Hoisting and rotary systems 
Hoisting system (unspecified) 1 Hoisting and rotary systems 
Wire sheave 1 Hoisting and rotary systems 
AC Switchboard 1 Electric power system 
7 
Electrical generator 2 Electric power system 
Transformer 1 Electric power system 
Electric cable 2 Electric power system 
Circuit breaker 1 Electric power system 
(Lifeboat) hook 1 Lifting gear 
6 
Personnel/work basket 2 Lifting gear 
Chain sling 2 Lifting gear 
Lifting collar 1 Lifting gear 
Azimuth thruster 1 Engine (MODU) 
5 Diesel generator 1 Engine (MODU) 
Engine (unspecified failure) 3 Engine (MODU) 
Derrick (unspecified) 2 Derrick structure 
4 Derrick beam 1 Derrick structure 
Mast 1 Derrick structure 
Drill string compensator 1 
Tensioning and motion compensating 
systems 
4 
Guideline compensator (piston) 1 
Tensioning and motion compensating 
systems 
Marine riser tensioner 1 Tensioning and motion compensating 
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systems 
Heave compensator 1 
Tensioning and motion compensating 
systems 
Casing hanger  1 Wellhead system 
3 Choke manifold 1 Wellhead system 
Wellhead 1 Wellhead system 
Gas separator 1 Separators and Tanks 
3 Heat exchanger 1 Separators and Tanks 
Tank (unspecified) 1 Separators and Tanks 
Hydraulic valve (unspecified) 1 Valves 
3 
Valve (unspecified) 2 Valves 
Fire damper 1 Fire protection 
3 
Fire-fighting system (unspecified) 1 Fire-fighting system 
Fire-fighting system (plugged 
nozzles) 
1 Fire-fighting system 
Elevator 1 Lifting appliances/accessories 
2 
Riser elevator 1 Lifting appliances/accessories 
Air line 1 Air supply/Pneumatic system 
2 
Pneumatic system (unspecified) 1 Air supply/Pneumatic system 
Fingerboard 2 Pipe-handling system 2 
Pump 2 Pumps and compressors 2 
Cement pump 1 Cementing system 1 
DP computer 1 Dynamic Positioning system 1 
Switchboard wiring 1 Communications system 1 
Boiler 1 Generic pressure equipment 1 
Eductor system 1 Eductor system 1 
Propeller shaft seal 1 Propeller 1 
A large number of different pieces of equipment and structural components were 
identified. The type of equipment/structural component that was most frequently 
involved in past accidental situations is the (semi-sub or jack up) leg108, followed by 
unspecified failures of the elevating system’s elements. However, it must be 
pointed out that problems concerning the leg were mostly due to the presence 
of cracks, or due to unspecified reasons. 
Due to the high number of different pieces of equipment or structural components 
identified, the types of equipment identified were also grouped into systems, in an 
attempt to highlight the ones that proved to be most vulnerable in the past (as shown 
in Table I-3). A more detailed analysis of the results of this activity is presented in the 
next section. 
I2.3.2. Analysis of data related to identified specific systems 
As shown in Table I-2, the identified equipment/structural components were also 
                                           
108 It should be noted that legs are not equipment, but rather a structural component of the MODU. In order 
to take into account all parts of a mobile installation, structural components (legs, hull, pontoons, etc.) have 
also been included. It should be pointed out that structural components have no relation with EU product 
safety legislation. 
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assigned a specific system category109. 
Figure I-6 shows the systems which were more frequently involved in past accidental 
events. As can be easily noted, the systems which are predominant are the following: 
o Structure (30 events); 
o Anchoring / Mooring / Towing system (29 events); 
o Unspecified equipment (18 events); 
o Crane (Lifting appliances) (16 events). 
o Elevating system (13 events). 
Figure I-6. MODU systems involved in offshore accidental events (WOAD) 
Figure I-7 shows the evolution over time of the number of events associated to the five 
most involved systems. 
Figure I-7. Number of offshore accidental events over time for the four main categories involved 
The highest number of accidental events was concentrated in the 1980s, for most of 
the systems considered110.  
                                           
109 Categories of systems are described in Section 3. 
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Figure I-8 shows the evolution over time in the number of fatalities and injuries which 
are associated with the 213 events caused by an equipment failure. In detail: 
o A total number of 64 fatalities were calculated, which account for only around 11% 
of the total 562 fatalities recorded; 
o A total number of 188 injuries were calculated, which account for 30% of the total 
631 injuries recorded. 
 
Figure I-8. Total number of fatalities and injuries over time in offshore events due to equipment failures 
Most of the fatalities occurred during the 1970s and 1980s, as already detected from 
the analysis of fatalities for the whole data sample (see Section I2.2). Fifteen fatalities 
were also registered more recently (2000 – 2004). Almost all fatalities related to this 
period (11) are linked to just one event, i.e. the total loss of a semi-submersible 
platform in South America, after the occurrence of fires and explosions, apparently due 
to pressurisation problems which resulted from the blockage of a fire damper. 
On the contrary, the highest number of injuries (94) occurred during the period 2010 – 
2013. At a closer look, most of these injuries (90) occurred during only one event, the 
tilting of a jack up (under construction in South East Asia) due to the failure of the 
elevating system. 
The following pie-charts (Figure I-9) illustrate which types of equipment/ structural 
components form the categories “Structure” and “Anchoring/ Mooring/ Towing system”, 
respectively. 
Figure I-9. Types of equipment involved in the “Structure” category and Types of equipment involved in the 
“Anchoring / Mooring / Towing system”. 
It should be pointed out that most of the components of these two systems111 
can barely be considered as “equipment”. Therefore, it seems that specific 
                                                                                                                                 
110 However, the numbers of events considered are not statistically representative. 
111 Anchoring/ Mooring/ Towing system and Structure. 
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equipment which might fall within the scope of EU product safety legislation is not 
among the most involved, as resulted from the analysis of past accidents recorded in 
the WOAD database. 
In addition, a deeper analysis of the events involving the two aforementioned systems 
was performed, in order to retrieve data regarding the number of fatalities, injuries and 
total cost of damages associated with such events. Results are shown in the next 
Section. 
I2.3.3. Consequences of events and trends over time for the most involved systems 
As explained in Section I2.3.2, the systems which were more frequently involved in 
offshore accidental events are: 
o Structure;  
o Anchoring/ Mooring/ Towing system. 
Table I-4 and Table I-5 provide information on the total number of fatalities and 
injuries, as well as the total cost of damage associated to the events in which the two 
systems were involved. 
Table I-4. Fatalities, injuries and cost of damage associated with the “Structure” system 
Table I-5. Fatalities, injuries and cost of damage associated with the “Anchoring/Mooring/Towing” system 
Structure system 
Time 
period 
Number of 
events 
% of the 
total 
Fatalities Injuries 
Associated cost of 
damage (if provided) 
[mln $] 
1970 - 
1979 
8 26.7 10 8 18.8 
1980 - 
1989 
10 33.3 2 4 2.2 
1990 - 
1999 
4 13.3 0 0 n/p 
2000 - 
2009 
6 20.0 0 0 n/p 
2010 - 
2013 
2 6.7 0 1 n/p 
Total 30 100 12 13 21.0 
Anchoring / Mooring / Towing system 
Time 
period 
Number of 
events % of the total Fatalities Injuries 
Associated cost of 
damage (if provided) 
[mln $] 
1970 - 
1979 
4 13.8 0 0 4 
1980 - 
1989 
14 48.3 1 7 25.77 
1990 - 
1999 
4 13.8 0 0 N/P 
2000 - 
2009 
5 17.2 0 2 N/P 
2010 - 
2013 
2 6.9 0 0 N/P 
Total 29 100 1 9 29.77 
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 For both systems, the highest number of events was registered during the 1980s, i.e. 
10 for the “Structure” system (33.3%), and 14 for “Anchoring/ Mooring/ Towing” 
system (48.3% of the total events). 
The total number of fatalities associated with the “Structure” system is twelve (12). 
However, it should be noted that all fatalities had occurred before 1990 (and most of 
them even during the 1970s). No fatality related to this system had occurred since then 
(i.e. until mid-2013). 
Only one fatality was registered for the “Anchoring/ Mooring/ Towing” system; also in 
this case, this death occurred during the 1980s. 
Thirteen (13) injuries were recorded for the “Structure” system. Similarly to the case of 
fatalities, the majority of these injuries happened during the 1970s and 1980s. One 
only injury has been recorded since 1990.  
In the case of the “Anchoring/ Mooring/ Towing” system, most of the injuries (seven 
out of nine) occurred during the 1980s, whereas the remaining two injuries occurred 
during the period 2000-2009. 
Finally, the highest cost of damage was sustained during the 1970s for the “Structure” 
system, and during the 1980s for the “Anchoring/ Mooring/ Towing” system. 
Due to the fact that the most involved systems are associated with relatively low 
numbers of fatalities and injuries, it seemed appropriate to investigate if other systems 
were related to higher numbers of fatalities and injuries. 
The results of this small analysis are shown in Table I-6 and Table I-7. 
Table I-6. Types of systems associated with the highest numbers of fatalities 
Type of system involved Number of fatalities 
Structure 12 
Fire protection system 11 
Crane (Lifting appliances) 7 
Lifting gear 5 
Table I-7. Types of systems associated with the highest numbers of injuries 
Type of system involved Number of injuries 
Elevating system 93 
Pipes for fluids 19 
Structure 13 
Pumps and compressors 9 
Crane (Lifting appliances) 8 
Note that the highest number of fatalities associated to one single system (12) is due to 
the “Structure” system.  
The second highest number of fatalities is due to the “fire protection system”. In this 
case, all fatalities are linked to one single event, i.e. the total loss of a semi-
submersible in South America due to pressurisation problems which resulted from the 
blockage of a fire damper. 
On the other hand, the highest number of injuries (93) is related to failures of the 
elevating system. Again, as explained in Section I2.3.2, 90 injuries out of 93 were 
caused by one single event in South East Asia. The second system in terms of number 
of injuries is the Pipes for fluids category, which mainly includes failures of pressurised 
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lines. 
In conclusion: 
o The systems which appear to be more frequently involved in accidental events on 
MODUs are the Structure system and the  Anchoring/ Mooring/ Towing system; 
o The Structure system is the most frequently involved system, and it is also the 
system associated with the highest number of fatalities. However, these fatalities 
account for only 2% of the total recorded fatalities. Injuries due to structural 
failures account for 14.7% of the total recorded injuries, but almost all of these 
injuries are due to one single event112;  
o Concerning events caused by failure of the Anchoring/ Mooring/ Towing system, 
only one fatality was recorded, along with a small number of injuries (9), most of 
which occurred during the 1980s; 
o It seems that no specific piece of equipment which might fall within the scope of EU 
product safety legislation could be considered as more often the cause of offshore 
accidental events. 
I2.3.4. Considerations on the trends for fatalities and injuries (2010 – 2013) 
As mentioned earlier in Section I2.2, according to the data showed in Figure I-10, it can 
be seen that the number of fatalities and injuries has started to increase again in the 
last 10-15 years. 
Fatalities and injuries which have occurred since 2010 have been analysed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure I-10. Total number of fatalities and injuries in offshore accidental events over time (circled in red: 
2000-2013) 
Of the 77 fatalities recorded in the period 2010–2013, 53 were caused by one accident, 
i.e. the capsize of a jack up in Russian waters in 2011. Two main causes contributed to 
the occurrence of the event, i.e. the unsafe towing of the jack up, and adverse weather 
conditions. No failure of specific equipment was involved. 
Again one single event, i.e. the Macondo blow-out in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010, 
contributed to the overall number of fatalities with 11 deaths. The remaining fatalities 
occurred in a number of other events. 
Concerning injuries, as already explained earlier in the report, 90 injuries out of 122 
are due to the tilting of another jack up, during construction operations, as a result of a 
failure of the elevating system. 
Moreover, the Macondo blow-out also caused 18 injuries among crew and third-party 
personnel. 
Therefore, according to the events analyzed for the period 2010-2013, it appears that 
an increase in the number fatalities is not attributable to the failure of a specific piece 
                                           
112 The tilting of a jack up (under construction) in Southern Asia. 
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of equipment. On the contrary, the increase in the number of injuries might be 
attributed to specific equipment, but most of the injuries were the result of one single 
event. 
I2.3.5. Limitations of the dataset 
The analysis of past events recorded in the WOAD is subject to some data limitations, 
which influence the results shown in the previous sections. In particular, the following 
considerations must be made: 
o In many cases, accidental events had incomplete/ insufficient descriptions, with 
only few details provided. This made it almost impossible to categorize an event in 
terms of failure of equipment or structural component; 
o In a number of cases, the categorization of events was not precise; for instance, an 
event with no fatalities/injuries or damage to the structure could be categorized as 
an “accident”, despite the definition of “accident” used in the database; 
o Similarly, many events’ descriptions were more focused on the consequences of the 
event (e.g. damages to the structural parts of the unit, details on injuries sustained 
by personnel) than on providing information on the causes; 
o WOAD collects information on past events from very different sources, from 
insurance companies and official investigation reports, to newspaper articles. 
Therefore, details contained in the event descriptions might differ significantly 
depending on the available source of information.  
o WOAD attempts to cover worldwide accidents, but there are areas of the world for 
which limited information is available. For these areas, accident data is available 
only for events which have occurred on units owned by private foreign operators 
[10]. 
I3. Analysis of WOAD major accidents and comparison with data 
from OGP 
For the sake of completeness, the results of an analysis performed on WOAD accident 
information by the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers were examined. 
OGP Report 434-17 “Risk Assessment Data Directory (RADD) – Major 
Accidents” was published in 2010 with the aim of providing information on past major 
accidents in both the onshore and offshore oil and gas sectors, to serve as background 
for QRA studies, with particular focus on the relative frequency of occurrence of a range 
of incident types [10]. 
For the purposes of their analysis, the WOAD database was used, which covered data 
on accidents which had occurred during the period 1970-2007. In addition, only major 
accidents were analysed. 
According to OGP, a major accident is defined as an accident resulting in at least one 
of the following: 
o multiple fatalities; 
o total loss or severe damage (for offshore units); 
o 1000 barrels of oil spilt. 
The terms total loss and severe damage were defined as by WOAD. 
Of particular interest to the present report are OGP’s results concerning the number of 
accidents associated to severe damage or total loss of the unit, sorted by main event. 
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Starting from this information, the following table (Table I-7) was completed to show 
the number of accidents which occurred on all types of installations, worldwide, 
associated with the highest levels of damage and sorted by type of event. Due sets 
of data are displayed: 
o data from OGP report, for the period 1970-2007; 
o data from the JRC study, for the period 1970-2013 (use of the updated version of 
WOAD). 
It must also be pointed out that – for the purpose of this small additional analysis - the 
accidents considered were not categorised according to the operation mode at the time 
of the event. Therefore, accidents related to operational and maintenance errors were 
also taken into account113.  
From Table I-7, it can be noticed that the numbers provided by WOAD in 2007 and 
2013 for the categories “Loss of buoyancy or sinking” and “Other” are considerably 
different (*). In the first case, the number of events decreases from 140 (OGP) to 73 
(JRC), whereas in the latter the opposite occurs, i.e. from 0 (OGP) to 83 (JRC). This can 
only be explained by a change in the definition of the accident categories made by 
WOAD between 2007 and 2013.  
Of all main event categories listed in the table, only one-third of them might be related 
to an extension of scopes of EU product safety legislation, as highlighted in Table I-8. 
                                           
113 As opposed to the main accident analysis, which aimed at identifying events due to the failure of specific 
types of equipment. 
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Table I-8. Number of accidents by type of event and level of damage [Sources: OGP and WOAD] 
OGP Data JRC Data OGP Data JRC Data 
Events 
resulting in 
severe 
damage 
Events 
resulting in 
severe 
damage 
Events resulting 
in total loss 
Events resulting 
in total loss 
Anchoring/Mooring 
failure 
0 0 0 0 
Blow-out 6 7 2 4 
Breakage or fatigue 93 98 12 13 
Capsize, overturn or 
toppling 
189 191 73 73 
Collision, non-offshore 
units 
42 43 18 18 
Collision, offshore 
units 
24 27 14 15 
Crane accident 0 0 0 0 
Explosion 10 10 0 0 
Falling loads/objects 13 14 1 1 
Fire 86 89 40 42 
Loss of buoyancy or 
sinking 
33 36 140* 73* 
Grounding 21 22 10 10 
Helicopter accident 0 0 0 1 
Leakage into hull 5 5 3 3 
List or uncontrolled 
inclination 
14 17 4 5 
Machinery/propulsion 
failure 
0 0 0 0 
Other 40 41 0* 83* 
Out of position, adrift 2 3 0 0 
Release of fluid or gas  122 128 1 1 
Towline failure 3 3 0 0 
Well problem, no 
blow-out 
0 0 0 0 
Total 703 734 318 342 
Table I-9 summarises the number of events which have occurred globally on all types 
of unit since 1970 in the offshore oil and gas sector, and have led to at least severe 
damages to the unit. 
The following considerations can be made: 
o according to the data from OGP, only 237 out of 703 accidents (33.7%) associated 
with severe damages to the unit could be due to failure of equipment which might 
fall within the scope of EU product safety legislation; 
o this percentage of events is the same even according to the more updated data 
from the JRC (due to availability of data until mid-2013); 
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o in case of total loss, the percentage of accidents which might be traced back to 
causes that an extension of scope of the three EU Directives could address is: 
• 13.8%, according to data from OGP (i.e. WOAD: 1970-2007); 
• 14%, according to data from JRC (i.e. WOAD: 1970-2013). 
Also in this case, no major differences in the two datasets were encountered. 
Table I-9. Number of accidents sorted by category of event (related to extension of scope of EU Directives) 
OGP Data JRC Data OGP Data JRC Data 
Events 
resulting in 
severe 
damage 
Events 
resulting in 
severe 
damage 
Events 
resulting in 
total loss 
Events 
resulting in 
total loss 
Blow-out 6 7 2 4 
Crane accident 0 0 0 0 
Explosion 10 10 0 0 
Falling loads/objects 13 14 1 1 
Fire 86 89 40 42 
Machinery/propulsion 
failure 
0 0 0 0 
Release of fluid or gas 122 128 1 1 
Total 237 248 44 48 
I4. Summary of Statistical analysis of offshore accidents and 
incidents on MODUs 
The present annex describes the results of the statistical analysis performed on past 
offshore accidental events, with the aim of identifying – if possible – specific types of 
equipment, structural components, and systems which were more frequently involved 
in accidental events on mobile installations, and to acquire information on the 
consequences of such events, in terms of fatalities, injuries and cost of damages. 
Information on the analysed past events was provided by the Worldwide Offshore 
Accident Databank (WOAD), operated by DNV GL. 
The analysis was carried out in support of a study on the socio-economic and 
environmental impacts of including MODUs equipment into the EU product safety 
legislation, i.e. 
o ATEX Directive (Directive 2014/34/EU - 96/9/EC); 
o Machinery Directive (Directive 2006/42/EC); 
o Pressure Equipment Directive (Directive 2014/68/EU – 97/23/EC). 
Such study is currently being carried out by the Joint Research Centre in collaboration 
with the Directorate General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs 
(DG GROW). 
The results of the analysis showed that the systems which were more frequently 
involved in past offshore accidental situations are the following: 
o Structure;  
o Anchoring / Mooring/Towing system; 
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o Unspecified equipment; 
o Elevating system; 
o Crane (Lifting appliances). 
It seems then that failures of specific pieces of equipment which might fall within the 
scope of EU product safety legislation did not account for a substantial proportion of 
events, compared to other causes of analysed events. In addition, it must be pointed 
out that – due to the limitations in the dataset used (i.e. WOAD) – it was not possible 
to make a distinction between the failures of pieces of equipment/systems due to 
design faults and unsafe system components, and those which were due, for instance, 
to lack of maintenance or improper use of the equipment, which might suggest 
procedural deficiencies.  
Structural components of MODUS, in particular semi-sub and jack up legs, were found 
to be more involved in accidental situations. However, it must be pointed out that 
problems concerning legs were mostly due to the presence of cracks, or due to 
unspecified reasons. 
It must also be pointed out that the numbers of events involving specific equipment 
could not be considered statistically representative. 
Moreover, it appeared that the highest number of accidents occurred during the period 
1980-1989, followed by a decrease in the following decades. This is most probably the 
result of new legislation, procedures, standards and technological advancements which 
took place after the Piper Alpha accident in 1988. Even though Piper Alpha was a fixed 
platform, the whole offshore sector benefitted from the improvements introduced to 
enhance offshore safety, including MODUs. However, a new increase in the number of 
accidents was noticed in the late 2000s, just before the Macondo accident in 2010. Due 
to the fact that accident data are available only until 2013, it is still too early to identify 
any trend in the occurrence of events as a result of new implemented post-Macondo 
measures. 
Finally, an evaluation of the total number of fatalities, injuries and cost of damage was 
also performed, in order to calculate the figures related to the failure of specific 
systems, types of equipment and structural components.  
It was noticed that the highest numbers in terms of fatalities and injuries occurred 
during the period 1980-1989, with a significant drop in the following decade (1990-
1999). These numbers have begun to increase again since 2000. However, according to 
the events analysed for the period 2010-2013, it appears that an increase in the 
number fatalities is not attributable to the failure of specific equipment. On the 
contrary, the increase in the number of injuries might be attributed to specific 
equipment, but most of the injuries were the result of one single event. 
The most involved system, i.e. Structure, is also the one with the highest number of 
fatalities. However, these account for only 2% of the total recorded fatalities. Injuries 
due to structural failures account for 14.7% of the total recorded injuries, but almost all 
of these injuries are due to one single event. Failures of the Anchoring/ Mooring/ 
Towing system are associated with only one fatality and with a small number of 
injuries, most of which have occurred during the 1980s. 
For the sake of completeness, the present statistical analysis was integrated with the 
results of an analysis performed on WOAD accident information by the International 
Association of Oil and Gas Producers were examined. To this aim, data from OGP 
Report 434-17 “Risk Assessment Data Directory (RADD) – Major Accidents” 
(2010) was used. Again, the WOAD database was used, but in this case only data on 
accidents which had occurred during the period 1970-2007 were available. Only major 
accidents (as defined by OGP) were analysed, and conclusions were drawn concerning 
the number of past major accidents sorted by type of main event (e.g. fire, explosion). 
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The main conclusions of this small additional analysis – also compared with the results 
from the JRC - were the following: 
o according to the data from OGP, only 237 out of 703 accidents (33.7%) associated
with severe damages to the unit could be due to failure of equipment which might
fall within the scope of EU product safety legislation;
o this percentage of events is the same even according to the more updated data
from the JRC (due to availability of data until mid-2013);
o in case of total loss, the percentage of accidents which might be traced back to
causes that an extension of scope of the three EU Directives could address is
13.8%, according to data from OGP (i.e. WOAD: 1970-2007) and 14%, according
to data from JRC (i.e. WOAD: 1970-2013).Also in this case, no major differences in
the two datasets were encountered.
In conclusion, from the results of the statistical analyses it is not possible to state that 
there is a safety issue related to the non-extension of the existing product safety 
legislation to MODUs, but it is also not possible to exclude it. 
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List of abbreviations 
• ABS - American Bureau of Shipping 
• ALARP - As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
• ATEX - Directive 2014/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
February 2014 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
equipment and protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive 
atmospheres (recast) Text with EEA relevance  
• API – American Petroleum Institute  
• ASME - American Society of Mechanical Engineers  
• BOP – Blow-out Preventer  
• BP British Petroleum - company  
• BS - British Standards  
• CAGR - Compound Annual Growth Rate  
• CE - originated as an abbreviation of Conformité Européenne, meaning European 
Conformity  
• CEN – European Committee for Standardization  
• CENELEC - European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization  
• CSA - Canadian Standards Association  
• DG - Direcorate General  
• DNV GL - Det Norske Veritas Germanischer Lloyd – private Certification Body and 
classification society  
• E&P - Exploration and Production  
• EC – European Commission  
• ECSA - European Community Shipowners’ Association  
• EHSR – Essential Health and Safety Requirements ç 
• EN - European harmonised standards – CEN/CENELEC  
• EPA - US Environmental Protection Agency  
• EPC - Engineering, Procurement, and Construction  
• EPCI - Engineering, Procurement, Construction, and Installation  
• EU – European Union  
• EU/EEA - European Union/European Economic Area  
• FLNG - Floating Liquefied Natural Gas  
• FPS - Floating Production System  
• GOST - Russian standards  
• HSE - UK Health and Safety Executive  
• HWU – Hydraulic Workover snubbing Unit 
• IACS – International Association of Classification Societies 
• IADC - International Association of Drilling Contractors  
• IEC - International Electrotechnical Commission  
• IEEE- Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
• IMCA - International Marine Contractors Association  
• IMO – International Maritime Organization  
• IP - Code, International Protection Marking, IEC standard 60529, sometimes 
interpreted as Ingress Protection Marking  
• ISO – International Standardization Organisation  
• LMRP - Lower Marine Riser Package 
• LNG - Liquefied Natural Gas  
• LR - Lloyd Register of Shipping 
• MD - Directive 2006/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
May 2006 on machinery, and amending Directive 95/16/EC (recast) (Text with EEA 
relevance)  
• MODU – Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit  
• NB - Notified Body  
• NORSOK – Norwegian Standards  
• NPD - Norwegian Petroleum Directorate  
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• NSA - Norwegian Shipowners' Association  
• O&G - Oil and Gas  
• OEMs - Original Equipment Manufacturers  
• Offshore Directive - Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 June 2013 on safety of offshore oil and gas operations and amending 
Directive 2004/35/EC Text with EEA relevance 
• PDVSA - Petroleum of Venezuela - company  
• PED - Directive 2014/68/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
May 2014 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the 
making available on the market of pressure equipment (recast) Text with EEA 
relevance  
• PSDs – European Product Safety Directives (ATEX, MD and PED) 
• PTIL (PSA) - Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority  
• RCD- Recreational Craft Directive 
• RO - Recognized Organizations 
• SEA - Ships and Maritime Equipment Association  
• SECS – Safety and Environmentally Critical Systems 
• SOLAS – International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
• SSM - Dutch State Supervision of Mines  
• UK - United Kingdom  
• UL - type of certification - private organization  
• US - United States of America  
• WBEs - Well Barrier Elements 
• WOAD - Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank 
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